By: Azhar Azam
The NATO summit in Ankara was expected to showcase allied solidarity after European nations agreed to a historic increase in defense spending. Instead, it ended with President Donald Trump intensifying his criticism of the transatlantic alliance.
Beyond burden-sharing, he lambasted European allies for declining to support US military campaign against Iran, arguing that the United States had spent decades underwriting Europe's security. Having long pressed Europe to spend more on defense, Trump now appears to measure allied loyalty by support for US-led military operations.
Trump's assumption rests on a premise that European allies benefitting from US security guarantees are also supposed to fight America’s wars. But that was never the bargain Nato struck in 1949. Although the alliance's role has evolved to crisis management, its core purpose remains safeguarding the freedom and security of its members, a commitment Europe has largely fulfilled.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Nato for the first and only time in its history invoked Article 5. Europe fought alongside the United States in Afghanistan for two decades, treating an attack on America as an attack on itself.
While Washington by far had the largest casualties in absolute terms, The United Kingdom lost 457 troops, Canada more than 150 and France 90. Germany, Italy and other countries also suffered significant casualties. Some European countries with much smaller populations than the US lost almost as many troops in relative terms. Denmark – facing intense pressure from Trump to cede its semi-autonomous region of Greenland to the US – recorded one of the coalition's highest per-capita fatality rates.
The 2003 Iraq War exposed deep political rifts; it did not represent European abandonment. Britain, Italy, Poland, Denmark and several other Nato allies joined the US-led “coalition of the willing,” while France and Germany opposed the invasion. The failure to find the alleged weapons of mass destruction later vindicated much of the skepticism surrounding the war. Yet those disagreements neither fractured Nato nor prevented its members from fighting together against the Islamic State.
Trump has long chastised European allies of freeloading on US military power, while failing to invest adequately in their own defense. In response, Nato members at last year's Hague summit agreed to dramatically increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, the alliance's most ambitious spending pledge to date.
European nations have since accelerated military procurement, expanded defense-industrial production and assumed greater responsibility for protecting the continent. Nato officials now acknowledge European allies have filled almost all the gaps left by US reductions to the Nato Force Model.
The summit showed that the debate has shifted the focus from burden-sharing to Nato’s purpose. During the US military campaign against Tehran, Trump criticized European allies for refusing to deploy naval assets to secure the Strait of Hormuz, which many European governments reckoned lay outside Nato's defensive mandate. Unlike Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks or the defense of Nato's eastern flank, they viewed attacks on Tehran as a discretionary military operation rather than an allied responsibility. Their reluctance reflected not anti-Americanism but a different understanding of Nato’s purpose.
So far, Trump has judged allied commitment by defense spending. Europe responded by committing to the higher spending target. The real issue emerging from the Ankara summit is whether Nato remains a collective-defense alliance or it is an organization whose members are expected to support US-led military operations beyond the alliance's traditional remit.
For more than seven decades, Nato has endured because its focus remained on defending against common threats without requiring its members to support every military campaign undertaken by another ally. This principle allowed the alliance to survive differences over the past conflicts without losing sight of its central mission.
Trump may expect Europe to shoulder a greater share of Nato's defense burden. But alliance solidarity cannot be measured by participation in every US-led military campaign. If this becomes the new benchmark of allied loyalty, Nato risks blurring the distinction between collective defense and collective intervention that has sustained the alliance through decades of political disagreement.
July 10, 2026
June 24, 2026
China is a both solution to–and a constraint on–global energy transition
 |
| Credit: ChatGPT |
China’s rise as the world’s leading producer of clean-energy technologies is one of the most contentious issues in global trade. The United States and European Union (EU) in particular regard Beijing’s dominance in solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) as a source of industrial vulnerability and strategic dependence.
Yet the overcapacity triggering these concerns is also accelerating the global clean-energy transition by making these technologies cheaper and more widely available as reflected in global trade of clean-tech products that reached an estimated $479 billion in 2025.
Much of this trade has been driven by China's production surplus. In sectors such as EVs, Beijing’s manufacturing has outstripped domestic demand, putting downward pressure on global prices. These cost declines have, in turn, supported faster electrification the world over.
The impact of falling costs is reciprocated in affordability – one of the main constraints on decarbonization. For many emerging and developing economies, limited fiscal space is the major barrier to energy transition. As prices drop, lower-cost imports have expanded their access to clean technologies.
Trade restrictions have a little effect. Rather than curbing China’s clean-energy exports, tariffs and industrial-policy tools introduced by the United States and Europe appear to have redirected a growing share of trade flows toward developing markets.
In many cases, this transition is enabled by Chinese manufacturing capacity. From EVs in Ethiopia to discounted solar panels in Pakistan, China’s industrial scale and overcapacity have lowered costs across many developing economies, contributing to global emissions reductions.
At the same time, volatility in global fossil-fuel markets could add momentum to electrification, prompting import-dependent countries across Africa and Asia-Pacific to diversify their energy mix and increase investment in renewable energy resources.
The International Energy Agency expects energy-sector investment to rise by around 5% to about $3.4 trillion in 2026, despite geopolitical and economic uncertainty. Roughly two-thirds of this capital is projected to go into renewables, nuclear power, grids, storage, low-emission fuels and energy-efficiency technologies.
Looking further ahead, it forecasts total energy investment to reach $3.7 trillion by 2035, with much of the growth concentrated in emerging and developing economies outside China. This indicates that clean energy is seen as a climate imperative as well as a means to bolster economic resilience and supporting development.
As clean-energy investment expands, China's dominance is perceived differently across regions. Advanced economies associate Beijing’s scale with industrial overcapacity; many developing economies view it as an opportunity to gain access to clean technologies at lower costs.
For instance, solar deployment in the EU has grown strongly in recent years, but the bloc still relies heavily on China for solar panels and key upstream inputs.
The same pattern is emerging in EV batteries. The EU efforts to restructure and localize production have eased some overcapacity risks; they have increased reliance on Chinese battery suppliers. As China continues to advance technologically, pressure is building on Brussels to amplify production in strategically important sectors while maintaining affordability.
This creates a policy trade-off for Europe. Greater industrial autonomy would strengthen long-term supply-chain resilience but is likely to raise costs and slow the pace of decarbonization. By contrast, continued reliance on China sustains faster deployment, yet leaves Europe exposed to ongoing dependencies.
The United States faces a similar challenge. Despite tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act and industrial-policy support for clean-tech production, China accounts for the majority of global clean-tech manufacturing capacity. Washington is scaling deployment in areas such as battery storage, emerging as second to Beijing. Still, as CSIS analysis highlights, expansion in downstream segments does not resolve upstream constraints such as limited domestic reserves and critical mineral processing capacity, limiting the scope of full self-sufficiency.
India follows a different but related trajectory. Its renewable energy installed capacity has expanded quickly. However, the scale gap with China is substantial. This is further evident in deployment where Beijing added 315.1 gigawatt (GW) of solar capacity versus New Delhi's 37 GW.
China’s clean-tech overcapacity has become an essential feature of the global energy transition. While criticized as trade distortion, it has contributed to significant cost reductions in solar, battery and EV technologies, accelerating their adoption across developing, emerging and advanced economies.
Yet, the same concentration that drives lower costs in clean technologies also generates structural vulnerabilities, increasing exposure of importing economies to supply-chain disruption, geopolitical friction, and industrial dependence, as reflected in policy responses from Brussels and Washington.
As demand for clean technologies surges globally, their supply remains highly concentrated in China, with advanced economies seeking to reduce reliance through industrial policy whereas developing and emerging economies prioritizing affordability and deployment.
Beijing’s role in the global energy transition is unlikely to diminish in the near term. For Western policymakers, the challenge is not simply to reduce reliance on Chinese clean technologies, but to strengthen energy security without undermining the pace of electrification.
June 20, 2026
The limits of Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor push
By: Azhar Azam
Central Asia is emerging as a critical hinge in the Eurasian trade and energy architecture. As Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted northern routes and instability in the Middle East exposes vulnerabilities in maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, demand for overland alternatives has accelerated.
Once considered secondary to the North Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or the Middle Corridor – linking China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus – has become a crucial artery. It is now widely viewed as a diversification pathway by countries seeking to reduce exposure to geopolitical risks.
For Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor presents both an opportunity and a test. If managed effectively, the route can diversify the country’s economy beyond hydrocarbons and cement its role as a regional logistics hub. Otherwise, Astana may remain merely a transit passage for bigger markets without substantial economic and development gains.
A 2023 World Bank report found the Corridor was unlikely to replace the northern route as a land connectivity option, acknowledging the transport link had already captured a limited share of transcontinental trade and could expand further if key bottlenecks were addressed. The study also highlighted its developmental relevance for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia by helping them to reduce reliance on a narrow set of export partners and low-value complexity commodities.
This paper gains a renewed importance as global trade navigates a complex global environment, where infrastructure isn’t solely a means of moving goods efficiently; it’s a tool to strengthen economic resilience and competitiveness.
Despite its potential, the Corridor’s performance is constrained by infrastructure gaps, non-harmonized border procedures and uneven logistics capacity across participating states. These factors curtail its ability to function as an integrated alternative to northern and maritime routes.
To overcome these obstacles, development finance institutions have stepped in with significant financing, including World Bank-backed investments in rail connectivity in Türkiye, greenfield railway line between Mointy and Kyzylzhar, and highway reconstruction in Kazakhstan. These investments reflect institutional confidence in the Corridor’s ability to boost regional connectivity and sustain economic diversification.
Momentum is already building. Freight volumes along the corridor have tripled over the past five years, supported by investments in ports, railways and logistics infrastructure. By upgrading east-west transport capacity and modernizing logistics systems, Astana is positioning itself at the center of this transformation both as a transit state and a strategic Eurasian logistics hub.
The success of this strategy depends not only on rising freight volumes but also on whether infrastructure investment generates inclusive and sustainable economic benefits, contributing to domestic and regional development.
Backed by the World Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, modernization of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy – the national railway operator – focuses on tariff reform, institutional restructuring, divestment of non-core assets, separation of infrastructure from freight and passenger operations and greater private participation in rail transport.
Yet without consistent implementation by policymakers, growing transit volumes may not produce lasting economic benefits, leaving Kazakhstan primarily a transit passage than a more integrated part of regional supply chains.
Astana is simultaneously diversifying its external partnerships. It is pursuing a close engagement with the US across energy, transport and investment alongside deepening ties with China and continued cooperation with Europe to avoid dependence on a single bloc. While this multi-vector approach elevates Kazakhstan’s strategic relevance; it could turn Central Asia into a theater of great-power rivalry, with implications for its own and regional development agenda.
China’s economic footprint reinforces this trend. Trade between Beijing and Central Asia has reached record levels, supported by investment in transport infrastructure, logistics nodes and industrial capacity. This helps bolster regional connectivity and economic integration, yet also intensifies competition over transit routes and strategic leverage in the region.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s status as a key Eurasian oil exporter further highlights the importance of non-Gulf supply routes as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz surge. However, diversification remains limited: roughly 80% of the country’s crude exports still move through the Russia-linked Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline, underscoring the need to develop additional corridors.
Globally, trade is being organized around overlapping corridors rather than a single integrated network. As the UN Trade and Development noted earlier this year, geopolitical fragmentation and rising regulatory and logistical pressures are altering supply chains across regions. Its recent assessment warns that non-tariff measures such as regulations, standards and compliance requirements impose higher export costs than tariffs in most economies.
These observations indicate that strategic and national security considerations – not just cost and efficiency – are driving external intervention in the region. For Central Asia, these factors compound existing economic and security challenges as fragmented standards, inconsistent customs procedures and uneven regulatory alignment continue to slow transit and raise costs despite infrastructure investment.
As global uncertainty deepens amid growing US-China competition, efforts are intensifying across the region to establish alternative trade and energy corridors, even as landlocked geography continues to constrain connectivity. Kazakhstan’s role in the Eurasian trade is likely to expand as these shifts take hold. Yet the real question is whether the country can translate this connectivity into genuine economic development for itself and the region or remain just a passage between bigger economies.
Central Asia is emerging as a critical hinge in the Eurasian trade and energy architecture. As Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted northern routes and instability in the Middle East exposes vulnerabilities in maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, demand for overland alternatives has accelerated.
Once considered secondary to the North Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or the Middle Corridor – linking China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus – has become a crucial artery. It is now widely viewed as a diversification pathway by countries seeking to reduce exposure to geopolitical risks.
For Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor presents both an opportunity and a test. If managed effectively, the route can diversify the country’s economy beyond hydrocarbons and cement its role as a regional logistics hub. Otherwise, Astana may remain merely a transit passage for bigger markets without substantial economic and development gains.
A 2023 World Bank report found the Corridor was unlikely to replace the northern route as a land connectivity option, acknowledging the transport link had already captured a limited share of transcontinental trade and could expand further if key bottlenecks were addressed. The study also highlighted its developmental relevance for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia by helping them to reduce reliance on a narrow set of export partners and low-value complexity commodities.
This paper gains a renewed importance as global trade navigates a complex global environment, where infrastructure isn’t solely a means of moving goods efficiently; it’s a tool to strengthen economic resilience and competitiveness.
Despite its potential, the Corridor’s performance is constrained by infrastructure gaps, non-harmonized border procedures and uneven logistics capacity across participating states. These factors curtail its ability to function as an integrated alternative to northern and maritime routes.
To overcome these obstacles, development finance institutions have stepped in with significant financing, including World Bank-backed investments in rail connectivity in Türkiye, greenfield railway line between Mointy and Kyzylzhar, and highway reconstruction in Kazakhstan. These investments reflect institutional confidence in the Corridor’s ability to boost regional connectivity and sustain economic diversification.
Momentum is already building. Freight volumes along the corridor have tripled over the past five years, supported by investments in ports, railways and logistics infrastructure. By upgrading east-west transport capacity and modernizing logistics systems, Astana is positioning itself at the center of this transformation both as a transit state and a strategic Eurasian logistics hub.
The success of this strategy depends not only on rising freight volumes but also on whether infrastructure investment generates inclusive and sustainable economic benefits, contributing to domestic and regional development.
Backed by the World Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, modernization of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy – the national railway operator – focuses on tariff reform, institutional restructuring, divestment of non-core assets, separation of infrastructure from freight and passenger operations and greater private participation in rail transport.
Yet without consistent implementation by policymakers, growing transit volumes may not produce lasting economic benefits, leaving Kazakhstan primarily a transit passage than a more integrated part of regional supply chains.
Astana is simultaneously diversifying its external partnerships. It is pursuing a close engagement with the US across energy, transport and investment alongside deepening ties with China and continued cooperation with Europe to avoid dependence on a single bloc. While this multi-vector approach elevates Kazakhstan’s strategic relevance; it could turn Central Asia into a theater of great-power rivalry, with implications for its own and regional development agenda.
China’s economic footprint reinforces this trend. Trade between Beijing and Central Asia has reached record levels, supported by investment in transport infrastructure, logistics nodes and industrial capacity. This helps bolster regional connectivity and economic integration, yet also intensifies competition over transit routes and strategic leverage in the region.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s status as a key Eurasian oil exporter further highlights the importance of non-Gulf supply routes as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz surge. However, diversification remains limited: roughly 80% of the country’s crude exports still move through the Russia-linked Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline, underscoring the need to develop additional corridors.
Globally, trade is being organized around overlapping corridors rather than a single integrated network. As the UN Trade and Development noted earlier this year, geopolitical fragmentation and rising regulatory and logistical pressures are altering supply chains across regions. Its recent assessment warns that non-tariff measures such as regulations, standards and compliance requirements impose higher export costs than tariffs in most economies.
These observations indicate that strategic and national security considerations – not just cost and efficiency – are driving external intervention in the region. For Central Asia, these factors compound existing economic and security challenges as fragmented standards, inconsistent customs procedures and uneven regulatory alignment continue to slow transit and raise costs despite infrastructure investment.
As global uncertainty deepens amid growing US-China competition, efforts are intensifying across the region to establish alternative trade and energy corridors, even as landlocked geography continues to constrain connectivity. Kazakhstan’s role in the Eurasian trade is likely to expand as these shifts take hold. Yet the real question is whether the country can translate this connectivity into genuine economic development for itself and the region or remain just a passage between bigger economies.
May 31, 2026
Emerging markets are the missing piece in China–U.S. stability
By: Azhar Azam
A White House fact sheet following meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping said the two leaders reached understandings to enhance stability and confidence for businesses and consumers. The document emphasized a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” reflecting recognition of economic interdependence and the need to steady major-power economic ties.
For emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), these signals matter given the macroeconomic backdrop is closely tied to the U.S.–China relationship. Although EMDEs have contributed about 60% of annual global growth, they are highly exposed to debt stress, financial volatility, and external disruptions. These constraints are slowing economic expansion, and critically, limiting investments in health, education and infrastructure amid rising development needs.
After a year of higher trade barriers and elevated uncertainty, global activity faces renewed pressure from the war in the Middle East. According to the International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook, the conflict-induced slower growth and rising inflation are expected to weigh heavily on EMDEs, with commodity-importing countries particularly exposed.
Energy markets are a key transmission channel. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have pushed up oil prices, spiking import costs for energy-dependent economies. Rising energy costs have fed into inflation, widened financial and current-account deficits, and prompted monetary tightening. Governments are likely to respond with higher interest rates or spending cuts, which in turn will stifle growth and deepen instability.
Financial markets accelerate these spillovers. During periods of stress, capital tends to flee toward safe-haven assets, particularly the U.S. dollar. This phenomenon triggers currency depreciation, raises borrowing cost and lowers investment in development priorities such as infrastructure, health and education.
Debt vulnerabilities compound these challenges. Many low- and middle-income countries face heavy debt servicing burdens that constrain fiscal space for development spending. External shocks such as the Iran conflict further narrow fiscal buffers, forcing spending cuts or additional borrowing. This deepens fragility in EMDEs and slows their development trajectories.
The consequences won’t be contained within those countries. If these economies buckle under debt distress, capital flight, and fragmented infrastructure finance–American and Chinese exporters alike will lose markets.
Debt restructuring mirrors the fragmentation of global finance. China is now the largest bilateral creditor to many developing countries; Western economies wield an outsized influence over multilateral financial institutions. As coordination between major economic players becomes more difficult and mechanisms like the G20 Common Framework struggle to deliver – debt crises are likely to prolong, increasing uncertainty and suppressing global demand.
Trade is also being reorganized by geopolitical competition between the United States and China. Supply chains are not contracting; they are rerouted through intermediary economies. This raises compliance costs, reduces transparency and increases prices for consumers around the world. A relatively stable Washington-Beijing relationship could ease these pressures, reducing uncertainty and limiting further fragmentation.
Even in technology, cooperation is possible. The U.S.-China collaboration in areas such as public health, environmental science and basic research shows that engagement can coexist. Export controls alone are unlikely to determine technological leadership. The challenge is to balance safeguards with continued innovation and diffusion.
Despite deep distrust and strategic rivalry, there remains scope for cooperation between Washington and Beijing in areas that directly affect global economic stability. This does not require broad political alignment, rather pragmatic coordination where interests overlap — including energy security, crisis management, and resilience in global supply chains.
Neither the United States nor China can insulate itself from instability abroad. Emerging markets are central to global demand, commodity consumption, manufacturing expansion, and future growth. Instability there will inevitably feed back into both economies through weaker trade, financial volatility and disrupted supply chains.
The defining question is no longer whether fragmentation will shape the global economy — it already does — yet whether it can be managed without exporting disproportionate instability onto more vulnerable economies. Managed fragmentation may still allow strategic competition between major powers, but without coordination on shared risks, it will make the global economy including the two economies more volatile, more uneven, and less predictable.
A White House fact sheet following meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping said the two leaders reached understandings to enhance stability and confidence for businesses and consumers. The document emphasized a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” reflecting recognition of economic interdependence and the need to steady major-power economic ties.
For emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), these signals matter given the macroeconomic backdrop is closely tied to the U.S.–China relationship. Although EMDEs have contributed about 60% of annual global growth, they are highly exposed to debt stress, financial volatility, and external disruptions. These constraints are slowing economic expansion, and critically, limiting investments in health, education and infrastructure amid rising development needs.
After a year of higher trade barriers and elevated uncertainty, global activity faces renewed pressure from the war in the Middle East. According to the International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook, the conflict-induced slower growth and rising inflation are expected to weigh heavily on EMDEs, with commodity-importing countries particularly exposed.
Energy markets are a key transmission channel. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have pushed up oil prices, spiking import costs for energy-dependent economies. Rising energy costs have fed into inflation, widened financial and current-account deficits, and prompted monetary tightening. Governments are likely to respond with higher interest rates or spending cuts, which in turn will stifle growth and deepen instability.
Financial markets accelerate these spillovers. During periods of stress, capital tends to flee toward safe-haven assets, particularly the U.S. dollar. This phenomenon triggers currency depreciation, raises borrowing cost and lowers investment in development priorities such as infrastructure, health and education.
Debt vulnerabilities compound these challenges. Many low- and middle-income countries face heavy debt servicing burdens that constrain fiscal space for development spending. External shocks such as the Iran conflict further narrow fiscal buffers, forcing spending cuts or additional borrowing. This deepens fragility in EMDEs and slows their development trajectories.
The consequences won’t be contained within those countries. If these economies buckle under debt distress, capital flight, and fragmented infrastructure finance–American and Chinese exporters alike will lose markets.
Debt restructuring mirrors the fragmentation of global finance. China is now the largest bilateral creditor to many developing countries; Western economies wield an outsized influence over multilateral financial institutions. As coordination between major economic players becomes more difficult and mechanisms like the G20 Common Framework struggle to deliver – debt crises are likely to prolong, increasing uncertainty and suppressing global demand.
Trade is also being reorganized by geopolitical competition between the United States and China. Supply chains are not contracting; they are rerouted through intermediary economies. This raises compliance costs, reduces transparency and increases prices for consumers around the world. A relatively stable Washington-Beijing relationship could ease these pressures, reducing uncertainty and limiting further fragmentation.
Even in technology, cooperation is possible. The U.S.-China collaboration in areas such as public health, environmental science and basic research shows that engagement can coexist. Export controls alone are unlikely to determine technological leadership. The challenge is to balance safeguards with continued innovation and diffusion.
Despite deep distrust and strategic rivalry, there remains scope for cooperation between Washington and Beijing in areas that directly affect global economic stability. This does not require broad political alignment, rather pragmatic coordination where interests overlap — including energy security, crisis management, and resilience in global supply chains.
Neither the United States nor China can insulate itself from instability abroad. Emerging markets are central to global demand, commodity consumption, manufacturing expansion, and future growth. Instability there will inevitably feed back into both economies through weaker trade, financial volatility and disrupted supply chains.
The defining question is no longer whether fragmentation will shape the global economy — it already does — yet whether it can be managed without exporting disproportionate instability onto more vulnerable economies. Managed fragmentation may still allow strategic competition between major powers, but without coordination on shared risks, it will make the global economy including the two economies more volatile, more uneven, and less predictable.
May 23, 2026
ABAC meeting charts course for Asia-Pacific stability amid global trade turmoil
By: Azhar Azam
Lead: As the United States doubles down on tariffs and trade barriers, business leaders from across the Asia-Pacific are looking to China to hold the line on open markets.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Advisory Council (ABAC) concluded its meeting in Mexico City recently, with a strong and unified call to restore stability in global trade. The event brought together some 200 business leaders and policymakers from China and 20 other APEC economies – collectively representing about 60% of global GDP – who urged bold, coordinated action to safeguard long-term prosperity across the region.
Delegates expressed deep concerns over mounting pressures on the global economy, including energy market volatility, persistent supply chain disruptions, rising trade and investment restrictions, and growing food security risks. Long-term growth, they said, depends on open markets and the adoption of digital and green infrastructure.
In response, ABAC outlined priority actions: accelerating progress toward the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), strengthening supply chain resilience, investing in trade and logistics infrastructure and reducing non-tariff barriers to food trade. The measures, members said, are necessary to stabilize trade flows and bolster the region's capacity to absorb external shocks.
The outcomes of the meeting reflected a convergence on restoring stability and predictability to the global economy, reviving growth momentum and reinforcing the foundations of regional economic cooperation. Delegates conveyed a shared concern that increasing fragmentation, supply shocks and policy uncertainty are eroding confidence and constraining economic activity across the Asia-Pacific.
To address these threats, members called for advancing early deliverables and harmonized trade rules and regulatory frameworks, enhancing transparency, reducing trade barriers, establishing permanent ban on tariffs for digital products and promoting the responsible use of artificial intelligence. The measures aim to boost cross-border trade and investment, laying the groundwork for a more inclusive Asia-Pacific.
In a world dominated by steeply rising protectionism and unilateralism, ABAC has set out a strategic direction for the region. Launched in February, its 2026 work program under the theme “Openness, Connectivity and Synergy” reaffirms its commitment to open markets, regional integration and collaborative innovation.
Openness, anchored in trade and investment liberalization, and stronger connectivity protect economic expansion by fortifying supply chain stability, regional linkages and people-to-people exchanges. Synergy serves as the driver of innovation and sustainable development, enabling economies to collectively harness technological change and translate it into more buoyant growth for economies in the region.
A consensus also emerged on a rules-based, open-market approach with resilience built through robust supply chains, improved connectivity and greater transparency. The meeting also emphasized trade facilitation and digital modernization, such as paperless systems and interoperable regulatory frameworks, alongside closer alignment between the business community and policymakers. This implied an implementation-focused agenda to improve the efficiency of the regional economy.
The meeting sent positive signals for shoring up cooperation across the Asia-Pacific, with the council releasing statements on FTAAP progress and renewing its commitment to the APEC Connectivity Blueprint.
In line with the Ichma Statement, the council outlined parallel strategies to accelerate the FTAAP, combining near-term steps with longer-term structural reforms. The approach reflects a focus on translating existing mechanisms into coordinated action, reinforced by a commitment to a connectivity framework spanning physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages — aimed at enabling seamless regional flows of trade, services and talent.
ABAC is widely regarded as a key mechanism for translating complex geopolitical shifts and evolving business conditions into actionable recommendations. Feedback from the recent session underscored a shared sense of urgency for decisive action to restore stability in global trade to ensure policies remain grounded in economic realities.
Representatives from participating economies and organizations similarly view the forum as a key bridge between government priorities and business execution while expecting ABAC to place greater emphasis on technology and innovation integration, particularly the widening AI and digital divide. This elevates ABAC from an advisory body to a conduit, linking policy direction with real-world application.
ABAC is not just about making statements or recommendations. It helps turn ideas into practical steps that economies can implement. Given that APEC members are at different stages of development, the focus is on making cooperation workable. The meeting’s outcomes show the council is steering efforts toward stable trade frameworks, stronger supply chains and expanded digital trade to address current economic pressures and reduce frictions in cross-border commerce.
Support from member economies, together with concerns over America's increasingly protectionist trade stance, adds weight to this direction. Countries have expressed backing for an action-oriented ABAC agenda under China’s APEC chairmanship alongside efforts to protect supply chain security, diversify trade links and fast-track digital transition. This points to a common recognition of the importance of upholding the rules-based multilateral trading system while encouraging innovation and supporting investment-led development across the Asia-Pacific.
Long committed to regional integration, Beijing has advocated the concept of a community with a shared future and championed multilateralism and free trade, offering developing countries access to capital and technology. As the chair of the 2026 APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting, the world's second-largest economy is expected to play a constructive role in advancing these goals, contributing to regional and global economic growth.
China is a major trading partner and a leading source of investment and infrastructure financing for many countries, earning growing international influence. Through connectivity projects of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has helped foster intra- and inter-regional trade and cultural and people-to-people exchanges across the Asia-Pacific and beyond. This positions Beijing to play a more active role in promoting dialogue, ensuring stability and maintaining focus on regional development.
The Mexico City meeting underscored ABAC's potential to serve as a stabilizing platform for the regional economy amid heightened global uncertainty. As trade policies become more restrictive and security-driven, the talks revealed a clear interest across the Asia-Pacific in preserving open markets and keeping economic priorities aligned.
As geopolitical tensions spill further into economic relations, China’s role – as APEC host and a key economic player – takes on greater significance. Its emphasis on non-interference, openness and inclusive growth may help shape the trajectory of regional cooperation and stability; against rising fragmentation, Beijing's pursuit of integration could help restore economic activity and business confidence in the Asia-Pacific.
As the region navigates a more complex global environment, this cooperation-driven leadership is essential to sustain growth, ease tensions and build an open and resilient regional economy.
Lead: As the United States doubles down on tariffs and trade barriers, business leaders from across the Asia-Pacific are looking to China to hold the line on open markets.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Advisory Council (ABAC) concluded its meeting in Mexico City recently, with a strong and unified call to restore stability in global trade. The event brought together some 200 business leaders and policymakers from China and 20 other APEC economies – collectively representing about 60% of global GDP – who urged bold, coordinated action to safeguard long-term prosperity across the region.
Delegates expressed deep concerns over mounting pressures on the global economy, including energy market volatility, persistent supply chain disruptions, rising trade and investment restrictions, and growing food security risks. Long-term growth, they said, depends on open markets and the adoption of digital and green infrastructure.
In response, ABAC outlined priority actions: accelerating progress toward the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), strengthening supply chain resilience, investing in trade and logistics infrastructure and reducing non-tariff barriers to food trade. The measures, members said, are necessary to stabilize trade flows and bolster the region's capacity to absorb external shocks.
The outcomes of the meeting reflected a convergence on restoring stability and predictability to the global economy, reviving growth momentum and reinforcing the foundations of regional economic cooperation. Delegates conveyed a shared concern that increasing fragmentation, supply shocks and policy uncertainty are eroding confidence and constraining economic activity across the Asia-Pacific.
To address these threats, members called for advancing early deliverables and harmonized trade rules and regulatory frameworks, enhancing transparency, reducing trade barriers, establishing permanent ban on tariffs for digital products and promoting the responsible use of artificial intelligence. The measures aim to boost cross-border trade and investment, laying the groundwork for a more inclusive Asia-Pacific.
In a world dominated by steeply rising protectionism and unilateralism, ABAC has set out a strategic direction for the region. Launched in February, its 2026 work program under the theme “Openness, Connectivity and Synergy” reaffirms its commitment to open markets, regional integration and collaborative innovation.
Openness, anchored in trade and investment liberalization, and stronger connectivity protect economic expansion by fortifying supply chain stability, regional linkages and people-to-people exchanges. Synergy serves as the driver of innovation and sustainable development, enabling economies to collectively harness technological change and translate it into more buoyant growth for economies in the region.
A consensus also emerged on a rules-based, open-market approach with resilience built through robust supply chains, improved connectivity and greater transparency. The meeting also emphasized trade facilitation and digital modernization, such as paperless systems and interoperable regulatory frameworks, alongside closer alignment between the business community and policymakers. This implied an implementation-focused agenda to improve the efficiency of the regional economy.
The meeting sent positive signals for shoring up cooperation across the Asia-Pacific, with the council releasing statements on FTAAP progress and renewing its commitment to the APEC Connectivity Blueprint.
In line with the Ichma Statement, the council outlined parallel strategies to accelerate the FTAAP, combining near-term steps with longer-term structural reforms. The approach reflects a focus on translating existing mechanisms into coordinated action, reinforced by a commitment to a connectivity framework spanning physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages — aimed at enabling seamless regional flows of trade, services and talent.
ABAC is widely regarded as a key mechanism for translating complex geopolitical shifts and evolving business conditions into actionable recommendations. Feedback from the recent session underscored a shared sense of urgency for decisive action to restore stability in global trade to ensure policies remain grounded in economic realities.
Representatives from participating economies and organizations similarly view the forum as a key bridge between government priorities and business execution while expecting ABAC to place greater emphasis on technology and innovation integration, particularly the widening AI and digital divide. This elevates ABAC from an advisory body to a conduit, linking policy direction with real-world application.
ABAC is not just about making statements or recommendations. It helps turn ideas into practical steps that economies can implement. Given that APEC members are at different stages of development, the focus is on making cooperation workable. The meeting’s outcomes show the council is steering efforts toward stable trade frameworks, stronger supply chains and expanded digital trade to address current economic pressures and reduce frictions in cross-border commerce.
Support from member economies, together with concerns over America's increasingly protectionist trade stance, adds weight to this direction. Countries have expressed backing for an action-oriented ABAC agenda under China’s APEC chairmanship alongside efforts to protect supply chain security, diversify trade links and fast-track digital transition. This points to a common recognition of the importance of upholding the rules-based multilateral trading system while encouraging innovation and supporting investment-led development across the Asia-Pacific.
Long committed to regional integration, Beijing has advocated the concept of a community with a shared future and championed multilateralism and free trade, offering developing countries access to capital and technology. As the chair of the 2026 APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting, the world's second-largest economy is expected to play a constructive role in advancing these goals, contributing to regional and global economic growth.
China is a major trading partner and a leading source of investment and infrastructure financing for many countries, earning growing international influence. Through connectivity projects of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has helped foster intra- and inter-regional trade and cultural and people-to-people exchanges across the Asia-Pacific and beyond. This positions Beijing to play a more active role in promoting dialogue, ensuring stability and maintaining focus on regional development.
The Mexico City meeting underscored ABAC's potential to serve as a stabilizing platform for the regional economy amid heightened global uncertainty. As trade policies become more restrictive and security-driven, the talks revealed a clear interest across the Asia-Pacific in preserving open markets and keeping economic priorities aligned.
As geopolitical tensions spill further into economic relations, China’s role – as APEC host and a key economic player – takes on greater significance. Its emphasis on non-interference, openness and inclusive growth may help shape the trajectory of regional cooperation and stability; against rising fragmentation, Beijing's pursuit of integration could help restore economic activity and business confidence in the Asia-Pacific.
As the region navigates a more complex global environment, this cooperation-driven leadership is essential to sustain growth, ease tensions and build an open and resilient regional economy.
*My article first appeared at China's Diplomacy in the New Era
April 18, 2026
U.S.-Iran coercive diplomacy produces managed instability
 |
| Credit: ChatGPT |
U.S.–Iran tensions can be read through coercive diplomacy in which escalation functions as a tool to shape negotiations. Throughout the conflict, President Donald Trump applied intense military pressure on Tehran to raise the cost of defiance, followed by diplomatic engagement once leverage was established.
Recent developments suggest this approach has yielded results. By pairing military readiness with threats of destroying Iranian infrastructure, Trump pursued a policy of a managed force intensification to compress Iran’s bargaining position.
The fragile ceasefire already showed that the situation was becoming harder to control. A campaign initially framed as limited to degrading Tehran’s nuclear program risked pulling the wider region into the conflict. Iranian retaliation spread widely across the Persian Gulf, threatening U.S. military bases, striking regional energy infrastructure, and disrupting oil and food supplies – exposing the vulnerabilities of America’s regional partners.
Three dynamics sustained this cycle: widening conflict, mounting economic toll, and growing strain on U.S. alliances.
Iran’s horizontal escalation
In response to joint U.S. and Israeli strikes, Tehran adopted a strategy of horizontal expansion, broadening the battlefield by targeting U.S. military installations and civilian infrastructure across Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait.
These strikes exploited a key feature of America’s regional posture. The U.S. maintains a network of forward bases in allied countries to conduct operations in the Middle East. By threatening these facilities, Iran effectively turned the geography of U.S. alliances into a combat zone, placing American partners in harm’s way.
Throughout the crisis, both Washington and Tehran employed coercive signaling – calibrated shows of force and public warnings – to influence each other’s decisions. Trump’s threats and deadlines sought to compel compliance; Tehran’s attacks sent clear counter-signals of retaliation and cost.
Iran was unlikely to prevail in a conventional military confrontation with the United States. Its strategy instead focused on increasing the political, economic, and military costs for Washington and its partners. This in turn increased risks of spillover, including civilian harm, infrastructure damage, and broader regional entanglement.
Mounting economic shock
A second driver behind Trump’s pursuit of de-escalation has been the growing economic shock from the conflict that rippled through energy markets, supply chains, and global food systems.
One of the most sensitive chokepoints is the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply and a substantial share of seaborne fertilizers pass. The near-shutdown of this strategic waterway disrupted shipping flows and pushed up oil prices, fuel costs, and war-risk insurance premiums.
Iran’s asymmetric retaliation also crossed a line with its Gulf neighbors. After an Israeli strike hit Iran’s South Pars gas field — one of the world’s largest energy hubs — Tehran launched missile and drone attacks on key regional energy hubs.
These strikes inflicted widespread damage to Gulf energy assets such as knocking out 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity for three to five years. These attacks demonstrate that Tehran’s response extended beyond direct confrontation with U.S. forces to disproportionately impact regional economies and civilian infrastructure.
Had Gulf leaders not exercised restraint, Iran’s actions could have driven the Middle East to a broader regional war, although these strikes strengthened Tehran’s position by forcing Trump to limit U.S. involvement and bring the conflict to a close.
Beyond energy, the disruption threatened to squeeze the global food system. With about one-third of global seaborne fertilizers traded through the Strait, this could have triggered a food and humanitarian crisis in several regions.
Domestically, rising inflation, eroded consumer purchasing power, and the prospect of slower growth intensified political and economic pressure on Trump. The economic fallout extended to the Gulf, where Arab states have so far incurred up to $194 billion in losses, according to the United Nations Development Program.
Combined, these shocks reveal that coercive strategies generate leverage but also impose economic constraints.
U.S. allies bear the costs
The conflict strained America’s alliance network as well.
Countries hosting U.S. forces — including Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE — faced direct security threats as missiles and drones traversed the region. For these governments, the danger of “entrapment risk” – the fear of being drawn into the conflict — increased pressure to limit further escalation and reassess the costs of forward deployment.
Tensions also surfaced within the transatlantic coalition. Several European nations hesitated to deploy warships to the Strait, with some denying the U.S. access to airspace or military facilities for operations, reflecting concerns about energy market instability and regional escalation.
At the same time, the White House indicated that the Trump administration could ask Arab countries to pay for the war, potentially shifting part of the burden onto regional partners. Yet as many Gulf states did not support the intervention and urged diplomacy beforehand, the prospect of being asked to absorb the consequences of a conflict they neither initiated nor endorsed would deepen unease among allies.
These dynamics nudged Trump toward capping the conflict.
The strategic gamble
Taken together, U.S.–Iran tensions could be best understood as a recurring system of coercive diplomacy in which force and negotiation acted as interconnected instruments of statecraft. The relationship has repeatedly oscillated between confrontation and limited engagement, without settlement.Iran’s conventional military limits constrain its ability to compete directly with the United States; it retains leverage to threaten energy infrastructure, maritime security, and broader regional stability. These tools do not enable decisive victory, but they are sufficient to raise the costs of sustained pressure.
The result is managed instability: a system where coercion and engagement repeatedly rise and recede, producing stability through adjustment rather than resolution.
*My article (unedited) appeared in Cambridge MENAF/Manara Magazine
April 16, 2026
How US betrayed allies by igniting an energy crisis
By: Azhar Azam
Amid the Iran conflict's sharp impact on global energy prices, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners (OPEC+) will meet on April 5 with a potential production increase on the agenda.
At a virtual session on March 1, the cartel's eight major oil-producing nations including Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to raise output by 206,000 barrels per day in April.
This comes as the fallout of the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran – particularly US "large-scale" bombing targeting facilities around Kharg Island, Iran's economic lifeline that processes 90% of the country's crude exports and handles 950 million barrels a year – has widened into a full‑blown disruption of the global energy system. The White House principal deputy press secretary's statement that the US military could "take out" Kharg Island has raised the risk of further escalation in the region.
The war has already established a de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil supply and one-third of the global fertilizers used to produce almost half of the world's food pass. As shipping companies reroute vessels and insurers raise risk premiums – global crude prices have surged past $100 per barrel, fueling fears that prolonged instability in this critical corridor would elicit a severe supply shock.
US President Donald Trump has called on nations to help secure the vital shipping route by sending warships. Yet even countries with longstanding security ties to Washington have shown little enthusiasm to join the proposed multinational escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz.
Instead, several of America's Asian and European allies including those from NATO have rebuffed the appeal and refused to become involved in a crisis they didn't create, exposing rifts within the US-led alliance system.
For the US, the economic consequences of this energy shock are far less than those faced by much of the rest of the world. Over the past decade, the "shale revolution" has transformed the US into one of the world's largest oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers and exporters. Higher global energy prices are actually helping the American energy sector, boosting the revenues of oil and LNG producers and exporters.
While the US remains largely insulated as a net energy exporter, many of its closest partners depend exceedingly on imported oil and gas. Japan and the Republic of Korea import about 95% and 70% of their crude, respectively, from the Middle East, much of which is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. Even short-term disruptions in Gulf shipping routes can quickly ripple through their manufacturing supply chains.
The recent spike in oil prices could add inflationary pressure across these energy-dependent industrial economies, raising input costs for petrochemicals and other energy-intensive sectors.
The economic impact is significant for the EU too, a major net energy importer getting 57% of its total energy needs from abroad. The bloc relies heavily on seaborne oil shipments, particularly diesel and jet fuel from the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, for fertilizers. With shipments at a near halt, European countries are scrambling to subsidize energy costs and shield the economy from one of the deepest energy crises ever.
For European economies still recovering from the energy shock triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a renewed surge in oil prices and lack of fertilizers could mean stagflation and food deprivation across the continent. A sustained interruption would tighten supply, push up energy costs higher and further complicate Europe's economic recovery at a time when growth remains fragile.
Australia, another key US partner in the Asia-Pacific, is also exposed to the spillover effects of the Iran conflict. While it is one of the world's largest exporters of LNG, Australia has just two operating refineries and gets roughly 80% of its refined petroleum products from overseas.
This structural dependence leaves it vulnerable to swings in international oil prices and supply chain bottlenecks. As energy costs climb, transport and logistics expenses rise in tandem, feeding into broader price increases and trade imbalances. The paradox reveals that even US energy-exporting allies are not immune to the wider economic repercussions of instability in the Gulf.
Washington bears considerable responsibility for the crisis. By launching a military campaign against Iran in the midst of nuclear negotiations, it undermined the prospects of a diplomatic solution, destabilized the entire Middle East and disrupted energy flows – creating an energy crisis that may benefit segments of its domestic energy sector but betrays allies by imposing significant economic costs on them through inflation, higher energy costs and trade shocks.
In effect, the US has weaponized global energy markets, turning its military leverage into economic advantage for itself while its strikes on Iran have ignited a supply squeeze that is reverberating across the global economy, leaving allies exposed.
Ultimately, America's strategic gain comes at the expense of the stability and prosperity of its partners.
Amid the Iran conflict's sharp impact on global energy prices, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners (OPEC+) will meet on April 5 with a potential production increase on the agenda.
At a virtual session on March 1, the cartel's eight major oil-producing nations including Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to raise output by 206,000 barrels per day in April.
This comes as the fallout of the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran – particularly US "large-scale" bombing targeting facilities around Kharg Island, Iran's economic lifeline that processes 90% of the country's crude exports and handles 950 million barrels a year – has widened into a full‑blown disruption of the global energy system. The White House principal deputy press secretary's statement that the US military could "take out" Kharg Island has raised the risk of further escalation in the region.
The war has already established a de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil supply and one-third of the global fertilizers used to produce almost half of the world's food pass. As shipping companies reroute vessels and insurers raise risk premiums – global crude prices have surged past $100 per barrel, fueling fears that prolonged instability in this critical corridor would elicit a severe supply shock.
US President Donald Trump has called on nations to help secure the vital shipping route by sending warships. Yet even countries with longstanding security ties to Washington have shown little enthusiasm to join the proposed multinational escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz.
Instead, several of America's Asian and European allies including those from NATO have rebuffed the appeal and refused to become involved in a crisis they didn't create, exposing rifts within the US-led alliance system.
For the US, the economic consequences of this energy shock are far less than those faced by much of the rest of the world. Over the past decade, the "shale revolution" has transformed the US into one of the world's largest oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers and exporters. Higher global energy prices are actually helping the American energy sector, boosting the revenues of oil and LNG producers and exporters.
While the US remains largely insulated as a net energy exporter, many of its closest partners depend exceedingly on imported oil and gas. Japan and the Republic of Korea import about 95% and 70% of their crude, respectively, from the Middle East, much of which is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. Even short-term disruptions in Gulf shipping routes can quickly ripple through their manufacturing supply chains.
The recent spike in oil prices could add inflationary pressure across these energy-dependent industrial economies, raising input costs for petrochemicals and other energy-intensive sectors.
The economic impact is significant for the EU too, a major net energy importer getting 57% of its total energy needs from abroad. The bloc relies heavily on seaborne oil shipments, particularly diesel and jet fuel from the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, for fertilizers. With shipments at a near halt, European countries are scrambling to subsidize energy costs and shield the economy from one of the deepest energy crises ever.
For European economies still recovering from the energy shock triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a renewed surge in oil prices and lack of fertilizers could mean stagflation and food deprivation across the continent. A sustained interruption would tighten supply, push up energy costs higher and further complicate Europe's economic recovery at a time when growth remains fragile.
Australia, another key US partner in the Asia-Pacific, is also exposed to the spillover effects of the Iran conflict. While it is one of the world's largest exporters of LNG, Australia has just two operating refineries and gets roughly 80% of its refined petroleum products from overseas.
This structural dependence leaves it vulnerable to swings in international oil prices and supply chain bottlenecks. As energy costs climb, transport and logistics expenses rise in tandem, feeding into broader price increases and trade imbalances. The paradox reveals that even US energy-exporting allies are not immune to the wider economic repercussions of instability in the Gulf.
Washington bears considerable responsibility for the crisis. By launching a military campaign against Iran in the midst of nuclear negotiations, it undermined the prospects of a diplomatic solution, destabilized the entire Middle East and disrupted energy flows – creating an energy crisis that may benefit segments of its domestic energy sector but betrays allies by imposing significant economic costs on them through inflation, higher energy costs and trade shocks.
In effect, the US has weaponized global energy markets, turning its military leverage into economic advantage for itself while its strikes on Iran have ignited a supply squeeze that is reverberating across the global economy, leaving allies exposed.
Ultimately, America's strategic gain comes at the expense of the stability and prosperity of its partners.
*My article first appeared at CGTN
April 15, 2026
Tokyo's military ambitions collide with US priorities
By: Azhar Azam
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's first official visit to the United States to reaffirm "unwavering solidarity" between Tokyo and Washington comes as Japan uses the regional environment to justify expanding its military position.
Since assuming office, Takaichi has adopted a strikingly hawkish tone toward China, frequently portraying Beijing as the central challenge to Japan's national security.
In a recent policy statement, she argued that her country was facing the most "severe and complex" security environment of the post-war era, citing China's military modernization and regional activities. Such rhetoric has become an essential component of her efforts to rally political support for sweeping changes to Japan's security policy.
Takaichi continues to rehash this confrontational message. Speaking at the National Defense Academy of Japan, she declared that Japan must strengthen its defense capabilities "without excluding any option." The remarks suggest Tokyo's intent to move beyond a strictly defensive posture and deepen concerns over its gradual abandonment of its pacifist posture in favor of a more assertive – even offensive – military identity.
Japan's militarization is accelerating this drift. Tokyo's defense reforms including raising military spending to 2% of GDP and coming under the US nuclear umbrella – Washington's pledge to employ its nuclear arsenal to defend allies like NATO members and Japan against nuclear or major conventional attacks – reflect a dramatic expansion of its security ambitions.
These measures further mark a clear departure from Japan's longstanding commitment to its three non-nuclear principles: not possessing, not producing and not allowing nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory or its territorial waters.
Last week, Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed that Tokyo had begun receiving US-made Tomahawk and Norwegian Joint Strike Missiles. The acquisition of these offensive weapons is a significant escalation in Japan's military approach. While successive governments have interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to allow self-defense, acquiring long-range strike capabilities is a clear shift toward a more assertive military role, stretching the limits of Japan's pacifist framework.
These actions have sparked an outrage in Japan's civil society and among opposition political leaders, many of whom view the missile acquisitions as a violation of Article 9. The controversy illustrates how far Japan has moved from its peaceful doctrine.
Tokyo frames this hardline stance as a response to growing regional threats. In practice, the narrative has become a familiar tool for pushing through military expansion and gradually dismantling the restraints of its post-war security guideline.
Since becoming prime minister, Takaichi has been emphasizing the centrality of the US-Japan alliance to secure US President Donald Trump's support for her contentious security agenda. She has repeatedly signaled goodwill toward him, highly accommodating his terms, highlighting cooperation on trade, defense spending and strategic alignment with Washington.
Yet this overture ignores the underlying feature of American foreign policy. For Washington, alliances are rarely altruistic. The Trump administration – and Washington more broadly – tend to treat partners through the lens of national interest and transactional pragmatism. The "America First" logic is explicit: Alliances are valued only if they advance US objectives.
From the US perspective, the Tokyo-Washington alliance is not an unconditional security guarantee but an instrument of geopolitical convenience. Within the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan functions as a strategic piece on the regional chessboard rather than an equal partner or staunch ally – valuable to contain China, yet expendable when American interests demand flexibility.
Senior American officials have already clarified that Washington's policy toward China and Japan will not be driven by an either-or choice. Recently, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that the US intends to maintain both close ties with Tokyo and constructive engagement with Beijing, calling tensions between the two countries "preexisting."
For Japanese policymakers, this statement should dispel any illusion that the US could be leveraged to pressure China. Japan's role in US strategy has inherently been and will remain contingent, dictated by American interests rather than Tokyo's security ambitions. Washington may at times seek to counterbalance Beijing's influence but it wants to maintain an extensive diplomatic and economic relationship with China.
Public opinion in the country backs this approach with many Americans supporting friendly cooperation and engagement between the world's two largest economies.
Relying on the US alliance to underwrite Japan's growing military assertiveness therefore is a risky strategy. Historically, Washington-Tokyo relations have proven transactional. Washington has demonstrated that it prioritizes its own economic and strategic interests. Trade negotiations, for example, have seen Japan accept tariffs and commit to large investment packages in the US.
Even US intelligence has flagged Takaichi's controversial remarks on Taiwan – that a Taiwan contingency would constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan – as a "significant shift" from a sitting Japanese leader.
By leaning on US support to justify its military expansion, Japan risks trading decades of restraint for a security promise that may never hold. Caught between Trump's demand to provide escort ships in the Strait of Hormuz and widespread domestic opposition to US-Israel actions in Iran, Tokyo's strategy will threaten its own pacifist principles, fracture public consensus and inflame regional tensions.
And whenever American priorities shift, it will leave the nation exposed, delivering neither security nor stability.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's first official visit to the United States to reaffirm "unwavering solidarity" between Tokyo and Washington comes as Japan uses the regional environment to justify expanding its military position.
Since assuming office, Takaichi has adopted a strikingly hawkish tone toward China, frequently portraying Beijing as the central challenge to Japan's national security.
In a recent policy statement, she argued that her country was facing the most "severe and complex" security environment of the post-war era, citing China's military modernization and regional activities. Such rhetoric has become an essential component of her efforts to rally political support for sweeping changes to Japan's security policy.
Takaichi continues to rehash this confrontational message. Speaking at the National Defense Academy of Japan, she declared that Japan must strengthen its defense capabilities "without excluding any option." The remarks suggest Tokyo's intent to move beyond a strictly defensive posture and deepen concerns over its gradual abandonment of its pacifist posture in favor of a more assertive – even offensive – military identity.
Japan's militarization is accelerating this drift. Tokyo's defense reforms including raising military spending to 2% of GDP and coming under the US nuclear umbrella – Washington's pledge to employ its nuclear arsenal to defend allies like NATO members and Japan against nuclear or major conventional attacks – reflect a dramatic expansion of its security ambitions.
These measures further mark a clear departure from Japan's longstanding commitment to its three non-nuclear principles: not possessing, not producing and not allowing nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory or its territorial waters.
Last week, Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed that Tokyo had begun receiving US-made Tomahawk and Norwegian Joint Strike Missiles. The acquisition of these offensive weapons is a significant escalation in Japan's military approach. While successive governments have interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to allow self-defense, acquiring long-range strike capabilities is a clear shift toward a more assertive military role, stretching the limits of Japan's pacifist framework.
These actions have sparked an outrage in Japan's civil society and among opposition political leaders, many of whom view the missile acquisitions as a violation of Article 9. The controversy illustrates how far Japan has moved from its peaceful doctrine.
Tokyo frames this hardline stance as a response to growing regional threats. In practice, the narrative has become a familiar tool for pushing through military expansion and gradually dismantling the restraints of its post-war security guideline.
Since becoming prime minister, Takaichi has been emphasizing the centrality of the US-Japan alliance to secure US President Donald Trump's support for her contentious security agenda. She has repeatedly signaled goodwill toward him, highly accommodating his terms, highlighting cooperation on trade, defense spending and strategic alignment with Washington.
Yet this overture ignores the underlying feature of American foreign policy. For Washington, alliances are rarely altruistic. The Trump administration – and Washington more broadly – tend to treat partners through the lens of national interest and transactional pragmatism. The "America First" logic is explicit: Alliances are valued only if they advance US objectives.
From the US perspective, the Tokyo-Washington alliance is not an unconditional security guarantee but an instrument of geopolitical convenience. Within the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan functions as a strategic piece on the regional chessboard rather than an equal partner or staunch ally – valuable to contain China, yet expendable when American interests demand flexibility.
Senior American officials have already clarified that Washington's policy toward China and Japan will not be driven by an either-or choice. Recently, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that the US intends to maintain both close ties with Tokyo and constructive engagement with Beijing, calling tensions between the two countries "preexisting."
For Japanese policymakers, this statement should dispel any illusion that the US could be leveraged to pressure China. Japan's role in US strategy has inherently been and will remain contingent, dictated by American interests rather than Tokyo's security ambitions. Washington may at times seek to counterbalance Beijing's influence but it wants to maintain an extensive diplomatic and economic relationship with China.
Public opinion in the country backs this approach with many Americans supporting friendly cooperation and engagement between the world's two largest economies.
Relying on the US alliance to underwrite Japan's growing military assertiveness therefore is a risky strategy. Historically, Washington-Tokyo relations have proven transactional. Washington has demonstrated that it prioritizes its own economic and strategic interests. Trade negotiations, for example, have seen Japan accept tariffs and commit to large investment packages in the US.
Even US intelligence has flagged Takaichi's controversial remarks on Taiwan – that a Taiwan contingency would constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan – as a "significant shift" from a sitting Japanese leader.
By leaning on US support to justify its military expansion, Japan risks trading decades of restraint for a security promise that may never hold. Caught between Trump's demand to provide escort ships in the Strait of Hormuz and widespread domestic opposition to US-Israel actions in Iran, Tokyo's strategy will threaten its own pacifist principles, fracture public consensus and inflame regional tensions.
And whenever American priorities shift, it will leave the nation exposed, delivering neither security nor stability.
*My article first appeared at CGTN
April 14, 2026
Boao Forum puts cooperation at the heart of Asia's future
By: Azhar Azam
Lead: Leaders and policymakers at the Boao Forum for Asia's 25th annual conference delivered a clear message: Asia's path to stability and growth depends on partnership, shared innovation and inclusive development.
Over the years, the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) has transformed into a high-level dialogue platform for governments, businesses, experts and scholars to jointly discuss the most pressing issues in Asia and the world.
Held annually in Boao, south China's Hainan province, this year's forum brought together participants to address shared challenges and promote economic growth across Asia.
Marking its 25th anniversary this year, the BFA reaffirmed its commitment to deepening regional economic integration and promoting common development among Asian countries. The Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2026, released during the forum, highlighted the resilience and vast economic potential of the continent. Asia's economy is forecast to expand by 4.5%, with its share of global GDP approaching half on a purchasing power parity basis, the report said, pointing to the continent's growing influence worldwide.
Equally significant is the strengthening of intra-regional trade dependence, which edged up from 56.3% in 2023 to 57.2% in 2024. This increase reflects a gradual shift toward deeper regional integration as major economies orient their partnerships within Asia itself. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been identified as "twin anchors of stability," helping sustain economic momentum and reinforce confidence across the region.
The region, particularly China and ASEAN, continues to be the world's premier destination for foreign direct investment, underpinned by economic resilience, an expanding consumer market and growing appeal for global investors. The region is also emerging as a global hub for artificial intelligence. Through advances in AI research, large-scale deployment and industrial application, China — through cooperative mechanisms like the BFA — is playing a central role in Asia's economic and technological transformation.
Despite headwinds such as unilateralism, protectionism and "de-risking," China has drawn global attention for its high-quality development. Amid efforts to downplay the event's significance, participants at the annual conference said Beijing had injected invaluable stability into global supply chains and that the country's edge in technology would drive exports of advanced machinery.
China's openness has fostered a strong and dynamic innovation ecosystem. Over the years, the East Asian nation has evolved from the "world's factory" into a global hub for research, development and technological advancement where multinational companies see value in locating their innovation centers. Beyond gaining access to China's vast consumer market, global enterprises recognize China’s pivotal driving role in global industrial and innovation development. They actively leverage the country's unparalleled talent pool, mature integrated supply chains and policy support that encourages technological collaboration and synchronized innovation strategies.
This openness has also created new corridors of cooperation, particularly with countries of the Global South. For multinationals, China not only offers opportunities to broaden their business footprint but also to grow alongside the country. Beyond collaboration with pharmaceutical firms, Beijing has extensively engaged global enterprises from diverse industries and strengthened comprehensive science and technology cooperation with developing nations.
By leveraging China's robust research infrastructure, advanced technology base and regulatory support, global companies can innovate, grow and contribute to shared development across the region.
International leaders are increasingly highlighting China's critical role in building an open, rules-based multilateral trading system and promoting innovation-led, sustainable development amid widening global fragmentation. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, speaking at the forum, said Beijing has a key role to play in supporting Asia's prosperity and stability. He cited the Hainan Free Trade Port as a "concrete example" of China's commitment to openness and its role in shaping the region's economic architecture.
Praising China's contribution to global development — including through the Belt and Road Initiative — and placing the country at the forefront of emerging areas such as digital and green technologies, Wong called on Beijing to lead the next wave of technological change. As the world explores new areas of cooperation, the BFA has stood out as a leading platform to help maintain the region's competitiveness, advance green growth and create opportunities for mutual development.
This year's forum took on added significance following China's adoption of the Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), which prioritizes high-quality development, AI, scientific and technological innovation and domestic consumption. As Beijing advances its long-term strategy and pushes into emerging technologies, the BFA served as a key venue for leaders, investors and policymakers to understand China's development priorities. Many see opportunities to leverage its strengths in renewable energy and green technologies to accelerate their own transitions.
Against a backdrop of intensifying tariff disputes and a deepening security crisis in the Middle East, this year's BFA emerged as a platform to advocate for peace, stability and development. Speaking at the forum, China's top legislator Zhao Leji emphasized that President Xi Jinping’s vision and initiatives—including building a community with a shared future for humanity and the four global initiatives—have provided a clear direction for the world amid profound global changes. He reaffirmed Beijing's commitment to openness, improving the business environment and promoting common development. He also urged regional nations to jointly work toward an "Asian security model" that emphasizes dialogue and consultation to resolve conflicts. In doing so, the forum reinforced its role as a venue for Asian leaders and global stakeholders to discuss pathways to maintaining stability and sustaining economic growth.
Asia is navigating an unprecedented phase marked by intense economic and security challenges. At such a critical juncture, the BFA proved more important than ever. By bringing together policymakers, industry leaders and scholars, the forum facilitated meaningful exchanges and helped steer the region's collective response to emerging risks and opportunities. China's sustained commitment to openness, innovation and regional cooperation — and its promotion of peace and stability — provides a solid foundation for deeper collaboration to safeguard regional economies and security.
Ultimately, the BFA delivered a compelling reminder: sustainable growth and stability in the region depend not on competition, rivalry or fragmentation but on strengthened partnerships, shared innovation, and a renewed commitment to inclusive development and lasting peace.
Lead: Leaders and policymakers at the Boao Forum for Asia's 25th annual conference delivered a clear message: Asia's path to stability and growth depends on partnership, shared innovation and inclusive development.
Over the years, the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) has transformed into a high-level dialogue platform for governments, businesses, experts and scholars to jointly discuss the most pressing issues in Asia and the world.
Held annually in Boao, south China's Hainan province, this year's forum brought together participants to address shared challenges and promote economic growth across Asia.
Marking its 25th anniversary this year, the BFA reaffirmed its commitment to deepening regional economic integration and promoting common development among Asian countries. The Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2026, released during the forum, highlighted the resilience and vast economic potential of the continent. Asia's economy is forecast to expand by 4.5%, with its share of global GDP approaching half on a purchasing power parity basis, the report said, pointing to the continent's growing influence worldwide.
Equally significant is the strengthening of intra-regional trade dependence, which edged up from 56.3% in 2023 to 57.2% in 2024. This increase reflects a gradual shift toward deeper regional integration as major economies orient their partnerships within Asia itself. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been identified as "twin anchors of stability," helping sustain economic momentum and reinforce confidence across the region.
The region, particularly China and ASEAN, continues to be the world's premier destination for foreign direct investment, underpinned by economic resilience, an expanding consumer market and growing appeal for global investors. The region is also emerging as a global hub for artificial intelligence. Through advances in AI research, large-scale deployment and industrial application, China — through cooperative mechanisms like the BFA — is playing a central role in Asia's economic and technological transformation.
Despite headwinds such as unilateralism, protectionism and "de-risking," China has drawn global attention for its high-quality development. Amid efforts to downplay the event's significance, participants at the annual conference said Beijing had injected invaluable stability into global supply chains and that the country's edge in technology would drive exports of advanced machinery.
China's openness has fostered a strong and dynamic innovation ecosystem. Over the years, the East Asian nation has evolved from the "world's factory" into a global hub for research, development and technological advancement where multinational companies see value in locating their innovation centers. Beyond gaining access to China's vast consumer market, global enterprises recognize China’s pivotal driving role in global industrial and innovation development. They actively leverage the country's unparalleled talent pool, mature integrated supply chains and policy support that encourages technological collaboration and synchronized innovation strategies.
This openness has also created new corridors of cooperation, particularly with countries of the Global South. For multinationals, China not only offers opportunities to broaden their business footprint but also to grow alongside the country. Beyond collaboration with pharmaceutical firms, Beijing has extensively engaged global enterprises from diverse industries and strengthened comprehensive science and technology cooperation with developing nations.
By leveraging China's robust research infrastructure, advanced technology base and regulatory support, global companies can innovate, grow and contribute to shared development across the region.
International leaders are increasingly highlighting China's critical role in building an open, rules-based multilateral trading system and promoting innovation-led, sustainable development amid widening global fragmentation. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, speaking at the forum, said Beijing has a key role to play in supporting Asia's prosperity and stability. He cited the Hainan Free Trade Port as a "concrete example" of China's commitment to openness and its role in shaping the region's economic architecture.
Praising China's contribution to global development — including through the Belt and Road Initiative — and placing the country at the forefront of emerging areas such as digital and green technologies, Wong called on Beijing to lead the next wave of technological change. As the world explores new areas of cooperation, the BFA has stood out as a leading platform to help maintain the region's competitiveness, advance green growth and create opportunities for mutual development.
This year's forum took on added significance following China's adoption of the Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), which prioritizes high-quality development, AI, scientific and technological innovation and domestic consumption. As Beijing advances its long-term strategy and pushes into emerging technologies, the BFA served as a key venue for leaders, investors and policymakers to understand China's development priorities. Many see opportunities to leverage its strengths in renewable energy and green technologies to accelerate their own transitions.
Against a backdrop of intensifying tariff disputes and a deepening security crisis in the Middle East, this year's BFA emerged as a platform to advocate for peace, stability and development. Speaking at the forum, China's top legislator Zhao Leji emphasized that President Xi Jinping’s vision and initiatives—including building a community with a shared future for humanity and the four global initiatives—have provided a clear direction for the world amid profound global changes. He reaffirmed Beijing's commitment to openness, improving the business environment and promoting common development. He also urged regional nations to jointly work toward an "Asian security model" that emphasizes dialogue and consultation to resolve conflicts. In doing so, the forum reinforced its role as a venue for Asian leaders and global stakeholders to discuss pathways to maintaining stability and sustaining economic growth.
Asia is navigating an unprecedented phase marked by intense economic and security challenges. At such a critical juncture, the BFA proved more important than ever. By bringing together policymakers, industry leaders and scholars, the forum facilitated meaningful exchanges and helped steer the region's collective response to emerging risks and opportunities. China's sustained commitment to openness, innovation and regional cooperation — and its promotion of peace and stability — provides a solid foundation for deeper collaboration to safeguard regional economies and security.
Ultimately, the BFA delivered a compelling reminder: sustainable growth and stability in the region depend not on competition, rivalry or fragmentation but on strengthened partnerships, shared innovation, and a renewed commitment to inclusive development and lasting peace.
*My article first appeared at "China Diplomacy in the New Era"
March 31, 2026
China's 'two sessions' chart course for high-quality growth
By: Azhar Azam
China's annual "two sessions" — the concurrent meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — opened in Beijing last week, setting the stage for the next chapter of the country's development strategy. Having invested heavily in innovation, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing, Beijing is now focused on leveraging these technological gains over the coming five years.
This year's gathering carries particular significance. As geopolitical tensions and conflicts weigh on global economic prospects, the policy direction emerging from Beijing underscores China's determination to sustain stable development and reinforce its role as a stabilizing force in the world economy, while accelerating its transition toward innovation-driven, green growth.
At the opening meeting of the NPC, Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the government work report, outlining an ambitious yet pragmatic roadmap for China's development in 2026. The report sets a GDP growth target of 4.5-5%, emphasizing a shift toward stable, high-quality development, building on the resilience shown in recent years.
It identifies clear development targets, including a surveyed unemployment rate of around 5.5%, over 12 million new urban jobs and a consumer price index increase of around 2%. Emphasis will be placed on innovative industries such as AI, cutting-edge sectors like quantum technology and next-generation communications, as well as green development, to achieve technological self-reliance and further the low-carbon transition.
The report also commits to proactive fiscal and monetary policies, which are crucial in boosting domestic consumption, strengthening social welfare and fostering inclusive growth. Taken together, these measures signal China’s commitment to quality growth and people-centered progress and cement its role as a responsible and major contributor to global economic growth.
Despite global uncertainty and challenges, China's economy continues to scale new heights. In 2025, the country's economic output topped 140 trillion yuan ($20 trillion), registering 5% growth from the previous year. This expansion translated into tangible social gains, including the creation of roughly 12.7 million urban jobs and the rollout of public well-being initiatives. Efforts to strengthen the social safety net and expand access to health care, education and other essential services promise a development model increasingly focused on improving the quality of people's lives.
At the same time, China's push toward innovation-driven, green development is yielding visible progress across key industrial sectors. In 2025, the output of industrial robots rose 28% and production of new energy vehicles exceeded 16 million units. These advances reflect the rapid modernization of China's manufacturing base, maximizing productivity and further consolidating its role in the global transition toward cleaner, more sustainable mobility.
China's broader energy landscape is changing too. The share of non-fossil energy in total consumption has reached 21.7%, with clean energy accounting for 30.4% of overall energy use. This is definitive evidence of Beijing's steady progress in building a more sustainable and diversified energy system.
Alongside these structural shifts, the production of green technologies continues to expand rapidly. Output of products such as charging piles and solar cells has surged, demonstrating how Beijing's green and low-carbon transformation is simultaneously advancing environmental goals, technological innovation and industrial growth.
Recent assessments support the view that China's current economic strategy places a growing emphasis on strengthening domestic demand through targeted social policy reforms. Elitza Mileva, the World Bank's lead economist for China, recently noted that measures such as higher pension benefits and childcare subsidies would expand social protection and reduce precautionary household savings, exerting a positive impact on household consumption.
Analysts view this approach as signaling "strong continuity" in China's economic management. As China's consumer market expands and upgrades, its scale and purchasing power are expected to drive global demand and generate spillover benefits across the Asia-Pacific. The momentum will be reinforced by expanded digital and green trade, AI and green technology exports and broader free trade partnerships.
At a time when the international economy is navigating a decisive period of geopolitical and technological transformation, a stronger Chinese consumer market can turbocharge the domestic economy and act as a catalyst for deeper regional economic integration, strengthening trade, investment and supply-chain connections with neighboring economies, particularly in Southeast Asia.
Beyond the near-term policy measures, the "two sessions" reaffirm China's strategic vision for development. The draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) highlights Beijing's resolve to anchor future growth in technological innovation, industrial upgrading and greater self-reliance. By pairing a more dynamic consumer market with advances in frontier technologies, China would be better positioned to achieve long-term growth, bolster economic resilience and secure a leading role in emerging industries.
The blueprint marks an evolution in the country's development model. Rather than prioritizing growth speed alone, the new draft plan emphasizes stability, technological sophistication, innovation and consumption. By embedding these priorities across sectors, Chinese policymakers aim to modernize the economy and reduce dependence on traditional growth drivers such as export-led expansion. This strategy — combining a vibrant domestic market with technological leadership — lays the groundwork for a flexible, future-ready economy capable of sustaining high-quality prosperity.
*My article first appeared at China Diplomacy in the New Era
China's annual "two sessions" — the concurrent meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — opened in Beijing last week, setting the stage for the next chapter of the country's development strategy. Having invested heavily in innovation, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing, Beijing is now focused on leveraging these technological gains over the coming five years.
This year's gathering carries particular significance. As geopolitical tensions and conflicts weigh on global economic prospects, the policy direction emerging from Beijing underscores China's determination to sustain stable development and reinforce its role as a stabilizing force in the world economy, while accelerating its transition toward innovation-driven, green growth.
At the opening meeting of the NPC, Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the government work report, outlining an ambitious yet pragmatic roadmap for China's development in 2026. The report sets a GDP growth target of 4.5-5%, emphasizing a shift toward stable, high-quality development, building on the resilience shown in recent years.
It identifies clear development targets, including a surveyed unemployment rate of around 5.5%, over 12 million new urban jobs and a consumer price index increase of around 2%. Emphasis will be placed on innovative industries such as AI, cutting-edge sectors like quantum technology and next-generation communications, as well as green development, to achieve technological self-reliance and further the low-carbon transition.
The report also commits to proactive fiscal and monetary policies, which are crucial in boosting domestic consumption, strengthening social welfare and fostering inclusive growth. Taken together, these measures signal China’s commitment to quality growth and people-centered progress and cement its role as a responsible and major contributor to global economic growth.
Despite global uncertainty and challenges, China's economy continues to scale new heights. In 2025, the country's economic output topped 140 trillion yuan ($20 trillion), registering 5% growth from the previous year. This expansion translated into tangible social gains, including the creation of roughly 12.7 million urban jobs and the rollout of public well-being initiatives. Efforts to strengthen the social safety net and expand access to health care, education and other essential services promise a development model increasingly focused on improving the quality of people's lives.
At the same time, China's push toward innovation-driven, green development is yielding visible progress across key industrial sectors. In 2025, the output of industrial robots rose 28% and production of new energy vehicles exceeded 16 million units. These advances reflect the rapid modernization of China's manufacturing base, maximizing productivity and further consolidating its role in the global transition toward cleaner, more sustainable mobility.
China's broader energy landscape is changing too. The share of non-fossil energy in total consumption has reached 21.7%, with clean energy accounting for 30.4% of overall energy use. This is definitive evidence of Beijing's steady progress in building a more sustainable and diversified energy system.
Alongside these structural shifts, the production of green technologies continues to expand rapidly. Output of products such as charging piles and solar cells has surged, demonstrating how Beijing's green and low-carbon transformation is simultaneously advancing environmental goals, technological innovation and industrial growth.
Recent assessments support the view that China's current economic strategy places a growing emphasis on strengthening domestic demand through targeted social policy reforms. Elitza Mileva, the World Bank's lead economist for China, recently noted that measures such as higher pension benefits and childcare subsidies would expand social protection and reduce precautionary household savings, exerting a positive impact on household consumption.
Analysts view this approach as signaling "strong continuity" in China's economic management. As China's consumer market expands and upgrades, its scale and purchasing power are expected to drive global demand and generate spillover benefits across the Asia-Pacific. The momentum will be reinforced by expanded digital and green trade, AI and green technology exports and broader free trade partnerships.
At a time when the international economy is navigating a decisive period of geopolitical and technological transformation, a stronger Chinese consumer market can turbocharge the domestic economy and act as a catalyst for deeper regional economic integration, strengthening trade, investment and supply-chain connections with neighboring economies, particularly in Southeast Asia.
Beyond the near-term policy measures, the "two sessions" reaffirm China's strategic vision for development. The draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) highlights Beijing's resolve to anchor future growth in technological innovation, industrial upgrading and greater self-reliance. By pairing a more dynamic consumer market with advances in frontier technologies, China would be better positioned to achieve long-term growth, bolster economic resilience and secure a leading role in emerging industries.
The blueprint marks an evolution in the country's development model. Rather than prioritizing growth speed alone, the new draft plan emphasizes stability, technological sophistication, innovation and consumption. By embedding these priorities across sectors, Chinese policymakers aim to modernize the economy and reduce dependence on traditional growth drivers such as export-led expansion. This strategy — combining a vibrant domestic market with technological leadership — lays the groundwork for a flexible, future-ready economy capable of sustaining high-quality prosperity.
*My article first appeared at China Diplomacy in the New Era
March 30, 2026
The Middle East is drifting toward rival security blocs
The Middle East is increasingly gravitating toward parallel – and potentially rival – security architectures. Rather than pursuing strategic diversification within a shared regional order, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are charting divergent paths amid waning U.S. guarantees. The trajectory points not to cohesion but to structural fragmentation in the regional security landscape.
Abu Dhabi’s signing a letter of intent with New Delhi on a Strategic Defense Partnership[i] highlights this shift, underscoring intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although not a formal defense pact, the arrangement would sharpen regional divisions particularly if Israel is formally embedded in the emerging security network, accelerating the consolidation of the Indo-Abrahamic alliance.
The recalibration unfolded following an October 2023 leaked report that allegedly outlined Abu Dhabi’s plans[ii] to provide support to Israel through a network of military facilities in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, including in Yemen, Eritrea and Somalia, against Hamas. The disclosure reinforced the perception of the UAE[iii] as a permissive conduit for Israeli power projection across the Middle East.
The partnership enables New Delhi to sustain strategic presence and influence in the Middle East without entanglement in regional conflicts[iv] and offers Abu Dhabi a pathway to long-term, technology-driven economic growth, anchored in diversified external partnerships. This flexible hedging model contrasts sharply with Riyadh’s security strategy.
Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Pakistan[v] commits the parties to treat aggression against one as aggression against both. While an embryonic framework lacks defined response mechanisms and clear command integration, it signals Riyadh’s preference for formalized deterrence.
Reports of Türkiye’s interest in joining the SMDA[vi] or building a standalone trilateral security alliance[vii] along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan magnifies the Abu Dhabi’s divergence. If realized, Ankara’s accession – as a NATO member with the alliance’s second-largest military[viii], a rapidly advancing defense industry and expanding military footprint[ix] across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus – would add substantial operational and strategic weight to the treaty.
Signed in September 2025[x], the SMDA’s formulation echoes NATO’s Article 5 even as it excludes explicit nuclear undertakings or predefined protocols. Still, observers believe that it could evolve into a more formal collective defense structure over time[xi] with subsequent agreements defining the role of deterrence and the scope of collective response. Turkish participation, especially if it catalyzes interest from additional states, would strengthen this perception.
The SMDA’s origins lie in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy[xii], accelerated by U.S. inaction following the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities. Since then, Riyadh has broadened diplomatic engagement with rivals including Iran and explored parallel security arrangements to reduce dependence on America’s protective umbrella.
Israel’s military operations across multiple theaters, including strikes targeting Hamas leadership in Qatar, crystallized anxieties about the reliability of external deterrence. For Gulf states, the concern was Washington’s apparent inability – or unwillingness – to restrain a close ally from trespassing the sovereignty of another U.S. partner, which could have ignited a wider regional conflict.
As Ellie Geranmayeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations anticipated the looming reckoning, “If you are an Arab country that hosts U.S. bases or a NATO member like Türkiye and then a major U.S. ally attacks Qatar, you are going to deeply question that American security umbrella you’ve paid top dollar for.”[xiii]
Similar doubts have surfaced in Europe. Germany’s exploration[xiv] and France’s conditional consideration of extending nuclear deterrence to other European states[xv] last year emphasized growing unease even among core NATO allies. Türkiye’s interest in the SMDA mirrors comparable skepticism.
For Riyadh, the pact enhances leverage over Washington, bolstering resistance to U.S. pressure to normalize relations with Israel[xvi] without tangible progress[xvii] toward a Palestinian state. For economically strained Pakistan, it offers prospects of translating strategic configuration into material gains[xviii] – arms exports, increased Saudi investment and deeper defense-industrial cooperation. Türkiye’s calculus is strategic, aimed at expanding regional influence and diversifying security options beyond NATO.
These shifts have unsettled peripheral actors. In India, the SMDA has drawn close scrutiny from policymakers[xix] and analysts[xx] about its long-term structural implications. The emerging Saudi–Pakistan–Türkiye triad, Indian critics argue[xxi], could reshape power balances across the Middle East and adjacent regions central to India’s energy security, trade routes and strategic interests.
The implications extend into the South Caucasus, a geostrategic corridor linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. An expanded SMDA would intersect with the existing Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Türkiye political-military axis, complicating India’s efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement.[xxii]
At the same time, Ankara’s strong ties with Baku and its strengthening relations with Tbilisi could provide Riyadh alternative investment and transit pathways into Central Asia via the Middle Corridor[xxiii], reinforcing the bloc’s strategic coherence beyond the Middle East.
Yet, conflating the multilateral defense alliance with ideological cohesion or strategic revisionism[xxiv] misreads the nature of contemporary alignment. From Saudi-UAE rifts over Yemen and divergent positions on Somaliland’s recognition – Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on one side and the UAE and Israel on the other – to their respective outreach to Pakistan and India reveal that regional geopolitics is driven by economic and strategic interests, not ideological affinity.
Whether the SMDA matures into a broader collective framework or remains limited, Türkiye’s interest reflects an adaptive response to eroding security guarantees. By contrast, the UAE–India partnership embodies a different logic, integrating defense cooperation with trade and technology without binding automatic defense commitments.
These contrasting approaches indicate that the Middle East is entering a period of competitive fragmentation. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a more institutionalized model of deterrence while the UAE’s flexible hedging emphasizes optionality over commitment. With little prospect for coordination between these parallel alignments, they risk calcifying into rival blocs – weakening deterrence, raising the stakes for miscalculation and heightening the likelihood of regional escalation.
[i] Embassy of India, Abdu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (2025). “India-UAE Bilateral Defence Cooperation”, retrieved from: https://www.indembassyuae.gov.in/defence-relation.php#:~:text=Bilateral%20defence%20cooperation%20between%20India,Defence%20Cooperation%20in%20June%202003.
[ii] Cafiero, G. (2025). “Israel, the UAE, and Yemen’s South: The Politics of Unlikely Alliances”, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 November 2025, retrieved from: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israel-the-uae-and-yemens-south-the-politics-of-unlikely-alliances/.
[iii] Middle East Eye (2026). “Prominent Saudi academic accuses UAE of being Israel’s ‘trojan horse’”, Middle East Eye, 23 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/prominent-saudi-academic-accuses-uae-being-israels-trojan-horse.
[iv] Patel, S. and Elimam, A. (2026). “India, UAE sign $3 billion LNG deal, agree to boost trade and defence ties at leaders’ meeting”, Reuters, 19 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-uae-agree-boost-trade-defence-ties-finalise-lng-deal-leaders-meeting-2026-01-19/.
[v] Saudi Press Agency (2025). “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister State Visit to Saudi Arabia”, 25 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2399706?
[vi] Hacaoglu, S., Mangi, S. and Kozok, F. (2026). “Turkey Said to Seek Membership of Saudi-Pakistan Defense Pact”, Bloomberg, 9 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/turkey-said-to-seek-membership-of-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact.
[vii] TRT World (2026). “Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defence deal ‘in pipeline’”, 16 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.trtworld.com/article/0ddf25688812.
[viii] Al Jazeera (2025). “Turkiye’s booming defence industry – a quick look”, 17 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/heres-a-look-at-turkiyes-booming-defence-industry.
[ix] Alhas, A.M. (2025). “Analysis: Turkey pursues deals, bases, training to bolster global military”, BBC Monitoring, 9 May 2025, retrieved from: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003u88.
[x] Saudi Press Agency (2025). “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister State Visit to Saudi Arabia”, 17 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2399706?
[xi] Ashtakala, D., Horschig, D. and Schiff, B. (2025). “Could the Pakistani-Saudi Defense Pact Be the First Step Toward a NATO-Style Alliance”, 6 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-pakistani-saudi-defense-pact-be-first-step-toward-nato-style-alliance.
[xii] El Yaakoubi, A. (2023). “Saudi crown prince acts to realign Mideast dynamics amid concern over US support”, Reuters, 4 April 2023, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-acts-realign-mideast-dynamics-amid-concern-over-us-support-2023-04-03/.
[xiii] Dagher, S. et al. (2025). “Israel’s Qatar Attack Has Gulf Doubting US security Pledge”, Bloomberg, 10 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-10/israel-s-qatar-attack-has-gulf-questioning-us-security-guarantee.
[xiv] Reuters (2025). “Germany’s Mertz wants European nuclear weapons to boost US shield”, 9 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-merz-wants-european-nuclear-weapons-boost-us-shield-2025-03-09/.
[xv] Hairsine, K. (2025). “Macron open to deploying French nuclear weapons in Europe”, DW, 14 May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/macron-open-to-deploying-french-nuclear-weapons-in-europe/a-72534138.
[xvi] MEMO (2025). “Report: Tensions soared during Trump-bin Salman meeting over normalization push”, 26 November 2025, retrieved from: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251126-report-tensions-soared-during-trump-bin-salman-meeting-over-normalisation-push/.
[xvii] Roll Call (2025). “Remarks: Donald Trump Holds a Bilat with Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia”, retrieved from: https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-november-18-2025/.
[xviii] Shahid, A. and Sayeed, S. (2026). “Exclusive: Pakistan, Saudi in talks on JF-17 jets-for-loans deal, sources say”, Reuters, 8 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-saudi-talks-jf-17-jets-for-loans-deal-sources-say-2026-01-07/.
[xix] Vaish, A. (2025). “India Says ‘Will Study Implications’ Of Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Defence Deal”, Outlook, 18 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.outlookindia.com/national/india-says-will-study-implications-of-pakistan-saudi-arabia-defence-deal.[xx] Pandya, A. (2025). “Could Saudi-Pakistan Defense Cooperation Spark War with India?”, Middle East Forum, 22 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/could-saudi-pakistan-defense-cooperation-spark-war-with-india.
[xxi] India Today (2026). “Turkey in talks to join Pakistan-Saudi Muslim Nato. Should India be concerned?”, 13 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-news-turkey-in-talks-to-join-pak-saudi-nato-like-defence-deal-should-india-be-worried-bloomberg-2851070-2026-01-13.
[xxii] Chalikyan, N. (2025). “India and the South Caucasus: Infrastructure, Arms, and Geopolitical Competition”, ORF America, 16 October 2025, retrieved from: https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/india-and-the-south-caucasus-infrastructure-arms-and-geopolitical-competition.
[xxiii] Amwaj Media (2025). “The burgeoning Gulf Arab footprint in the South Caucasus”, 21 March 2025, retrieved from: https://amwaj.media/en/article/the-burgeoning-gulf-arab-footprint-in-the-south-caucasus.
[xxiv] Restelli, S. (2026). “Two Security Architectures, One Region: Why the India-UAE-Israel Axis Matters”, 20 January 2026, retrieved from: https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/two-security-architectures-one-region-why-the-india-uae-israel-axis-matters/.
*My article first appeared at Manara Magazine/Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum
March 25, 2026
Merz's visit to set a positive tone for future Sino-German relations
By: Azhar Azam
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he would seek "strategic partnerships" and pursue future cooperation with Beijing during his China visit, which begins on Wednesday. Against the backdrop of rising protectionism, his comments reflect Berlin's intent to reinforce pragmatic collaboration in trade, investment and manufacturing with Beijing through renewed high-level exchanges and intensified business engagement.
Asked whether concrete outcomes were expected, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul earlier confirmed, "Yes, they can, and in all likelihood they will." He noted that Beijing had approved the export applications for some German companies, reaffirming China as one of Germany's most important trading partner.
Merz is bringing an unusually large business delegation including chief executives from leading firms such as Bayer, Volkswagen and Siemens. With around 30 senior corporate leaders accompanying him and with interest far exceeding available places, the trip has attracted significant attention from not only China and Germany, but also the international community.
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, Sino-German relations have navigated periods of tensions that have evolved into a robust economic relationship. Despite differences, both countries share interests in boosting trade and investment, supporting the international economy and addressing global challenges such as climate change and public health.
Among Berlin's major demands from Beijing are increased market access for its companies and products. China has already signaled receptiveness to deeper commercial engagement. At a roundtable for German-invested enterprises on February 12, Chinese officials encouraged German firms to invest in innovation, green development and the digital sector, pledging a fair and stable business environment.
For Germany, China remains a vital market and an attractive investment destination. German corporate investment in China reached a four-year high in 2025, and firms themselves credit China-based technologies and products with strengthening their global presence and competitiveness. This demonstrates commitment to elevate business ties and sustain advanced-manufacturing linkages.
Economic fundamentals highlight the depth of the relationship. China was Germany's largest trading partner from 2016 to 2023. After the US briefly overtook it in 2024, Beijing regained the top position in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching 251.8 billion euros (around $296.66 billion), according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis).
Some frame Germany's economic ties with China as a source of dependence; they are reciprocal and historically rooted. Decades of investment, trade and technological cooperation have produced structurally embedded interlinkages that benefit both sides. The priority shouldn't be asymmetric dependence but mutual interdependence.
Merz's outreach to China carries wider geopolitical significance. Amid intensifying global trade frictions and attempts to undermine a coordinated response to climate change, disease surveillance and pandemic preparedness, Berlin's stance on tariffs, support for multilateral institutions and emphasis on free trade align with Beijing's.
At the Munich Security Conference, the German Chancellor himself warned against unilateralism. "We do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade. We stand by climate agreements and the World Health Organization." As protectionist impulses and efforts to weaken institutions threaten global cohesion, closer China-Germany coordination becomes crucial to safeguard multilateralism, open trade and collective action on climate and global health.
As Wadephul, who recently met with his Chinese and French counterparts Wang Yi and Jean-Noel Barrot, stressed: Germany and France should increase communication with China to dispel misunderstandings and consolidate mutual trust. Such engagements could advance strategic dialogue, strengthen the UN-centered international system, improve global governance and support each other's development.
At the European Industry Summit, Merz hailed China's industrial speed and implementation capacity in rolling out large renewable-energy projects as a benchmark for Europe. By partnering with Beijing, Berlin and Brussels can accelerate their green transition, scale innovation and boost competitiveness – three pillars of Europe's industrial renewal amid a protectionist, anti-green administration in Washington.
Building on recent diplomatic exchanges and strong complementarities between Europe's largest industrial economy and the world's leading manufacturing and innovation hub, Merz's China visit is expected to yield concrete results. Possible outcomes include a more predictable market environment, collaboration in innovation, green industries, the digital sector, advanced manufacturing, automotive and chemicals.
Germany's long-standing engagement with China provides a solid foundation. For two decades, German firms have thrived on China's demand – particularly in the automotive, machinery and chemical industries – creating a win-win scenario that allowed them to weather shocks better than their peers.
The momentum hasn't faded. Still, roughly all German companies in China are optimistic about their future outlook, with half intending to increase investment in metal products, automotive, electronic, chemicals and logistics.
As US tariffs weigh on German firms and pivot toward the Chinese market, Beijing is extending robust policy support. During the 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan period, China aims to expand high-quality opening-up and development, generating significant opportunities for German exporters. Germany's parallel efforts to ensure an equitable business environment for Chinese companies would promise a more resilient Beijing-Berlin economic and trade partnership.
Looking ahead, this leadership-level engagement is poised to set a constructive tone for the future of Beijing-Berlin relations. The world's second and third-largest economies share strong economic and political interconnections and a common stake in global stability.
When combined with China's high-quality demand, technological innovation and industrial capacity, Germany's drive for trade expansion, competitiveness and resilient supply chains could help revitalize its economy and sustain a mutually beneficial partnership for decades to come.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he would seek "strategic partnerships" and pursue future cooperation with Beijing during his China visit, which begins on Wednesday. Against the backdrop of rising protectionism, his comments reflect Berlin's intent to reinforce pragmatic collaboration in trade, investment and manufacturing with Beijing through renewed high-level exchanges and intensified business engagement.
Asked whether concrete outcomes were expected, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul earlier confirmed, "Yes, they can, and in all likelihood they will." He noted that Beijing had approved the export applications for some German companies, reaffirming China as one of Germany's most important trading partner.
Merz is bringing an unusually large business delegation including chief executives from leading firms such as Bayer, Volkswagen and Siemens. With around 30 senior corporate leaders accompanying him and with interest far exceeding available places, the trip has attracted significant attention from not only China and Germany, but also the international community.
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, Sino-German relations have navigated periods of tensions that have evolved into a robust economic relationship. Despite differences, both countries share interests in boosting trade and investment, supporting the international economy and addressing global challenges such as climate change and public health.
Among Berlin's major demands from Beijing are increased market access for its companies and products. China has already signaled receptiveness to deeper commercial engagement. At a roundtable for German-invested enterprises on February 12, Chinese officials encouraged German firms to invest in innovation, green development and the digital sector, pledging a fair and stable business environment.
For Germany, China remains a vital market and an attractive investment destination. German corporate investment in China reached a four-year high in 2025, and firms themselves credit China-based technologies and products with strengthening their global presence and competitiveness. This demonstrates commitment to elevate business ties and sustain advanced-manufacturing linkages.
Economic fundamentals highlight the depth of the relationship. China was Germany's largest trading partner from 2016 to 2023. After the US briefly overtook it in 2024, Beijing regained the top position in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching 251.8 billion euros (around $296.66 billion), according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis).
Some frame Germany's economic ties with China as a source of dependence; they are reciprocal and historically rooted. Decades of investment, trade and technological cooperation have produced structurally embedded interlinkages that benefit both sides. The priority shouldn't be asymmetric dependence but mutual interdependence.
Merz's outreach to China carries wider geopolitical significance. Amid intensifying global trade frictions and attempts to undermine a coordinated response to climate change, disease surveillance and pandemic preparedness, Berlin's stance on tariffs, support for multilateral institutions and emphasis on free trade align with Beijing's.
At the Munich Security Conference, the German Chancellor himself warned against unilateralism. "We do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade. We stand by climate agreements and the World Health Organization." As protectionist impulses and efforts to weaken institutions threaten global cohesion, closer China-Germany coordination becomes crucial to safeguard multilateralism, open trade and collective action on climate and global health.
As Wadephul, who recently met with his Chinese and French counterparts Wang Yi and Jean-Noel Barrot, stressed: Germany and France should increase communication with China to dispel misunderstandings and consolidate mutual trust. Such engagements could advance strategic dialogue, strengthen the UN-centered international system, improve global governance and support each other's development.
At the European Industry Summit, Merz hailed China's industrial speed and implementation capacity in rolling out large renewable-energy projects as a benchmark for Europe. By partnering with Beijing, Berlin and Brussels can accelerate their green transition, scale innovation and boost competitiveness – three pillars of Europe's industrial renewal amid a protectionist, anti-green administration in Washington.
Building on recent diplomatic exchanges and strong complementarities between Europe's largest industrial economy and the world's leading manufacturing and innovation hub, Merz's China visit is expected to yield concrete results. Possible outcomes include a more predictable market environment, collaboration in innovation, green industries, the digital sector, advanced manufacturing, automotive and chemicals.
Germany's long-standing engagement with China provides a solid foundation. For two decades, German firms have thrived on China's demand – particularly in the automotive, machinery and chemical industries – creating a win-win scenario that allowed them to weather shocks better than their peers.
The momentum hasn't faded. Still, roughly all German companies in China are optimistic about their future outlook, with half intending to increase investment in metal products, automotive, electronic, chemicals and logistics.
As US tariffs weigh on German firms and pivot toward the Chinese market, Beijing is extending robust policy support. During the 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan period, China aims to expand high-quality opening-up and development, generating significant opportunities for German exporters. Germany's parallel efforts to ensure an equitable business environment for Chinese companies would promise a more resilient Beijing-Berlin economic and trade partnership.
Looking ahead, this leadership-level engagement is poised to set a constructive tone for the future of Beijing-Berlin relations. The world's second and third-largest economies share strong economic and political interconnections and a common stake in global stability.
When combined with China's high-quality demand, technological innovation and industrial capacity, Germany's drive for trade expansion, competitiveness and resilient supply chains could help revitalize its economy and sustain a mutually beneficial partnership for decades to come.
*My article first appeared in CGTN
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)