What U.S.-Iran coercive diplomacy produces is managed instability

By: Azhar Azam

U.S.–Iran tensions can be read through coercive diplomacy in which escalation functions as a tool to shape negotiations. Throughout the conflict, President Donald Trump applied intense military pressure on Tehran to raise the cost of defiance, followed by diplomatic engagement once leverage was established.

Recent developments suggest this approach has yielded results. By pairing military readiness with threats of destroying Iranian infrastructure, Trump pursued a policy of a managed force intensification to compress Iran’s bargaining position.

The fragile ceasefire already showed that the situation was becoming harder to control. A campaign initially framed as limited to degrading Tehran’s nuclear program risked pulling the wider region into the conflict. Iranian retaliation spread widely across the Persian Gulf, threatening U.S. military bases, striking regional energy infrastructure, and disrupting oil and food supplies – exposing the vulnerabilities of America’s regional partners.

Three dynamics sustained this cycle: widening conflict, mounting economic toll, and growing strain on U.S. alliances.

 

Iran’s horizontal escalation

The scale of Iran's retaliation was the primary driver behind Trump's push for de-escalation.

In response to joint U.S. and Israeli strikes, Tehran adopted a strategy of horizontal expansion, broadening the battlefield by targeting U.S. military installations and civilian infrastructure across Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait.

These strikes exploited a key feature of America’s regional posture. The U.S. maintains a network of forward bases in allied countries to conduct operations in the Middle East. By threatening these facilities, Iran effectively turned the geography of U.S. alliances into a combat zone, placing American partners in harm’s way.

Throughout the crisis, both Washington and Tehran employed coercive signaling – calibrated shows of force and public warnings – to influence each other’s decisions. Trump’s threats and deadlines sought to compel compliance; Tehran’s attacks sent clear counter-signals of retaliation and cost.

Iran was unlikely to prevail in a conventional military confrontation with the United States. Its strategy instead focused on increasing the political, economic, and military costs for Washington and its partners. This in turn increased risks of spillover, including civilian harm, infrastructure damage, and broader regional entanglement.

Mounting economic shock

A second driver behind Trump’s pursuit of de-escalation has been the growing economic shock from the conflict that rippled through energy markets, supply chains, and global food systems.

One of the most sensitive chokepoints is the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply and a substantial share of seaborne fertilizers pass. The near-shutdown of this strategic waterway disrupted shipping flows and pushed up oil prices, fuel costs, and war-risk insurance premiums.

Iran’s asymmetric retaliation also crossed a line with its Gulf neighbors. After an Israeli strike hit Iran’s South Pars gas field — one of the world’s largest energy hubs — Tehran launched missile and drone attacks on key regional energy hubs.

These strikes inflicted widespread damage to Gulf energy assets such as knocking out 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity for three to five years. These attacks demonstrate that Tehran’s response extended beyond direct confrontation with U.S. forces to disproportionately impact regional economies and civilian infrastructure.

Had Gulf leaders not exercised restraint, Iran’s actions could have driven the Middle East to a broader regional war, although these strikes strengthened Tehran’s position by forcing Trump to limit U.S. involvement and bring the conflict to a close.

Beyond energy, the disruption threatened to squeeze the global food system. With about one-third of global seaborne fertilizers traded through the Strait, this could have triggered a food and humanitarian crisis in several regions.

Domestically, rising inflation, eroded consumer purchasing power, and the prospect of slower growth intensified political and economic pressure on Trump. The economic fallout extended to the Gulf, where Arab states have so far incurred up to $194 billion in losses, according to the United Nations Development Program.

Combined, these shocks reveal that coercive strategies generate leverage but also impose economic constraints.

U.S. allies bear the costs

The conflict strained America’s alliance network as well.

Countries hosting U.S. forces — including Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE — faced direct security threats as missiles and drones traversed the region. For these governments, the danger of “entrapment risk” – the fear of being drawn into the conflict — increased pressure to limit further escalation and reassess the costs of forward deployment.

Tensions also surfaced within the transatlantic coalition. Several European nations hesitated to deploy warships to the Strait, with some denying the U.S. access to airspace or military facilities for operations, reflecting concerns about energy market instability and regional escalation.

At the same time, the White House indicated that the Trump administration could ask Arab countries to pay for the war, potentially shifting part of the burden onto regional partners. Yet as many Gulf states did not support the intervention and urged diplomacy beforehand, the prospect of being asked to absorb the consequences of a conflict they neither initiated nor endorsed would deepen unease among allies.

These dynamics nudged Trump toward capping the conflict.

The strategic gamble

Taken together, U.S.–Iran tensions could be best understood as a recurring system of coercive diplomacy in which force and negotiation acted as interconnected instruments of statecraft. The relationship has repeatedly oscillated between confrontation and limited engagement, without settlement.

Iran’s conventional military limits constrain its ability to compete directly with the United States; it retains leverage to threaten energy infrastructure, maritime security, and broader regional stability. These tools do not enable decisive victory, but they are sufficient to raise the costs of sustained pressure.

The result is managed instability: a system where coercion and engagement repeatedly rise and recede, producing stability through adjustment rather than resolution.

How US betrayed allies by igniting an energy crisis

By: Azhar Azam

Amid the Iran conflict's sharp impact on global energy prices, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners (OPEC+) will meet on April 5 with a potential production increase on the agenda.

At a virtual session on March 1, the cartel's eight major oil-producing nations including Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to raise output by 206,000 barrels per day in April.

This comes as the fallout of the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran – particularly US "large-scale" bombing targeting facilities around Kharg Island, Iran's economic lifeline that processes 90% of the country's crude exports and handles 950 million barrels a year – has widened into a full‑blown disruption of the global energy system. The White House principal deputy press secretary's statement that the US military could "take out" Kharg Island has raised the risk of further escalation in the region.

The war has already established a de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil supply and one-third of the global fertilizers used to produce almost half of the world's food pass. As shipping companies reroute vessels and insurers raise risk premiums – global crude prices have surged past $100 per barrel, fueling fears that prolonged instability in this critical corridor would elicit a severe supply shock.

US President Donald Trump has called on nations to help secure the vital shipping route by sending warships. Yet even countries with longstanding security ties to Washington have shown little enthusiasm to join the proposed multinational escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz.

Instead, several of America's Asian and European allies including those from NATO have rebuffed the appeal and refused to become involved in a crisis they didn't create, exposing rifts within the US-led alliance system.

For the US, the economic consequences of this energy shock are far less than those faced by much of the rest of the world. Over the past decade, the "shale revolution" has transformed the US into one of the world's largest oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers and exporters. Higher global energy prices are actually helping the American energy sector, boosting the revenues of oil and LNG producers and exporters.

While the US remains largely insulated as a net energy exporter, many of its closest partners depend exceedingly on imported oil and gas. Japan and the Republic of Korea import about 95% and 70% of their crude, respectively, from the Middle East, much of which is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. Even short-term disruptions in Gulf shipping routes can quickly ripple through their manufacturing supply chains.

The recent spike in oil prices could add inflationary pressure across these energy-dependent industrial economies, raising input costs for petrochemicals and other energy-intensive sectors.

The economic impact is significant for the EU too, a major net energy importer getting 57% of its total energy needs from abroad. The bloc relies heavily on seaborne oil shipments, particularly diesel and jet fuel from the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, for fertilizers. With shipments at a near halt, European countries are scrambling to subsidize energy costs and shield the economy from one of the deepest energy crises ever.

For European economies still recovering from the energy shock triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a renewed surge in oil prices and lack of fertilizers could mean stagflation and food deprivation across the continent. A sustained interruption would tighten supply, push up energy costs higher and further complicate Europe's economic recovery at a time when growth remains fragile.

Australia, another key US partner in the Asia-Pacific, is also exposed to the spillover effects of the Iran conflict. While it is one of the world's largest exporters of LNG, Australia has just two operating refineries and gets roughly 80% of its refined petroleum products from overseas.

This structural dependence leaves it vulnerable to swings in international oil prices and supply chain bottlenecks. As energy costs climb, transport and logistics expenses rise in tandem, feeding into broader price increases and trade imbalances. The paradox reveals that even US energy-exporting allies are not immune to the wider economic repercussions of instability in the Gulf.

Washington bears considerable responsibility for the crisis. By launching a military campaign against Iran in the midst of nuclear negotiations, it undermined the prospects of a diplomatic solution, destabilized the entire Middle East and disrupted energy flows – creating an energy crisis that may benefit segments of its domestic energy sector but betrays allies by imposing significant economic costs on them through inflation, higher energy costs and trade shocks.

In effect, the US has weaponized global energy markets, turning its military leverage into economic advantage for itself while its strikes on Iran have ignited a supply squeeze that is reverberating across the global economy, leaving allies exposed.

Ultimately, America's strategic gain comes at the expense of the stability and prosperity of its partners.

*My article first appeared at CGTN

Tokyo's military ambitions collide with US priorities

By: Azhar Azam

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's first official visit to the United States to reaffirm "unwavering solidarity" between Tokyo and Washington comes as Japan uses the regional environment to justify expanding its military position.

Since assuming office, Takaichi has adopted a strikingly hawkish tone toward China, frequently portraying Beijing as the central challenge to Japan's national security.

In a recent policy statement, she argued that her country was facing the most "severe and complex" security environment of the post-war era, citing China's military modernization and regional activities. Such rhetoric has become an essential component of her efforts to rally political support for sweeping changes to Japan's security policy.

Takaichi continues to rehash this confrontational message. Speaking at the National Defense Academy of Japan, she declared that Japan must strengthen its defense capabilities "without excluding any option." The remarks suggest Tokyo's intent to move beyond a strictly defensive posture and deepen concerns over its gradual abandonment of its pacifist posture in favor of a more assertive – even offensive – military identity.

Japan's militarization is accelerating this drift. Tokyo's defense reforms including raising military spending to 2% of GDP and coming under the US nuclear umbrella – Washington's pledge to employ its nuclear arsenal to defend allies like NATO members and Japan against nuclear or major conventional attacks – reflect a dramatic expansion of its security ambitions.

These measures further mark a clear departure from Japan's longstanding commitment to its three non-nuclear principles: not possessing, not producing and not allowing nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory or its territorial waters.

Last week, Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed that Tokyo had begun receiving US-made Tomahawk and Norwegian Joint Strike Missiles. The acquisition of these offensive weapons is a significant escalation in Japan's military approach. While successive governments have interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to allow self-defense, acquiring long-range strike capabilities is a clear shift toward a more assertive military role, stretching the limits of Japan's pacifist framework.

These actions have sparked an outrage in Japan's civil society and among opposition political leaders, many of whom view the missile acquisitions as a violation of Article 9. The controversy illustrates how far Japan has moved from its peaceful doctrine.

Tokyo frames this hardline stance as a response to growing regional threats. In practice, the narrative has become a familiar tool for pushing through military expansion and gradually dismantling the restraints of its post-war security guideline.

Since becoming prime minister, Takaichi has been emphasizing the centrality of the US-Japan alliance to secure US President Donald Trump's support for her contentious security agenda. She has repeatedly signaled goodwill toward him, highly accommodating his terms, highlighting cooperation on trade, defense spending and strategic alignment with Washington.

Yet this overture ignores the underlying feature of American foreign policy. For Washington, alliances are rarely altruistic. The Trump administration – and Washington more broadly – tend to treat partners through the lens of national interest and transactional pragmatism. The "America First" logic is explicit: Alliances are valued only if they advance US objectives.

From the US perspective, the Tokyo-Washington alliance is not an unconditional security guarantee but an instrument of geopolitical convenience. Within the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan functions as a strategic piece on the regional chessboard rather than an equal partner or staunch ally – valuable to contain China, yet expendable when American interests demand flexibility.

Senior American officials have already clarified that Washington's policy toward China and Japan will not be driven by an either-or choice. Recently, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that the US intends to maintain both close ties with Tokyo and constructive engagement with Beijing, calling tensions between the two countries "preexisting."

For Japanese policymakers, this statement should dispel any illusion that the US could be leveraged to pressure China. Japan's role in US strategy has inherently been and will remain contingent, dictated by American interests rather than Tokyo's security ambitions. Washington may at times seek to counterbalance Beijing's influence but it wants to maintain an extensive diplomatic and economic relationship with China.

Public opinion in the country backs this approach with many Americans supporting friendly cooperation and engagement between the world's two largest economies.

Relying on the US alliance to underwrite Japan's growing military assertiveness therefore is a risky strategy. Historically, Washington-Tokyo relations have proven transactional. Washington has demonstrated that it prioritizes its own economic and strategic interests. Trade negotiations, for example, have seen Japan accept tariffs and commit to large investment packages in the US.

Even US intelligence has flagged Takaichi's controversial remarks on Taiwan – that a Taiwan contingency would constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan – as a "significant shift" from a sitting Japanese leader.

By leaning on US support to justify its military expansion, Japan risks trading decades of restraint for a security promise that may never hold. Caught between Trump's demand to provide escort ships in the Strait of Hormuz and widespread domestic opposition to US-Israel actions in Iran, Tokyo's strategy will threaten its own pacifist principles, fracture public consensus and inflame regional tensions.

And whenever American priorities shift, it will leave the nation exposed, delivering neither security nor stability.

*My article first appeared at CGTN

Boao Forum puts cooperation at the heart of Asia's future

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: Leaders and policymakers at the Boao Forum for Asia's 25th annual conference delivered a clear message: Asia's path to stability and growth depends on partnership, shared innovation and inclusive development.

Over the years, the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) has transformed into a high-level dialogue platform for governments, businesses, experts and scholars to jointly discuss the most pressing issues in Asia and the world.

Held annually in Boao, south China's Hainan province, this year's forum brought together participants to address shared challenges and promote economic growth across Asia.

Marking its 25th anniversary this year, the BFA reaffirmed its commitment to deepening regional economic integration and promoting common development among Asian countries. The Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2026, released during the forum, highlighted the resilience and vast economic potential of the continent. Asia's economy is forecast to expand by 4.5%, with its share of global GDP approaching half on a purchasing power parity basis, the report said, pointing to the continent's growing influence worldwide.

Equally significant is the strengthening of intra-regional trade dependence, which edged up from 56.3% in 2023 to 57.2% in 2024. This increase reflects a gradual shift toward deeper regional integration as major economies orient their partnerships within Asia itself. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been identified as "twin anchors of stability," helping sustain economic momentum and reinforce confidence across the region.

The region, particularly China and ASEAN, continues to be the world's premier destination for foreign direct investment, underpinned by economic resilience, an expanding consumer market and growing appeal for global investors. The region is also emerging as a global hub for artificial intelligence. Through advances in AI research, large-scale deployment and industrial application, China — through cooperative mechanisms like the BFA — is playing a central role in Asia's economic and technological transformation.

Despite headwinds such as unilateralism, protectionism and "de-risking," China has drawn global attention for its high-quality development. Amid efforts to downplay the event's significance, participants at the annual conference said Beijing had injected invaluable stability into global supply chains and that the country's edge in technology would drive exports of advanced machinery.

China's openness has fostered a strong and dynamic innovation ecosystem. Over the years, the East Asian nation has evolved from the "world's factory" into a global hub for research, development and technological advancement where multinational companies see value in locating their innovation centers. Beyond gaining access to China's vast consumer market, global enterprises recognize China’s pivotal driving role in global industrial and innovation development. They actively leverage the country's unparalleled talent pool, mature integrated supply chains and policy support that encourages technological collaboration and synchronized innovation strategies.

This openness has also created new corridors of cooperation, particularly with countries of the Global South. For multinationals, China not only offers opportunities to broaden their business footprint but also to grow alongside the country. Beyond collaboration with pharmaceutical firms, Beijing has extensively engaged global enterprises from diverse industries and strengthened comprehensive science and technology cooperation with developing nations.

By leveraging China's robust research infrastructure, advanced technology base and regulatory support, global companies can innovate, grow and contribute to shared development across the region.

International leaders are increasingly highlighting China's critical role in building an open, rules-based multilateral trading system and promoting innovation-led, sustainable development amid widening global fragmentation. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, speaking at the forum, said Beijing has a key role to play in supporting Asia's prosperity and stability. He cited the Hainan Free Trade Port as a "concrete example" of China's commitment to openness and its role in shaping the region's economic architecture.

Praising China's contribution to global development — including through the Belt and Road Initiative — and placing the country at the forefront of emerging areas such as digital and green technologies, Wong called on Beijing to lead the next wave of technological change. As the world explores new areas of cooperation, the BFA has stood out as a leading platform to help maintain the region's competitiveness, advance green growth and create opportunities for mutual development.

This year's forum took on added significance following China's adoption of the Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), which prioritizes high-quality development, AI, scientific and technological innovation and domestic consumption. As Beijing advances its long-term strategy and pushes into emerging technologies, the BFA served as a key venue for leaders, investors and policymakers to understand China's development priorities. Many see opportunities to leverage its strengths in renewable energy and green technologies to accelerate their own transitions.

Against a backdrop of intensifying tariff disputes and a deepening security crisis in the Middle East, this year's BFA emerged as a platform to advocate for peace, stability and development. Speaking at the forum, China's top legislator Zhao Leji emphasized that President Xi Jinping’s vision and initiatives—including building a community with a shared future for humanity and the four global initiatives—have provided a clear direction for the world amid profound global changes. He reaffirmed Beijing's commitment to openness, improving the business environment and promoting common development. He also urged regional nations to jointly work toward an "Asian security model" that emphasizes dialogue and consultation to resolve conflicts. In doing so, the forum reinforced its role as a venue for Asian leaders and global stakeholders to discuss pathways to maintaining stability and sustaining economic growth.

Asia is navigating an unprecedented phase marked by intense economic and security challenges. At such a critical juncture, the BFA proved more important than ever. By bringing together policymakers, industry leaders and scholars, the forum facilitated meaningful exchanges and helped steer the region's collective response to emerging risks and opportunities. China's sustained commitment to openness, innovation and regional cooperation — and its promotion of peace and stability — provides a solid foundation for deeper collaboration to safeguard regional economies and security.

Ultimately, the BFA delivered a compelling reminder: sustainable growth and stability in the region depend not on competition, rivalry or fragmentation but on strengthened partnerships, shared innovation, and a renewed commitment to inclusive development and lasting peace.

*My article first appeared at "China Diplomacy in the New Era"

China's 'two sessions' chart course for high-quality growth

By: Azhar Azam

China's annual "two sessions" — the concurrent meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — opened in Beijing last week, setting the stage for the next chapter of the country's development strategy. Having invested heavily in innovation, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing, Beijing is now focused on leveraging these technological gains over the coming five years.

This year's gathering carries particular significance. As geopolitical tensions and conflicts weigh on global economic prospects, the policy direction emerging from Beijing underscores China's determination to sustain stable development and reinforce its role as a stabilizing force in the world economy, while accelerating its transition toward innovation-driven, green growth.

At the opening meeting of the NPC, Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the government work report, outlining an ambitious yet pragmatic roadmap for China's development in 2026. The report sets a GDP growth target of 4.5-5%, emphasizing a shift toward stable, high-quality development, building on the resilience shown in recent years.

It identifies clear development targets, including a surveyed unemployment rate of around 5.5%, over 12 million new urban jobs and a consumer price index increase of around 2%. Emphasis will be placed on innovative industries such as AI, cutting-edge sectors like quantum technology and next-generation communications, as well as green development, to achieve technological self-reliance and further the low-carbon transition.

The report also commits to proactive fiscal and monetary policies, which are crucial in boosting domestic consumption, strengthening social welfare and fostering inclusive growth. Taken together, these measures signal China’s commitment to quality growth and people-centered progress and cement its role as a responsible and major contributor to global economic growth.

Despite global uncertainty and challenges, China's economy continues to scale new heights. In 2025, the country's economic output topped 140 trillion yuan ($20 trillion), registering 5% growth from the previous year. This expansion translated into tangible social gains, including the creation of roughly 12.7 million urban jobs and the rollout of public well-being initiatives. Efforts to strengthen the social safety net and expand access to health care, education and other essential services promise a development model increasingly focused on improving the quality of people's lives.

At the same time, China's push toward innovation-driven, green development is yielding visible progress across key industrial sectors. In 2025, the output of industrial robots rose 28% and production of new energy vehicles exceeded 16 million units. These advances reflect the rapid modernization of China's manufacturing base, maximizing productivity and further consolidating its role in the global transition toward cleaner, more sustainable mobility.

China's broader energy landscape is changing too. The share of non-fossil energy in total consumption has reached 21.7%, with clean energy accounting for 30.4% of overall energy use. This is definitive evidence of Beijing's steady progress in building a more sustainable and diversified energy system.

Alongside these structural shifts, the production of green technologies continues to expand rapidly. Output of products such as charging piles and solar cells has surged, demonstrating how Beijing's green and low-carbon transformation is simultaneously advancing environmental goals, technological innovation and industrial growth.

Recent assessments support the view that China's current economic strategy places a growing emphasis on strengthening domestic demand through targeted social policy reforms. Elitza Mileva, the World Bank's lead economist for China, recently noted that measures such as higher pension benefits and childcare subsidies would expand social protection and reduce precautionary household savings, exerting a positive impact on household consumption.

Analysts view this approach as signaling "strong continuity" in China's economic management. As China's consumer market expands and upgrades, its scale and purchasing power are expected to drive global demand and generate spillover benefits across the Asia-Pacific. The momentum will be reinforced by expanded digital and green trade, AI and green technology exports and broader free trade partnerships.

At a time when the international economy is navigating a decisive period of geopolitical and technological transformation, a stronger Chinese consumer market can turbocharge the domestic economy and act as a catalyst for deeper regional economic integration, strengthening trade, investment and supply-chain connections with neighboring economies, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Beyond the near-term policy measures, the "two sessions" reaffirm China's strategic vision for development. The draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) highlights Beijing's resolve to anchor future growth in technological innovation, industrial upgrading and greater self-reliance. By pairing a more dynamic consumer market with advances in frontier technologies, China would be better positioned to achieve long-term growth, bolster economic resilience and secure a leading role in emerging industries.

The blueprint marks an evolution in the country's development model. Rather than prioritizing growth speed alone, the new draft plan emphasizes stability, technological sophistication, innovation and consumption. By embedding these priorities across sectors, Chinese policymakers aim to modernize the economy and reduce dependence on traditional growth drivers such as export-led expansion. This strategy — combining a vibrant domestic market with technological leadership — lays the groundwork for a flexible, future-ready economy capable of sustaining high-quality prosperity.

*My article first appeared at China Diplomacy in the New Era

The Middle East is drifting toward rival security blocs

The Middle East is increasingly gravitating toward parallel – and potentially rival – security architectures. Rather than pursuing strategic diversification within a shared regional order, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are charting divergent paths amid waning U.S. guarantees. The trajectory points not to cohesion but to structural fragmentation in the regional security landscape.

Abu Dhabi’s signing a letter of intent with New Delhi on a Strategic Defense Partnership[i] highlights this shift, underscoring intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although not a formal defense pact, the arrangement would sharpen regional divisions particularly if Israel is formally embedded in the emerging security network, accelerating the consolidation of the Indo-Abrahamic alliance.

The recalibration unfolded following an October 2023 leaked report that allegedly outlined Abu Dhabi’s plans[ii] to provide support to Israel through a network of military facilities in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, including in Yemen, Eritrea and Somalia, against Hamas. The disclosure reinforced the perception of the UAE[iii] as a permissive conduit for Israeli power projection across the Middle East.

The partnership enables New Delhi to sustain strategic presence and influence in the Middle East without entanglement in regional conflicts[iv] and offers Abu Dhabi a pathway to long-term, technology-driven economic growth, anchored in diversified external partnerships. This flexible hedging model contrasts sharply with Riyadh’s security strategy.

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Pakistan[v] commits the parties to treat aggression against one as aggression against both. While an embryonic framework lacks defined response mechanisms and clear command integration, it signals Riyadh’s preference for formalized deterrence.

Reports of Türkiye’s interest in joining the SMDA[vi] or building a standalone trilateral security alliance[vii] along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan magnifies the Abu Dhabi’s divergence. If realized, Ankara’s accession – as a NATO member with the alliance’s second-largest military[viii], a rapidly advancing defense industry and expanding military footprint[ix] across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus – would add substantial operational and strategic weight to the treaty.

Signed in September 2025[x], the SMDA’s formulation echoes NATO’s Article 5 even as it excludes explicit nuclear undertakings or predefined protocols. Still, observers believe that it could evolve into a more formal collective defense structure over time[xi] with subsequent agreements defining the role of deterrence and the scope of collective response. Turkish participation, especially if it catalyzes interest from additional states, would strengthen this perception.

The SMDA’s origins lie in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy[xii], accelerated by U.S. inaction following the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities. Since then, Riyadh has broadened diplomatic engagement with rivals including Iran and explored parallel security arrangements to reduce dependence on America’s protective umbrella.

Israel’s military operations across multiple theaters, including strikes targeting Hamas leadership in Qatar, crystallized anxieties about the reliability of external deterrence. For Gulf states, the concern was Washington’s apparent inability – or unwillingness – to restrain a close ally from trespassing the sovereignty of another U.S. partner, which could have ignited a wider regional conflict.

As Ellie Geranmayeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations anticipated the looming reckoning, “If you are an Arab country that hosts U.S. bases or a NATO member like Türkiye and then a major U.S. ally attacks Qatar, you are going to deeply question that American security umbrella you’ve paid top dollar for.”[xiii]

Similar doubts have surfaced in Europe. Germany’s exploration[xiv] and France’s conditional consideration of extending nuclear deterrence to other European states[xv] last year emphasized growing unease even among core NATO allies. Türkiye’s interest in the SMDA mirrors comparable skepticism.

For Riyadh, the pact enhances leverage over Washington, bolstering resistance to U.S. pressure to normalize relations with Israel[xvi] without tangible progress[xvii] toward a Palestinian state. For economically strained Pakistan, it offers prospects of translating strategic configuration into material gains[xviii] – arms exports, increased Saudi investment and deeper defense-industrial cooperation. Türkiye’s calculus is strategic, aimed at expanding regional influence and diversifying security options beyond NATO.

These shifts have unsettled peripheral actors. In India, the SMDA has drawn close scrutiny from policymakers[xix] and analysts[xx] about its long-term structural implications. The emerging Saudi–Pakistan–Türkiye triad, Indian critics argue[xxi], could reshape power balances across the Middle East and adjacent regions central to India’s energy security, trade routes and strategic interests.

The implications extend into the South Caucasus, a geostrategic corridor linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. An expanded SMDA would intersect with the existing Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Türkiye political-military axis, complicating India’s efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement.[xxii]

At the same time, Ankara’s strong ties with Baku and its strengthening relations with Tbilisi could provide Riyadh alternative investment and transit pathways into Central Asia via the Middle Corridor[xxiii], reinforcing the bloc’s strategic coherence beyond the Middle East.

Yet, conflating the multilateral defense alliance with ideological cohesion or strategic revisionism[xxiv] misreads the nature of contemporary alignment. From Saudi-UAE rifts over Yemen and divergent positions on Somaliland’s recognition – Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on one side and the UAE and Israel on the other – to their respective outreach to Pakistan and India reveal that regional geopolitics is driven by economic and strategic interests, not ideological affinity.

Whether the SMDA matures into a broader collective framework or remains limited, Türkiye’s interest reflects an adaptive response to eroding security guarantees. By contrast, the UAE–India partnership embodies a different logic, integrating defense cooperation with trade and technology without binding automatic defense commitments.

These contrasting approaches indicate that the Middle East is entering a period of competitive fragmentation. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a more institutionalized model of deterrence while the UAE’s flexible hedging emphasizes optionality over commitment. With little prospect for coordination between these parallel alignments, they risk calcifying into rival blocs – weakening deterrence, raising the stakes for miscalculation and heightening the likelihood of regional escalation.


[i] Embassy of India, Abdu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (2025). “India-UAE Bilateral Defence Cooperation”, retrieved from: https://www.indembassyuae.gov.in/defence-relation.php#:~:text=Bilateral%20defence%20cooperation%20between%20India,Defence%20Cooperation%20in%20June%202003.
[ii] Cafiero, G. (2025). “Israel, the UAE, and Yemen’s South: The Politics of Unlikely Alliances”, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 November 2025, retrieved from: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israel-the-uae-and-yemens-south-the-politics-of-unlikely-alliances/.
[iii] Middle East Eye (2026). “Prominent Saudi academic accuses UAE of being Israel’s ‘trojan horse’”, Middle East Eye, 23 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/prominent-saudi-academic-accuses-uae-being-israels-trojan-horse.
[iv] Patel, S. and Elimam, A. (2026). “India, UAE sign $3 billion LNG deal, agree to boost trade and defence ties at leaders’ meeting”, Reuters, 19 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-uae-agree-boost-trade-defence-ties-finalise-lng-deal-leaders-meeting-2026-01-19/.
[v] Saudi Press Agency (2025). “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister State Visit to Saudi Arabia”, 25 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2399706?
[vi] Hacaoglu, S., Mangi, S. and Kozok, F. (2026). “Turkey Said to Seek Membership of Saudi-Pakistan Defense Pact”, Bloomberg, 9 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/turkey-said-to-seek-membership-of-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact.
[vii] TRT World (2026). “Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defence deal ‘in pipeline’”, 16 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.trtworld.com/article/0ddf25688812.
[viii] Al Jazeera (2025). “Turkiye’s booming defence industry – a quick look”, 17 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/heres-a-look-at-turkiyes-booming-defence-industry.
[ix] Alhas, A.M. (2025). “Analysis: Turkey pursues deals, bases, training to bolster global military”, BBC Monitoring, 9 May 2025, retrieved from: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003u88.
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*My article first appeared at Manara Magazine/Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum

Merz's visit to set a positive tone for future Sino-German relations

By: Azhar  Azam

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he would seek "strategic partnerships" and pursue future cooperation with Beijing during his China visit, which begins on Wednesday. Against the backdrop of rising protectionism, his comments reflect Berlin's intent to reinforce pragmatic collaboration in trade, investment and manufacturing with Beijing through renewed high-level exchanges and intensified business engagement.

Asked whether concrete outcomes were expected, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul earlier confirmed, "Yes, they can, and in all likelihood they will." He noted that Beijing had approved the export applications for some German companies, reaffirming China as one of Germany's most important trading partner.

Merz is bringing an unusually large business delegation including chief executives from leading firms such as Bayer, Volkswagen and Siemens. With around 30 senior corporate leaders accompanying him and with interest far exceeding available places, the trip has attracted significant attention from not only China and Germany, but also the international community.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, Sino-German relations have navigated periods of tensions that have evolved into a robust economic relationship. Despite differences, both countries share interests in boosting trade and investment, supporting the international economy and addressing global challenges such as climate change and public health.

Among Berlin's major demands from Beijing are increased market access for its companies and products. China has already signaled receptiveness to deeper commercial engagement. At a roundtable for German-invested enterprises on February 12, Chinese officials encouraged German firms to invest in innovation, green development and the digital sector, pledging a fair and stable business environment.

For Germany, China remains a vital market and an attractive investment destination. German corporate investment in China reached a four-year high in 2025, and firms themselves credit China-based technologies and products with strengthening their global presence and competitiveness. This demonstrates commitment to elevate business ties and sustain advanced-manufacturing linkages.

Economic fundamentals highlight the depth of the relationship. China was Germany's largest trading partner from 2016 to 2023. After the US briefly overtook it in 2024, Beijing regained the top position in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching 251.8 billion euros (around $296.66 billion), according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis).

Some frame Germany's economic ties with China as a source of dependence; they are reciprocal and historically rooted. Decades of investment, trade and technological cooperation have produced structurally embedded interlinkages that benefit both sides. The priority shouldn't be asymmetric dependence but mutual interdependence.

Merz's outreach to China carries wider geopolitical significance. Amid intensifying global trade frictions and attempts to undermine a coordinated response to climate change, disease surveillance and pandemic preparedness, Berlin's stance on tariffs, support for multilateral institutions and emphasis on free trade align with Beijing's.

At the Munich Security Conference, the German Chancellor himself warned against unilateralism. "We do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade. We stand by climate agreements and the World Health Organization." As protectionist impulses and efforts to weaken institutions threaten global cohesion, closer China-Germany coordination becomes crucial to safeguard multilateralism, open trade and collective action on climate and global health.

As Wadephul, who recently met with his Chinese and French counterparts Wang Yi and Jean-Noel Barrot, stressed: Germany and France should increase communication with China to dispel misunderstandings and consolidate mutual trust. Such engagements could advance strategic dialogue, strengthen the UN-centered international system, improve global governance and support each other's development.

At the European Industry Summit, Merz hailed China's industrial speed and implementation capacity in rolling out large renewable-energy projects as a benchmark for Europe. By partnering with Beijing, Berlin and Brussels can accelerate their green transition, scale innovation and boost competitiveness – three pillars of Europe's industrial renewal amid a protectionist, anti-green administration in Washington.

Building on recent diplomatic exchanges and strong complementarities between Europe's largest industrial economy and the world's leading manufacturing and innovation hub, Merz's China visit is expected to yield concrete results. Possible outcomes include a more predictable market environment, collaboration in innovation, green industries, the digital sector, advanced manufacturing, automotive and chemicals.

Germany's long-standing engagement with China provides a solid foundation. For two decades, German firms have thrived on China's demand – particularly in the automotive, machinery and chemical industries – creating a win-win scenario that allowed them to weather shocks better than their peers.

The momentum hasn't faded. Still, roughly all German companies in China are optimistic about their future outlook, with half intending to increase investment in metal products, automotive, electronic, chemicals and logistics.

As US tariffs weigh on German firms and pivot toward the Chinese market, Beijing is extending robust policy support. During the 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan period, China aims to expand high-quality opening-up and development, generating significant opportunities for German exporters. Germany's parallel efforts to ensure an equitable business environment for Chinese companies would promise a more resilient Beijing-Berlin economic and trade partnership.

Looking ahead, this leadership-level engagement is poised to set a constructive tone for the future of Beijing-Berlin relations. The world's second and third-largest economies share strong economic and political interconnections and a common stake in global stability.

When combined with China's high-quality demand, technological innovation and industrial capacity, Germany's drive for trade expansion, competitiveness and resilient supply chains could help revitalize its economy and sustain a mutually beneficial partnership for decades to come.

*My article first appeared in CGTN

Why Japan is right to restart its nuclear reactors

By: Azhar Azam

Japan’s decision to restart nuclear reactors heralds a major shift in its approach to addressing multifaceted challenges. For an economy that recorded its first real GDP contraction in six quarters, the move could strengthen economic resilience, enhance energy security and advance decarbonization goals.

A key factor, making nuclear power pivotal to energy security, is its capacity to deliver large volumes of continuous, clean and reliable electricity.

In contrast to intermittent, weather-dependent renewable sources such as wind and solar, nuclear plants provide firm baseload power and work 24×7. This reliability is crucial for an advanced economy like Japan, which needs a stable electricity supply to bolster industrial competitiveness.

Nuclear is a zero-emission clean energy source and has successfully been deployed by several leading economies, including America. Nuclear-generated electricity in the US avoids 470 million metric tons of CO2 emissions annually, the equivalent of removing 100 million cars off the roads, in addition to reducing several harmful air pollutants.

Facing geographical constraints for large-scale renewable deployment, nuclear restarts could reduce Japan’s reliance on imported coal and liquefied natural gas, which cost $68 billion last year and accounted for 60-70% electricity generation – helping Tokyo to mitigate geopolitical risks and limit exposure to external shocks and supply chain disruptions.

For power-intensive AI data centers – where electricity demand is expected to increase five-fold by 2035 – Japan’s emphasis on nuclear energy can translate into grid stability and a diversified power supply – thanks to its advantages such as reliability, high energy density, scalable power output, low carbon emissions and enhanced land use efficiency.

But given that nuclear alone cannot meet the looming power surge, Japan must also accelerate investments in renewables to build a robust energy system.

In this context, SEMI’s three priority actions – removing permitting delays, overcoming land-use challenges and reducing market uncertainties – could stimulate local economies, scale up the system’s resilience and cut costs while strengthening Japan’s industrial competitiveness against global peers.

The country’s revised energy strategy maps out an actionable roadmap to achieve long-term goals. By targeting nuclear and renewables to account for 20% and 50% respectively of the energy mix, the plan provides policy stability for businesses – promoting decarbonization, ensuring stable power supply and reinforcing industrial capacity to drive economic growth.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi wants to curb large solar projects, arguing they could damage Japan’s natural environment and increase Tokyo’s reliance on solar panels on foreign countries, particularly China.

Beijing dominates manufacturing and supply chains for solar panels and wind turbines and is rapidly ascending into a powerhouse in nuclear energy with substantial investments in fusion.

Japan’s push to reduce dependence on China-made solar panels has led to Takaichi administration’s action to end financial support and tighten regulations on mega renewable energy projects and promote next-generation technologies like perovskite solar cells and nuclear fusion.

But her ambitions confront several headwinds. These technologies are still in early stages of development, sparking concerns that Takaichi’s bets could sideline Japan’s climate and renewable-energy ambitions.

Studies suggest that perovskites are unlikely to match conventional solar photovoltaics (PV) on cost price and performance by 2040. For perovskites, durability is the key hurdle: they are yet to become stable enough to operate outdoors for decades.

With next-generation reactors carrying a hefty price tag and most experts projecting that fusion needs at least another 20 to 30 years to develop into a commercial reality – an overemphasis on these technologies could divert investments from economically and technologically proven renewables, whose capacity is set to double to 4,600GW by 2030.

Solar PV alone is likely to account for 80% of this growth due to cost efficiency, wider social acceptance and faster permitting.

Nuclear energy can deliver high-capacity, low-carbon baseload power; its financial and construction challenges can’t be ignored. According to the US Energy Information, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for advanced nuclear power stood as high as $110/MWh (megawatt-hour) in 2023 and is predicted to remain unchanged through 2050.

In comparison, the LCOE of solar PVs is likely to drop from $55/MWh to $25/MWh for the same period. Even France, the world’s second-largest producer of nuclear energy that sources about 70% of its electricity from the industry, aims for renewables to account for 33% of its energy mix by 2030.

Japan’s pivot to nuclear and perovskite is a forward-looking response to an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment and domestic topographical barriers to deploy renewables at scale.

This futuristic approach contributes to strengthening economic resilience by lowering electricity cost, cutting dependence on imported fuel and fortifying energy security, self-reliance and climate action.

Yet as these technologies will take decades to fully mature, downplaying established significance of traditional renewables now risks leaving Japan behind in a sector central to economic competitiveness.

This policy imprecision could undermine Tokyo’s ability to navigate immediate challenges, such as economic stagnation and inflation – to which electricity prices are a major contributor.

Tokyo’s goal, therefore, shouldn’t be choosing between nuclear and renewables but to sequence them intelligently: using nuclear restarts and conventional renewables as near-term stabilizers to contain energy costs while next-generation technologies mature and lay the foundation for Japan’s long-term economic and climate resilience.

*My article first appeared in Asia Times

Lee's China visit marks turning point for Beijing-Seoul ties

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: President Lee's Beijing visit marked a "new starting point" for China-South Korea relations, with leaders committing to expanded cooperation in AI, trade and diplomatic engagement.

During South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's maiden visit to Beijing since taking office, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks for the second time in just two months, signaling a strong determination on both sides to boost economic, political and social exchanges and deliver tangible benefits to people in both countries.

One of the key highlights of the meeting was the convergence in the two leaders' approaches toward stabilizing and building the bilateral relationship. Welcoming Lee at the Great Hall of the People, Xi emphasized that as friends and neighbors, China and South Korea should intensify exchanges and conduct closer communication. He pledged to work with Seoul to bolster cooperation, adhere to the principle of mutual benefit and promote a strategic cooperative partnership for people's well-being and regional stability.

Lee was equally optimistic about working with China to improve people's livelihoods and open a "new phase" in the bilateral relationship. Hoping 2026 to be the year for "full restoration" of Beijing-Seoul relations, Lee recalled that the two countries had friendly exchanges for thousands of years. He also noted their shared history of suffering the loss of sovereignty and fighting for independence in reference to Japan's militarist aggression in the early 20th century.

Describing Xi as a "visionary leader" and China as a "truly reliable neighbor," he emphasized more frequent dialogue and deeper collaboration with Beijing in high-tech sectors and artificial intelligence to unlock mutually beneficial opportunities. He reaffirmed Seoul's commitment to the one-China principle and underlined the importance of respecting each other's national interests.

Xi visited South Korea in November for the first time in 11 years, meeting Lee after the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in the South Korean city of Gyeongju. The Chinese president called for respecting each other's social systems and development paths, promoting cultural and people-to-people exchanges and increasing cooperation in emerging areas such as AI, biomedicine, green industries and the silver economy.

Speaking before South Koreans in Beijing on Sunday, Lee said the trip would serve as a "new starting point" to bridge existing gaps in Sino-South Korean relations, restore them to normal and elevate them further. This optimism would translate into a more robust strategic partnership, contributing to bilateral relations and regional prosperity and security.


At the first China-South Korea Business Forum since 2017 on Monday, Lee acknowledged that closely intertwined supply chains had long supported both countries' development. He stressed the need to unveil "new engines of growth" like AI and consumer products to strengthen and expand bilateral trade.

"The Republic of Korea and China are ships that sail on the same sea in the same direction," Lee said, cautioning that "if we rely only on inertia, we could miss important turning points." The position stood as an endorsement of Xi's proposal to view the bilateral partnership from a long-term perspective, pursue common development, properly handle differences and enhance communication to tackle global challenges.

Bilateral trade volume, according to China's General Administration of Customs, reached about $299 billion in the first 11 months of 2025. People-to-people exchanges are gathering pace as China and South Korea become popular destinations for each other's tourists. South Korea's trade ministry announced nine memorandums of understanding between Chinese and Korean companies in such areas as consumer goods, content production and supply chain management. These agreements signal growing resilience and diversification in Beijing-Seoul cooperation.

For instance, South Korea's retail conglomerate Shinsegae signed a deal with China's e-commerce giant Alibaba to support the former's overseas sales. The initiative aims to export high-quality South Korean goods through the latter's platforms to South Asia and southern Europe, including Spain and Portugal, extending afterward to China and eventually to more than 200 countries and regions. The collaboration will further allow South Korean shopping site Gmarket to move beyond its domestic market and compete globally, enabling even small sellers to reach customers abroad by leveraging Alibaba's AI tools.

Three other MOUs were signed between Korean companies — fish cake maker Samjinfood, agriculture technology firm Farmstaff and biotech company PharmaResearch — and their respective Chinese counterparts. The deals aim to boost Beijing's imports from Seoul. They also meet Lee's aspiration to make AI and consumer goods new pillars of the reinvigorated bilateral relationship while revealing Beijing's willingness to open its vast domestic market for South Korean companies.

Following the leaders' summit, Xi and Lee witnessed the signing of 15 cooperation documents covering science and technology, the economy and trade, transportation, and environmental protection. While these MOUs reflect the two leaders' vision to support each other's development, they underscore how sustained top-level political engagement can lead to substantial opportunities for both countries and their peoples.

The global geopolitical environment is becoming increasingly turbulent, driven by rising protectionism and a resurgence of unilateral military actions. This volatility is illustrated by the U.S. global tariff war and recent invasion of Venezuela, including the widely condemned abduction of President Nicolas Maduro.

Such an act of unparalleled aggression — which violates the territorial integrity of an independent nation, the U.N. Charter and established international norms — will deepen the sense of insecurity among states, particularly those wary of U.S. military intervention. It also risks fueling arms races in multiple regions and accelerating the push for nuclear capability rather than denuclearization and nonproliferation.

In the face of intensifying economic and security challenges, China and South Korea need to strengthen their exchanges and cooperation while resolving differences through dialogue and consultation. They must also assume greater responsibilities to safeguard their own economies as well as promote global development and regional peace, including working together for long-term stability in Northeast Asia. Both countries have a shared legacy of resisting Japanese militarism and benefiting from economic globalization. By aligning their development strategies, strengthening strategic coordination and making the right policy decisions, Beijing and Seoul can jointly oppose protectionism, uphold multilateralism and contribute to building a more equitable, accountable and multipolar world.

Lee has expressed confidence that strategic cooperation between Beijing and Seoul will become an "irreversible trend," indicating his determination to build China-South Korea relations on a solid and lasting foundation. This approach is crucial for deepening political trust, improving people's livelihoods, promoting trade and investment, and cementing industrial and supply chain collaboration.

Snapping family selfies with Xi using a Xiaomi smartphone his Chinese counterpart gifted him, Lee demonstrated the personal warmth now characterizing Beijing-Seoul relations. Both leaders' commitment to more frequent communication and deeper cooperation positions the Beijing-Seoul relationship as a stabilizing force for the region amid global uncertainty.

In short, the visit and its outcomes will have positive impact on bilateral ties and regional and global peace and stability if both sides can effectively manage various interferences and distractions, especially pressure from the other side of the Pacific.

*My article first appeared in China Diplomacy in the New Era