September 3, 2026

The China-US economic rivalry is transforming into a battle for leverage



Several Chinese companies including Alibaba, ByteDance and Tencent have reportedly accessed compute power from GB300 chips remotely through data centers in Asian countries including Thailand, Malaysia and Japan. Less than a week after another Chinese company, Moonshot AI, released a new model, a White House official accused the firm of using one of Nvidia's most advanced processors.

Irrespective of whether it is legal or exposes loopholes in the US export control regime, the episode shows that restricting direct access cannot prevent Beijing from tapping America's advanced computing power. As technology networks become more global, controlling the physical movement of chips doesn’t necessarily mean controlling their use too.

In recent years, Beijing and Washington have pursued strategies to reduce their respective vulnerabilities to each other. The United States has raised tariffs and restricted China's access to advanced technologies, coordinating with allies on export controls targeting strategically sensitive industries. Beijing, in turn, has sought greater financial and technological autonomy to reduce dependence on US-dominated payment systems and leverage its role in critical supply chains including rare earths to safeguard its economic and security interests.

China has made rapid technological progress. According to the 2026 Stanford AI Index, the performance gap between leading US and Chinese AI models has narrowed with America still producing more top-tier AI models and high-impact patents and China leading in AI publication volume, citations, patent output and industrial robot installations. The finding points at the rising Chinese ability to develop its AI sector indigenously and the limits of the US efforts to contain China's technological development.

The US hosts 5,427 data centers, more than 10 times any other country; almost every leading chip is fabricated by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, making it dependent on a single foundry. America's own ambition to lead AI development, thus, relies heavily on international production networks.

Donald Trump's authorization to resume sale of the Nvidia H200 AI chips to "approved customers" in China was a calculated gamble. By giving Chinese tech giants access to a less advanced generation and embargoing the cutting-edge Blackwell chips, he intended to exert US influence on China's AI ecosystem and strengthen his bargaining position against Beijing in trade negotiations.

But by placing caps on the H200 deployment in the mainland and using them for training AI models, China continues to support its domestic AI growth while benefiting from American technology and avoiding long-term dependence on Washington, effectively blunting the leverage Trump is searching for. The response reinforces the perception that US attempts to constrain China's technological advancement has only accelerated the latter's determination to build a self-reliant semiconductor industry. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang himself has blamed US withdrawal from the Chinese market for helping fuel China's semiconductor industry.

A White House report, accusing Chinese exporters of routing goods through more than 40 countries to evade US tariffs, earlier reflected the limits of Washington's effort to reduce its economic dependence on China, revealing that the United States may erect barriers to curtail the influx of Chinese goods into the country but it cannot prevent the China-linked supply chains from adapting.

The report itself acknowledges that some of the shift stems from “legitimate changes” in production, investment and sourcing. This indicates that not every China-linked product reaching the United States through a third country represents tariff evasion and that companies are genuinely moving production in response to geopolitical risks.

Recent research by the Peterson Institute of International Economics demonstrates that Chinese goods and services despite years of US tariffs remain deeply woven into US imports from third countries. While tariffs have reduced direct bilateral trade, they haven’t eliminated Chinese inputs across global supply chains. A Nikkei Asia survey also found that Chinese companies had expanded their global market share albeit tariff barriers.

At the same time, China remains connected to American demand. Even as bilateral trade has shrunk, Beijing's exports of electronics, computers and circuit-board assemblies to neighboring Asian countries have increased. As much of this production is tied to the US artificial intelligence (AI) boom, it has allowed Chinese manufacturers to benefit indirectly from Washington's AI investments. This does not necessarily mean that Chinese goods are being illegally routed into the United States, rather emphasizes the underlying trade relationship remains intact.

With studies already showing that Chinese inputs entering the US through intermediaries such as Vietnam and Mexico, the Trump administration appears to have realized that complete commercial divorce between the two biggest economies in the foreseeable future is improbable. Its new approach appears to move away from outright decoupling toward extracting economic concessions from China such as securing its commitment to address US concerns regarding critical minerals supply chains, purchase Boeing aircraft and restore market access for US farm produce.

This does not mean that the United States has abandoned economic pressure. Washington is pursuing selective commercial engagement with China while continuing to restrict its access to technologies deemed critical to US national security. The emerging strategy suggests that the Trump administration is focusing on increasing trade with Beijing in non-sensitive sectors to retain economic leverage over China. Beijing, meanwhile, is doubling down on its efforts to build domestic capabilities to reduce exposure to foreign suppliers and establish its own leverage against Washington.

The Trump administration's policy has clearly shifted from decoupling to selective economic engagement. While Washington is deploying tariffs and technology curbs to secure benefits for domestic manufacturers and farmers, China continues to draw on its dominance in global supply chains and limited reliance on American semiconductors to strengthen its position in future trade negotiations. In this fierce brinkmanship, both sides are playing to their respective advantages to prevail over the other: Washington by applying economic pressure and Beijing by finding ways to blunt it.


September 1, 2026

How Saudi Arabia is turning great-power rivalry to its advantage

By: Azhar Azam

The US-Saudi nuclear energy deal, also known as a 123 Agreement, is the culmination of Riyadh’s decades-long effort to diversify its energy mix, reduce the massive amount of oil and gas consumed domestically and free more hydrocarbons for export and higher-value uses.

Electricity demand in the kingdom has grown rapidly due to population growth, urbanization, air conditioning and energy-intensive water desalination plants. With local energy consumption projected to surge three fold by 2030, continued reliance on fossil fuels for domestic electricity production risks reducing Saudi Arabia's export revenues, compressing its fiscal space to finance the Vision 2030 and achieve strategic autonomy.

According to the International Energy Administration (IEA), natural gas and oil account for about 58% and 41% of Saudi Arabia's electricity generation. By replacing just a fraction of fossil fuels with nuclear power, Riyadh can redirect the displaced crude and gas to higher-value industrial sectors, diversifying its economy and pushing non-oil exports.

Nuclear energy is expensive. Implementing such a project requires enormous upfront investment, long timeline and sophisticated regulatory institutions. In comparison, solar energy is exceptionally attractive especially for Saudi Arabia, which has abundant sunlight and large tracts of land that makes the country suitable to construct some of the world’s lower-cost solar projects.

Riyadh is not choosing between renewables and nuclear; it’s pursuing both as part of its dual-track strategy. Through the Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia initially set a target of generating 9.5 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy. By the end of 2025, the total capacity of proposed renewable energy projects had reached approximately 64GW with solar projects in Shaybah and Najran producing electricity at just $1.04 cents/kWh and $1.09 cents/kWh. While the United States is emerging as the kingdom's partner in civil nuclear energy, China has become indispensable to Riyadh's energy transition through its low-cost solar panel manufacturing and dominance in clean-energy supply chains.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia is undergoing a rapid industrial transformation. Heavy industries such as mining, petrochemical and manufacturing require stable, continuous electricity at scale. As nuclear reactors provide uninterrupted baseload power and high-temperature industrial heat that solar and wind technologies struggle to deliver, the kingdom has been seeking a nuclear energy cooperation deal with America to advance its economic ambitions.

Earlier, the Biden administration offered Riyadh a civil nuclear cooperation agreement and security guarantees, tying it with Saudi normalization with Israel. Riyadh signaled to proceed with the "grand bargain" yet following Hamas' Oct 7 attacks and Israel military operations in the Gaza Strip and beyond, it in February 2024 reverted to its prior stance, calling for an independent Palestinian state before establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel. As nuclear negotiations with Washington stalled, Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Beijing on nuclear safety and security at the first China-GCC Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology.

Saudi Arabia believed that the most effective way to shield its nuclear ambitions from potential sanctions and international scrutiny over proliferation risks was to secure a nuclear cooperation deal with the United States. The MOU with Beijing gave Riyadh the crucial leverage to push back against the United States' precondition and showcase that it had alternatives if America remained inflexible. Saudi Arabia further indicated its determination to pursue an independent foreign policy by signing a mutual defense pact with Pakistan in September 2025 that vowed to consider an aggression on either as an aggression against both.

The nuclear energy deal is being celebrated as a "win" in the United States against China and Russia even as America has 123 Agreements with dozens of countries including China. It rather represents Saudi Arabia's diplomatic triumph given it has secured a pathway for nuclear cooperation without any commitment to formalize ties with Israel. Unlike many countries struggling to navigate intense US-China rivalry, the kingdom has successfully turned the great-power competition to its advantage, using its ties with Beijing to extract concessions from Washington.

Meanwhile, China is already deeply embedded in the regional energy infrastructure and economic landscape. In addition to strengthening collaboration with Gulf nations in the renewable sector, Beijing has overtaken the United States and European Union to emerge as GCC's largest trading partner while demonstrating its utility as a peace broker such as in the Saudi-Iran rapprochement.

The United States cannot realistically expect Saudi Arabia to exclude China from its energy transition since Beijing has capabilities, scale and cost advantages that are difficult to replicate elsewhere. Through the agreements such as the civil nuclear deal, Washington however could ensure that China's role in the kingdom does not extend beyond trade, infrastructure and green technology and the United States retains an outsized influence in shaping the Saudi and region's future economic and strategic trajectory.

Still by conditioning the nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia's participation in the Abraham Accords, President Donald Trump has once again vindicated that Riyadh's approach is heading down the right path. If Washington continues to make access to nuclear technology contingent on political concessions, it risks conceding more ground to China in the region. The Middle Kingdom may not replace the United States as Riyadh's principal strategic ally but it will create an opportunity for the East Asian country to establish itself as Saudi Arabia's long-term partner in the region.

Amid an intense US-Iran conflict, the Washington-Riyadh nuclear agreement has gained renewed attention. Yet Saudi Arabia's focus remains on accelerating Vision 2030, which requires diplomatic engagement with Tehran, security guarantees and civil nuclear cooperation with Washington and deepening economic ties with China. This omnidirectional diplomacy enables Riyadh to manage threats from Iran's regional proxies, acquire advanced weapons from the United States and maintain strong trade ties with its largest crude buyer and technology partner, Beijing.

Saudi Arabia is doing precisely what Trump's National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy expect from its regional allies. Even before these strategies called on regional allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, the kingdom had signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan. Adapting to Trump's transactional approach, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to the White House last year raised his investment pledge in the United States from $600 billion to nearly $1 trillion, targeting infrastructure, technology and industry. Through these initiatives, Riyadh diversified its security partnerships without abandoning Washington as a primary security anchor while broadening its relationship with the United States on a more solid, durable foundation.

The kingdom's approach can be summed up in one word: pragmatism. As the United States redefines its role in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is adjusting just as quickly. By avoiding getting pulled in the regional conflicts and expanding cooperation with Washington beyond defense and security into higher-growth sectors such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and semiconductors, Riyadh is aligning itself with the "America First" agenda, Trump's blueprint emphasizing investment, technology and industrial renewal.

In return, Riyadh is securing critical strategic assets like advanced weapons, civil nuclear cooperation and frontier chips to accelerate its Vision 2030's goals of economic diversification and digital leadership while elevating collaboration with China on trade, manufacturing and clean-energy infrastructure. This multi-faceted approach allows Saudi Arabia to successfully leverage its relations with two major powers to preserve its national strategic objectives and foster modernization.

*My article first appeared at "Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum/Manara Magazine"

August 27, 2026

What Xi's World AI Conference speech means for global AI governance

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: Chinese President Xi Jinping used a keynote address at the World AI Conference in Shanghai to lay out China's vision for a more inclusive, multilateral approach to governing artificial intelligence.

The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance concluded in Shanghai on July 20, reaffirming the city's preeminence as a leading global hub for AI innovation and governance.

This year's exhibition, themed "AI Partnership for a Brighter Future," brought together more than 1,100 enterprises and showcased roughly 3,000 AI products and technologies.

Since its inception, the WAIC has evolved into one of the world's premier platforms for unveiling technological innovation, facilitating exchanges among academics, entrepreneurs and industry pioneers, fostering international collaboration, translating ideas into real-world applications, and advancing dialogue on AI governance, ethics and emerging technological standards.

At the opening ceremony, President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech outlining China's perspective on the future of AI and its global governance.

Describing AI as the driving force behind a new wave of technological revolution and industrial transformation, he highlighted both the immense opportunities created by rapid progress in intelligent connectivity, human-machine collaboration and cross-sector innovation, as well as the complex governance challenges they present.

Xi urged countries to adopt a people-centered approach to AI development and work together to build a just and equitable global AI governance system. He stressed that AI should serve humanity and contribute to common prosperity and collective security, advocating closer global cooperation on development strategies, governance rules and technical standards to forge a consensus-based governance framework.

His remarks underscored the growing priority Beijing places on cultivating an inclusive global AI governance architecture to advance innovation-driven development for all. Rather than pitching China as the leader of a new global AI order or challenging any country's dominance, he emphasized creating a multilateral AI governance mechanism that promotes openness, narrows the AI divide and extends the benefits of AI to developing countries.

Xi's speech built on a sustained policy focus on AI. During a visit last year to the Shanghai Foundation Model Innovation Center, a large-model incubator home to more than 100 enterprises, he observed that AI was entering a period of "explosive growth" and urged the city to take the lead and become a frontrunner in AI development and governance.

In a fragmented global AI governance landscape, Xi continues to make AI a new frontier for human development and international cooperation, reinforcing China's commitment to sharing AI opportunities with the Global South.

His vision for global AI governance is anchored in the China-proposed Global AI Governance Initiative. Unveiled by Xi in 2023 at the opening ceremony of the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing, the initiative seeks to build a community with a shared future, articulating the country's proposals on AI across three main areas: development, security and governance.

The initiative provides a comprehensive framework to promote technological innovation, strengthen international collaboration to mitigate emerging AI risks and lower barriers to technological access. The initiative draws on China's domestic AI governance experience, with the country regarded as among the first nations to introduce detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common AI applications.

At WAIC, Xi further advanced this vision by calling for the establishment of early warning and emergency response systems to prevent abuse and malicious use of AI.

China has expanded its domestic AI development through the "AI Plus" initiative, which featured prominently in Xi's address. The blueprint aims to supercharge productivity by integrating AI across every facet of industry, government and society.

Looking ahead, Beijing plans to advance the strategy by promoting the deployment of next-generation intelligent terminals and AI agents, encouraging the large-scale commercial application of AI across key sectors.

AI should not remain an exclusive preserve of a handful of technology powers. This principle underpins the Global AI Governance Initiative, which calls on all countries to build consensus on promoting the development of AI technologies, boosting information exchange and working together to jointly develop AI governance mechanisms that make AI more secure, reliable, controllable and equitable while preventing technological monopolies.

The initiative upholds a people-centered model. It urges respect for the sovereignty of other countries and opposes the use of AI to manipulate public opinion, spread disinformation or intervene in other countries' internal affairs. It also advocates greater representation of the Global South. Together, these principles help safeguard humanity's common interests and international peace and development.

Open-source and accessible AI is a shared asset. Beijing has moved to act on that principle: China's National Development and Reform Commission and other government departments jointly released a Global AI Governance Action Plan during the WAIC, mapping out cooperation in data, computing power and talent development.

By implementing the plan, China is striving to provide international public goods to help developing countries build AI capacity. Chinese companies and research communities have also made advanced models such as DeepSeek and Qwen more accessible, including through open-source releases and lower-cost deployment options, enabling nations, particularly across the Global South, to accelerate their AI transformation.

To further support their AI development and capacity-building, Xi announced a series of measures at WAIC. These include providing specialized training on artificial intelligence to 5,000 individuals from developing countries and establishing AI application cooperation centers in partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS.

Xi also announced plans to enable 30 countries to use AI-powered meteorological warning systems, as part of China's response to the United Nations' "Early Warnings for All" campaign.

Beijing has institutionalized this approach through mechanisms such as the Group of Friends for International Cooperation on AI Capacity-building, which seeks to foster partnerships and harness AI to empower sustainable development in partner nations.

Since its establishment in 2024, the group has convened several workshops involving around 200 representatives from member states. Xi's call to strengthen AI capacity-building and bridge the widening AI and digital divides gives practical expression to China's vision of inclusive AI governance.

The endeavor has been seen in the West as an attempt by China to amplify its influence within the United Nations system. In fact, it aims to promote open-source and accessible AI technologies and scale up South-South cooperation in computing power, data and talent to ensure that AI dividends are shared more equitably by people around the world.

The conference opened one day after the formal establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), an idea Xi floated last year. The "important milestone" in the history of AI development responded to the call of developing countries, constituting a significant step toward uniting the international community to promote AI development and governance.

WAICO is incorrectly portrayed as China's AI coalition to rival the U.S.-led Pax Silica. While the former embodies China's development-oriented AI approach to elevate the role of the Global South in global AI governance through capacity-building and technology sharing, the latter focuses on building a resilient technological ecosystem, securing control over critical AI infrastructure, and achieving technological hegemony and digital extraterritoriality. WAICO thus offers a just and inclusive framework, encompassing participatory governance, shared development, equitable access to AI and technical collaboration.

China's commitment to AI cooperation extends beyond its work with the developing world. During a meeting with U.S. business leaders, including Tesla, Nvidia and Apple in May, Xi reaffirmed that China would continue opening its economy. Even as Washington has sought to restrict Beijing's access to advanced AI chips, the Chinese president struck an optimistic tone, reflecting his conviction that mutually beneficial collaboration could still define the future of bilateral economic and technological relations. Those restrictions have instead prompted Chinese companies such as Alibaba to accelerate indigenous innovation and develop AI models that compete with leading U.S. companies.

Despite China's triumphs in AI, Xi remains committed to international cooperation. According to Stanford University's 2026 AI Index, Beijing has effectively closed the AI model performance gap with Washington, leading in publication volume, citations, patent output and industrial robot installation. Even companies in the U.S. are reportedly adopting Chinese open-source AI models because they are highly competitive compared with U.S. frontier models and accessible at lower cost.

With China's LineShine overtaking the U.S.-based El Capitan as the world's fastest supercomputer, Beijing has further demonstrated its ability to sustain technological progress despite America's export controls.

In his maiden appearance at WAIC, Xi described AI both as a shared opportunity and a shared challenge, necessitating collective action and extensive international cooperation. Through initiatives such as the Global AI Governance Initiative, the expanded "AI Plus" initiative, AI capacity-building and training programs, AI-powered meteorological warning systems, the Group of Friends and the newly launched WAICO, he is positioning Beijing to help developing countries strengthen their AI capabilities, embrace emerging technologies more rapidly and play a more active role in global AI governance.

Xi's address leaves little doubt about the direction China intends to pursue: advancing an inclusive AI governance framework that places development, multilateralism and access to AI, not "China First," as the country's central priority. In a world divided by technological competition and faced with technological exclusivity, such an approach has the potential to serve all humanity rather than a few select countries.

*My article first appeared at "China Diplomacy in the New Era"

July 10, 2026

Nato was never meant to fight every American war

By: Azhar Azam

The NATO summit in Ankara was expected to showcase allied solidarity after European nations agreed to a historic increase in defense spending. Instead, it ended with President Donald Trump intensifying his criticism of the transatlantic alliance.

Beyond burden-sharing, he lambasted European allies for declining to support US military campaign against Iran, arguing that the United States had spent decades underwriting Europe's security. Having long pressed Europe to spend more on defense, Trump now appears to measure allied loyalty by support for US-led military operations.

Trump's assumption rests on a premise that European allies benefitting from US security guarantees are also supposed to fight America’s wars. But that was never the bargain Nato struck in 1949. Although the alliance's role has evolved to crisis management, its core purpose remains safeguarding the freedom and security of its members, a commitment Europe has largely fulfilled.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Nato for the first and only time in its history invoked Article 5. Europe fought alongside the United States in Afghanistan for two decades, treating an attack on America as an attack on itself.

While Washington by far had the largest casualties in absolute terms, The United Kingdom lost 457 troops, Canada more than 150 and France 90. Germany, Italy and other countries also suffered significant casualties. Some European countries with much smaller populations than the US lost almost as many troops in relative terms. Denmark – facing intense pressure from Trump to cede its semi-autonomous region of Greenland to the US – recorded one of the coalition's highest per-capita fatality rates.

The 2003 Iraq War exposed deep political rifts; it did not represent European abandonment. Britain, Italy, Poland, Denmark and several other Nato allies joined the US-led “coalition of the willing,” while France and Germany opposed the invasion. The failure to find the alleged weapons of mass destruction later vindicated much of the skepticism surrounding the war. Yet those disagreements neither fractured Nato nor prevented its members from fighting together against the Islamic State.

Trump has long chastised European allies of freeloading on US military power, while failing to invest adequately in their own defense. In response, Nato members at last year's Hague summit agreed to dramatically increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, the alliance's most ambitious spending pledge to date.

European nations have since accelerated military procurement, expanded defense-industrial production and assumed greater responsibility for protecting the continent. Nato officials now acknowledge European allies have filled almost all the gaps left by US reductions to the Nato Force Model.

The summit showed that the debate has shifted the focus from burden-sharing to Nato’s purpose. During the US military campaign against Tehran, Trump criticized European allies for refusing to deploy naval assets to secure the Strait of Hormuz, which many European governments reckoned lay outside Nato's defensive mandate. Unlike Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks or the defense of Nato's eastern flank, they viewed attacks on Tehran as a discretionary military operation rather than an allied responsibility. Their reluctance reflected not anti-Americanism but a different understanding of Nato’s purpose.

So far, Trump has judged allied commitment by defense spending. Europe responded by committing to the higher spending target. The real issue emerging from the Ankara summit is whether Nato remains a collective-defense alliance or it is an organization whose members are expected to support US-led military operations beyond the alliance's traditional remit.

For more than seven decades, Nato has endured because its focus remained on defending against common threats without requiring its members to support every military campaign undertaken by another ally. This principle allowed the alliance to survive differences over the past conflicts without losing sight of its central mission.

Trump may expect Europe to shoulder a greater share of Nato's defense burden. But alliance solidarity cannot be measured by participation in every US-led military campaign. If this becomes the new benchmark of allied loyalty, Nato risks blurring the distinction between collective defense and collective intervention that has sustained the alliance through decades of political disagreement.

June 24, 2026

China is a both solution to–and a constraint on–global energy transition

Credit: ChatGPT


China’s rise as the world’s leading producer of clean-energy technologies is one of the most contentious issues in global trade. The United States and European Union (EU) in particular regard Beijing’s dominance in solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) as a source of industrial vulnerability and strategic dependence.

Yet the overcapacity triggering these concerns is also accelerating the global clean-energy transition by making these technologies cheaper and more widely available as reflected in global trade of clean-tech products that reached an estimated $479 billion in 2025.

Much of this trade has been driven by China's production surplus. In sectors such as EVs, Beijing’s manufacturing has outstripped domestic demand, putting downward pressure on global prices. These cost declines have, in turn, supported faster electrification the world over.

The impact of falling costs is reciprocated in affordability – one of the main constraints on decarbonization. For many emerging and developing economies, limited fiscal space is the major barrier to energy transition. As prices drop, lower-cost imports have expanded their access to clean technologies.

Trade restrictions have a little effect. Rather than curbing China’s clean-energy exports, tariffs and industrial-policy tools introduced by the United States and Europe appear to have redirected a growing share of trade flows toward developing markets.

In many cases, this transition is enabled by Chinese manufacturing capacity. From EVs in Ethiopia to discounted solar panels in Pakistan, China’s industrial scale and overcapacity have lowered costs across many developing economies, contributing to global emissions reductions.

At the same time, volatility in global fossil-fuel markets could add momentum to electrification, prompting import-dependent countries across Africa and Asia-Pacific to diversify their energy mix and increase investment in renewable energy resources.

The International Energy Agency expects energy-sector investment to rise by around 5% to about $3.4 trillion in 2026, despite geopolitical and economic uncertainty. Roughly two-thirds of this capital is projected to go into renewables, nuclear power, grids, storage, low-emission fuels and energy-efficiency technologies.

Looking further ahead, it forecasts total energy investment to reach $3.7 trillion by 2035, with much of the growth concentrated in emerging and developing economies outside China. This indicates that clean energy is seen as a climate imperative as well as a means to bolster economic resilience and supporting development.

As clean-energy investment expands, China's dominance is perceived differently across regions. Advanced economies associate Beijing’s scale with industrial overcapacity; many developing economies view it as an opportunity to gain access to clean technologies at lower costs.

For instance, solar deployment in the EU has grown strongly in recent years, but the bloc still relies heavily on China for solar panels and key upstream inputs.

The same pattern is emerging in EV batteries. The EU efforts to restructure and localize production have eased some overcapacity risks; they have increased reliance on Chinese battery suppliers. As China continues to advance technologically, pressure is building on Brussels to amplify production in strategically important sectors while maintaining affordability.

This creates a policy trade-off for Europe. Greater industrial autonomy would strengthen long-term supply-chain resilience but is likely to raise costs and slow the pace of decarbonization. By contrast, continued reliance on China sustains faster deployment, yet leaves Europe exposed to ongoing dependencies.

The United States faces a similar challenge. Despite tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act and industrial-policy support for clean-tech production, China accounts for the majority of global clean-tech manufacturing capacity. Washington is scaling deployment in areas such as battery storage, emerging as second to Beijing. Still, as CSIS analysis highlights, expansion in downstream segments does not resolve upstream constraints such as limited domestic reserves and critical mineral processing capacity, limiting the scope of full self-sufficiency.

India follows a different but related trajectory. Its renewable energy installed capacity has expanded quickly. However, the scale gap with China is substantial. This is further evident in deployment where Beijing added 315.1 gigawatt (GW) of solar capacity versus New Delhi's 37 GW.

China’s clean-tech overcapacity has become an essential feature of the global energy transition. While criticized as trade distortion, it has contributed to significant cost reductions in solar, battery and EV technologies, accelerating their adoption across developing, emerging and advanced economies.

Yet, the same concentration that drives lower costs in clean technologies also generates structural vulnerabilities, increasing exposure of importing economies to supply-chain disruption, geopolitical friction, and industrial dependence, as reflected in policy responses from Brussels and Washington.

As demand for clean technologies surges globally, their supply remains highly concentrated in China, with advanced economies seeking to reduce reliance through industrial policy whereas developing and emerging economies prioritizing affordability and deployment.

Beijing’s role in the global energy transition is unlikely to diminish in the near term. For Western policymakers, the challenge is not simply to reduce reliance on Chinese clean technologies, but to strengthen energy security without undermining the pace of electrification.

June 20, 2026

The limits of Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor push

By: Azhar Azam

Central Asia is emerging as a critical hinge in the Eurasian trade and energy architecture. As Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted northern routes and instability in the Middle East exposes vulnerabilities in maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, demand for overland alternatives has accelerated.

Once considered secondary to the North Corridor, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or the Middle Corridor – linking China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus – has become a crucial artery. It is now widely viewed as a diversification pathway by countries seeking to reduce exposure to geopolitical risks.

For Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor presents both an opportunity and a test. If managed effectively, the route can diversify the country’s economy beyond hydrocarbons and cement its role as a regional logistics hub. Otherwise, Astana may remain merely a transit passage for bigger markets without substantial economic and development gains.

A 2023 World Bank report found the Corridor was unlikely to replace the northern route as a land connectivity option, acknowledging the transport link had already captured a limited share of transcontinental trade and could expand further if key bottlenecks were addressed. The study also highlighted its developmental relevance for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia by helping them to reduce reliance on a narrow set of export partners and low-value complexity commodities.

This paper gains a renewed importance as global trade navigates a complex global environment, where infrastructure isn’t solely a means of moving goods efficiently; it’s a tool to strengthen economic resilience and competitiveness.

Despite its potential, the Corridor’s performance is constrained by infrastructure gaps, non-harmonized border procedures and uneven logistics capacity across participating states. These factors curtail its ability to function as an integrated alternative to northern and maritime routes.

To overcome these obstacles, development finance institutions have stepped in with significant financing, including World Bank-backed investments in rail connectivity in Türkiye, greenfield railway line between Mointy and Kyzylzhar, and highway reconstruction in Kazakhstan. These investments reflect institutional confidence in the Corridor’s ability to boost regional connectivity and sustain economic diversification.

Momentum is already building. Freight volumes along the corridor have tripled over the past five years, supported by investments in ports, railways and logistics infrastructure. By upgrading east-west transport capacity and modernizing logistics systems, Astana is positioning itself at the center of this transformation both as a transit state and a strategic Eurasian logistics hub.

The success of this strategy depends not only on rising freight volumes but also on whether infrastructure investment generates inclusive and sustainable economic benefits, contributing to domestic and regional development.

Backed by the World Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, modernization of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy – the national railway operator – focuses on tariff reform, institutional restructuring, divestment of non-core assets, separation of infrastructure from freight and passenger operations and greater private participation in rail transport.

Yet without consistent implementation by policymakers, growing transit volumes may not produce lasting economic benefits, leaving Kazakhstan primarily a transit passage than a more integrated part of regional supply chains.

Astana is simultaneously diversifying its external partnerships. It is pursuing a close engagement with the US across energy, transport and investment alongside deepening ties with China and continued cooperation with Europe to avoid dependence on a single bloc. While this multi-vector approach elevates Kazakhstan’s strategic relevance; it could turn Central Asia into a theater of great-power rivalry, with implications for its own and regional development agenda.

China’s economic footprint reinforces this trend. Trade between Beijing and Central Asia has reached record levels, supported by investment in transport infrastructure, logistics nodes and industrial capacity. This helps bolster regional connectivity and economic integration, yet also intensifies competition over transit routes and strategic leverage in the region.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s status as a key Eurasian oil exporter further highlights the importance of non-Gulf supply routes as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz surge. However, diversification remains limited: roughly 80% of the country’s crude exports still move through the Russia-linked Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline, underscoring the need to develop additional corridors.

Globally, trade is being organized around overlapping corridors rather than a single integrated network. As the UN Trade and Development noted earlier this year, geopolitical fragmentation and rising regulatory and logistical pressures are altering supply chains across regions. Its recent assessment warns that non-tariff measures such as regulations, standards and compliance requirements impose higher export costs than tariffs in most economies.

These observations indicate that strategic and national security considerations – not just cost and efficiency – are driving external intervention in the region. For Central Asia, these factors compound existing economic and security challenges as fragmented standards, inconsistent customs procedures and uneven regulatory alignment continue to slow transit and raise costs despite infrastructure investment.

As global uncertainty deepens amid growing US-China competition, efforts are intensifying across the region to establish alternative trade and energy corridors, even as landlocked geography continues to constrain connectivity. Kazakhstan’s role in the Eurasian trade is likely to expand as these shifts take hold. Yet the real question is whether the country can translate this connectivity into genuine economic development for itself and the region or remain just a passage between bigger economies.

May 31, 2026

Emerging markets are the missing piece in China–U.S. stability

By: Azhar Azam

A White House fact sheet following meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping said the two leaders reached understandings to enhance stability and confidence for businesses and consumers. The document emphasized a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” reflecting recognition of economic interdependence and the need to steady major-power economic ties.

For emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), these signals matter given the macroeconomic backdrop is closely tied to the U.S.–China relationship. Although EMDEs have contributed about 60% of annual global growth, they are highly exposed to debt stress, financial volatility, and external disruptions. These constraints are slowing economic expansion, and critically, limiting investments in health, education and infrastructure amid rising development needs.

After a year of higher trade barriers and elevated uncertainty, global activity faces renewed pressure from the war in the Middle East. According to the International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook, the conflict-induced slower growth and rising inflation are expected to weigh heavily on EMDEs, with commodity-importing countries particularly exposed.

Energy markets are a key transmission channel. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have pushed up oil prices, spiking import costs for energy-dependent economies. Rising energy costs have fed into inflation, widened financial and current-account deficits, and prompted monetary tightening. Governments are likely to respond with higher interest rates or spending cuts, which in turn will stifle growth and deepen instability.

Financial markets accelerate these spillovers. During periods of stress, capital tends to flee toward safe-haven assets, particularly the U.S. dollar. This phenomenon triggers currency depreciation, raises borrowing cost and lowers investment in development priorities such as infrastructure, health and education.

Debt vulnerabilities compound these challenges. Many low- and middle-income countries face heavy debt servicing burdens that constrain fiscal space for development spending. External shocks such as the Iran conflict further narrow fiscal buffers, forcing spending cuts or additional borrowing. This deepens fragility in EMDEs and slows their development trajectories.

The consequences won’t be contained within those countries. If these economies buckle under debt distress, capital flight, and fragmented infrastructure finance–American and Chinese exporters alike will lose markets.

Debt restructuring mirrors the fragmentation of global finance. China is now the largest bilateral creditor to many developing countries; Western economies wield an outsized influence over multilateral financial institutions. As coordination between major economic players becomes more difficult and mechanisms like the G20 Common Framework struggle to deliver – debt crises are likely to prolong, increasing uncertainty and suppressing global demand.

Trade is also being reorganized by geopolitical competition between the United States and China. Supply chains are not contracting; they are rerouted through intermediary economies. This raises compliance costs, reduces transparency and increases prices for consumers around the world. A relatively stable Washington-Beijing relationship could ease these pressures, reducing uncertainty and limiting further fragmentation.

Even in technology, cooperation is possible. The U.S.-China collaboration in areas such as public health, environmental science and basic research shows that engagement can coexist. Export controls alone are unlikely to determine technological leadership. The challenge is to balance safeguards with continued innovation and diffusion.

Despite deep distrust and strategic rivalry, there remains scope for cooperation between Washington and Beijing in areas that directly affect global economic stability. This does not require broad political alignment, rather pragmatic coordination where interests overlap — including energy security, crisis management, and resilience in global supply chains.

Neither the United States nor China can insulate itself from instability abroad. Emerging markets are central to global demand, commodity consumption, manufacturing expansion, and future growth. Instability there will inevitably feed back into both economies through weaker trade, financial volatility and disrupted supply chains.

The defining question is no longer whether fragmentation will shape the global economy — it already does — yet whether it can be managed without exporting disproportionate instability onto more vulnerable economies. Managed fragmentation may still allow strategic competition between major powers, but without coordination on shared risks, it will make the global economy including the two economies more volatile, more uneven, and less predictable.

May 23, 2026

ABAC meeting charts course for Asia-Pacific stability amid global trade turmoil

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: As the United States doubles down on tariffs and trade barriers, business leaders from across the Asia-Pacific are looking to China to hold the line on open markets.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Advisory Council (ABAC) concluded its meeting in Mexico City recently, with a strong and unified call to restore stability in global trade. The event brought together some 200 business leaders and policymakers from China and 20 other APEC economies – collectively representing about 60% of global GDP – who urged bold, coordinated action to safeguard long-term prosperity across the region.

Delegates expressed deep concerns over mounting pressures on the global economy, including energy market volatility, persistent supply chain disruptions, rising trade and investment restrictions, and growing food security risks. Long-term growth, they said, depends on open markets and the adoption of digital and green infrastructure.

In response, ABAC outlined priority actions: accelerating progress toward the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), strengthening supply chain resilience, investing in trade and logistics infrastructure and reducing non-tariff barriers to food trade. The measures, members said, are necessary to stabilize trade flows and bolster the region's capacity to absorb external shocks.

The outcomes of the meeting reflected a convergence on restoring stability and predictability to the global economy, reviving growth momentum and reinforcing the foundations of regional economic cooperation. Delegates conveyed a shared concern that increasing fragmentation, supply shocks and policy uncertainty are eroding confidence and constraining economic activity across the Asia-Pacific.

To address these threats, members called for advancing early deliverables and harmonized trade rules and regulatory frameworks, enhancing transparency, reducing trade barriers, establishing permanent ban on tariffs for digital products and promoting the responsible use of artificial intelligence. The measures aim to boost cross-border trade and investment, laying the groundwork for a more inclusive Asia-Pacific.

In a world dominated by steeply rising protectionism and unilateralism, ABAC has set out a strategic direction for the region. Launched in February, its 2026 work program under the theme “Openness, Connectivity and Synergy” reaffirms its commitment to open markets, regional integration and collaborative innovation.

Openness, anchored in trade and investment liberalization, and stronger connectivity protect economic expansion by fortifying supply chain stability, regional linkages and people-to-people exchanges. Synergy serves as the driver of innovation and sustainable development, enabling economies to collectively harness technological change and translate it into more buoyant growth for economies in the region.

A consensus also emerged on a rules-based, open-market approach with resilience built through robust supply chains, improved connectivity and greater transparency. The meeting also emphasized trade facilitation and digital modernization, such as paperless systems and interoperable regulatory frameworks, alongside closer alignment between the business community and policymakers. This implied an implementation-focused agenda to improve the efficiency of the regional economy.

The meeting sent positive signals for shoring up cooperation across the Asia-Pacific, with the council releasing statements on FTAAP progress and renewing its commitment to the APEC Connectivity Blueprint.

In line with the Ichma Statement, the council outlined parallel strategies to accelerate the FTAAP, combining near-term steps with longer-term structural reforms. The approach reflects a focus on translating existing mechanisms into coordinated action, reinforced by a commitment to a connectivity framework spanning physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages — aimed at enabling seamless regional flows of trade, services and talent.

ABAC is widely regarded as a key mechanism for translating complex geopolitical shifts and evolving business conditions into actionable recommendations. Feedback from the recent session underscored a shared sense of urgency for decisive action to restore stability in global trade to ensure policies remain grounded in economic realities.

Representatives from participating economies and organizations similarly view the forum as a key bridge between government priorities and business execution while expecting ABAC to place greater emphasis on technology and innovation integration, particularly the widening AI and digital divide. This elevates ABAC from an advisory body to a conduit, linking policy direction with real-world application.

ABAC is not just about making statements or recommendations. It helps turn ideas into practical steps that economies can implement. Given that APEC members are at different stages of development, the focus is on making cooperation workable. The meeting’s outcomes show the council is steering efforts toward stable trade frameworks, stronger supply chains and expanded digital trade to address current economic pressures and reduce frictions in cross-border commerce.

Support from member economies, together with concerns over America's increasingly protectionist trade stance, adds weight to this direction. Countries have expressed backing for an action-oriented ABAC agenda under China’s APEC chairmanship alongside efforts to protect supply chain security, diversify trade links and fast-track digital transition. This points to a common recognition of the importance of upholding the rules-based multilateral trading system while encouraging innovation and supporting investment-led development across the Asia-Pacific.

Long committed to regional integration, Beijing has advocated the concept of a community with a shared future and championed multilateralism and free trade, offering developing countries access to capital and technology. As the chair of the 2026 APEC Senior Officials’ Meeting, the world's second-largest economy is expected to play a constructive role in advancing these goals, contributing to regional and global economic growth.

China is a major trading partner and a leading source of investment and infrastructure financing for many countries, earning growing international influence. Through connectivity projects of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has helped foster intra- and inter-regional trade and cultural and people-to-people exchanges across the Asia-Pacific and beyond. This positions Beijing to play a more active role in promoting dialogue, ensuring stability and maintaining focus on regional development.

The Mexico City meeting underscored ABAC's potential to serve as a stabilizing platform for the regional economy amid heightened global uncertainty. As trade policies become more restrictive and security-driven, the talks revealed a clear interest across the Asia-Pacific in preserving open markets and keeping economic priorities aligned.

As geopolitical tensions spill further into economic relations, China’s role – as APEC host and a key economic player – takes on greater significance. Its emphasis on non-interference, openness and inclusive growth may help shape the trajectory of regional cooperation and stability; against rising fragmentation, Beijing's pursuit of integration could help restore economic activity and business confidence in the Asia-Pacific.

As the region navigates a more complex global environment, this cooperation-driven leadership is essential to sustain growth, ease tensions and build an open and resilient regional economy.

*My article first appeared at China's Diplomacy in the New Era

April 18, 2026

U.S.-Iran coercive diplomacy produces managed instability

Credit: ChatGPT

By: Azhar Azam

U.S.–Iran tensions can be read through coercive diplomacy in which escalation functions as a tool to shape negotiations. Throughout the conflict, President Donald Trump applied intense military pressure on Tehran to raise the cost of defiance, followed by diplomatic engagement once leverage was established.

Recent developments suggest this approach has yielded results. By pairing military readiness with threats of destroying Iranian infrastructure, Trump pursued a policy of a managed force intensification to compress Iran’s bargaining position.

The fragile ceasefire already showed that the situation was becoming harder to control. A campaign initially framed as limited to degrading Tehran’s nuclear program risked pulling the wider region into the conflict. Iranian retaliation spread widely across the Persian Gulf, threatening U.S. military bases, striking regional energy infrastructure, and disrupting oil and food supplies – exposing the vulnerabilities of America’s regional partners.

Three dynamics sustained this cycle: widening conflict, mounting economic toll, and growing strain on U.S. alliances.
 

Iran’s horizontal escalation


The scale of Iran's retaliation was the primary driver behind Trump's push for de-escalation.

In response to joint U.S. and Israeli strikes, Tehran adopted a strategy of horizontal expansion, broadening the battlefield by targeting U.S. military installations and civilian infrastructure across Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait.

These strikes exploited a key feature of America’s regional posture. The U.S. maintains a network of forward bases in allied countries to conduct operations in the Middle East. By threatening these facilities, Iran effectively turned the geography of U.S. alliances into a combat zone, placing American partners in harm’s way.

Throughout the crisis, both Washington and Tehran employed coercive signaling – calibrated shows of force and public warnings – to influence each other’s decisions. Trump’s threats and deadlines sought to compel compliance; Tehran’s attacks sent clear counter-signals of retaliation and cost.

Iran was unlikely to prevail in a conventional military confrontation with the United States. Its strategy instead focused on increasing the political, economic, and military costs for Washington and its partners. This in turn increased risks of spillover, including civilian harm, infrastructure damage, and broader regional entanglement.

Mounting economic shock


A second driver behind Trump’s pursuit of de-escalation has been the growing economic shock from the conflict that rippled through energy markets, supply chains, and global food systems.

One of the most sensitive chokepoints is the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply and a substantial share of seaborne fertilizers pass. The near-shutdown of this strategic waterway disrupted shipping flows and pushed up oil prices, fuel costs, and war-risk insurance premiums.

Iran’s asymmetric retaliation also crossed a line with its Gulf neighbors. After an Israeli strike hit Iran’s South Pars gas field — one of the world’s largest energy hubs — Tehran launched missile and drone attacks on key regional energy hubs.

These strikes inflicted widespread damage to Gulf energy assets such as knocking out 17% of Qatar’s LNG export capacity for three to five years. These attacks demonstrate that Tehran’s response extended beyond direct confrontation with U.S. forces to disproportionately impact regional economies and civilian infrastructure.

Had Gulf leaders not exercised restraint, Iran’s actions could have driven the Middle East to a broader regional war, although these strikes strengthened Tehran’s position by forcing Trump to limit U.S. involvement and bring the conflict to a close.

Beyond energy, the disruption threatened to squeeze the global food system. With about one-third of global seaborne fertilizers traded through the Strait, this could have triggered a food and humanitarian crisis in several regions.

Domestically, rising inflation, eroded consumer purchasing power, and the prospect of slower growth intensified political and economic pressure on Trump. The economic fallout extended to the Gulf, where Arab states have so far incurred up to $194 billion in losses, according to the United Nations Development Program.

Combined, these shocks reveal that coercive strategies generate leverage but also impose economic constraints.

U.S. allies bear the costs


The conflict strained America’s alliance network as well.

Countries hosting U.S. forces — including Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE — faced direct security threats as missiles and drones traversed the region. For these governments, the danger of “entrapment risk” – the fear of being drawn into the conflict — increased pressure to limit further escalation and reassess the costs of forward deployment.

Tensions also surfaced within the transatlantic coalition. Several European nations hesitated to deploy warships to the Strait, with some denying the U.S. access to airspace or military facilities for operations, reflecting concerns about energy market instability and regional escalation.

At the same time, the White House indicated that the Trump administration could ask Arab countries to pay for the war, potentially shifting part of the burden onto regional partners. Yet as many Gulf states did not support the intervention and urged diplomacy beforehand, the prospect of being asked to absorb the consequences of a conflict they neither initiated nor endorsed would deepen unease among allies.

These dynamics nudged Trump toward capping the conflict.

The strategic gamble

Taken together, U.S.–Iran tensions could be best understood as a recurring system of coercive diplomacy in which force and negotiation acted as interconnected instruments of statecraft. The relationship has repeatedly oscillated between confrontation and limited engagement, without settlement.

Iran’s conventional military limits constrain its ability to compete directly with the United States; it retains leverage to threaten energy infrastructure, maritime security, and broader regional stability. These tools do not enable decisive victory, but they are sufficient to raise the costs of sustained pressure.

The result is managed instability: a system where coercion and engagement repeatedly rise and recede, producing stability through adjustment rather than resolution.

*My article (unedited) appeared in Cambridge MENAF/Manara Magazine 

April 16, 2026

How US betrayed allies by igniting an energy crisis

By: Azhar Azam

Amid the Iran conflict's sharp impact on global energy prices, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners (OPEC+) will meet on April 5 with a potential production increase on the agenda.

At a virtual session on March 1, the cartel's eight major oil-producing nations including Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to raise output by 206,000 barrels per day in April.

This comes as the fallout of the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran – particularly US "large-scale" bombing targeting facilities around Kharg Island, Iran's economic lifeline that processes 90% of the country's crude exports and handles 950 million barrels a year – has widened into a full‑blown disruption of the global energy system. The White House principal deputy press secretary's statement that the US military could "take out" Kharg Island has raised the risk of further escalation in the region.

The war has already established a de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil supply and one-third of the global fertilizers used to produce almost half of the world's food pass. As shipping companies reroute vessels and insurers raise risk premiums – global crude prices have surged past $100 per barrel, fueling fears that prolonged instability in this critical corridor would elicit a severe supply shock.

US President Donald Trump has called on nations to help secure the vital shipping route by sending warships. Yet even countries with longstanding security ties to Washington have shown little enthusiasm to join the proposed multinational escort coalition in the Strait of Hormuz.

Instead, several of America's Asian and European allies including those from NATO have rebuffed the appeal and refused to become involved in a crisis they didn't create, exposing rifts within the US-led alliance system.

For the US, the economic consequences of this energy shock are far less than those faced by much of the rest of the world. Over the past decade, the "shale revolution" has transformed the US into one of the world's largest oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers and exporters. Higher global energy prices are actually helping the American energy sector, boosting the revenues of oil and LNG producers and exporters.

While the US remains largely insulated as a net energy exporter, many of its closest partners depend exceedingly on imported oil and gas. Japan and the Republic of Korea import about 95% and 70% of their crude, respectively, from the Middle East, much of which is shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. Even short-term disruptions in Gulf shipping routes can quickly ripple through their manufacturing supply chains.

The recent spike in oil prices could add inflationary pressure across these energy-dependent industrial economies, raising input costs for petrochemicals and other energy-intensive sectors.

The economic impact is significant for the EU too, a major net energy importer getting 57% of its total energy needs from abroad. The bloc relies heavily on seaborne oil shipments, particularly diesel and jet fuel from the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz, for fertilizers. With shipments at a near halt, European countries are scrambling to subsidize energy costs and shield the economy from one of the deepest energy crises ever.

For European economies still recovering from the energy shock triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a renewed surge in oil prices and lack of fertilizers could mean stagflation and food deprivation across the continent. A sustained interruption would tighten supply, push up energy costs higher and further complicate Europe's economic recovery at a time when growth remains fragile.

Australia, another key US partner in the Asia-Pacific, is also exposed to the spillover effects of the Iran conflict. While it is one of the world's largest exporters of LNG, Australia has just two operating refineries and gets roughly 80% of its refined petroleum products from overseas.

This structural dependence leaves it vulnerable to swings in international oil prices and supply chain bottlenecks. As energy costs climb, transport and logistics expenses rise in tandem, feeding into broader price increases and trade imbalances. The paradox reveals that even US energy-exporting allies are not immune to the wider economic repercussions of instability in the Gulf.

Washington bears considerable responsibility for the crisis. By launching a military campaign against Iran in the midst of nuclear negotiations, it undermined the prospects of a diplomatic solution, destabilized the entire Middle East and disrupted energy flows – creating an energy crisis that may benefit segments of its domestic energy sector but betrays allies by imposing significant economic costs on them through inflation, higher energy costs and trade shocks.

In effect, the US has weaponized global energy markets, turning its military leverage into economic advantage for itself while its strikes on Iran have ignited a supply squeeze that is reverberating across the global economy, leaving allies exposed.

Ultimately, America's strategic gain comes at the expense of the stability and prosperity of its partners.

*My article first appeared at CGTN

April 15, 2026

Tokyo's military ambitions collide with US priorities

By: Azhar Azam

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's first official visit to the United States to reaffirm "unwavering solidarity" between Tokyo and Washington comes as Japan uses the regional environment to justify expanding its military position.

Since assuming office, Takaichi has adopted a strikingly hawkish tone toward China, frequently portraying Beijing as the central challenge to Japan's national security.

In a recent policy statement, she argued that her country was facing the most "severe and complex" security environment of the post-war era, citing China's military modernization and regional activities. Such rhetoric has become an essential component of her efforts to rally political support for sweeping changes to Japan's security policy.

Takaichi continues to rehash this confrontational message. Speaking at the National Defense Academy of Japan, she declared that Japan must strengthen its defense capabilities "without excluding any option." The remarks suggest Tokyo's intent to move beyond a strictly defensive posture and deepen concerns over its gradual abandonment of its pacifist posture in favor of a more assertive – even offensive – military identity.

Japan's militarization is accelerating this drift. Tokyo's defense reforms including raising military spending to 2% of GDP and coming under the US nuclear umbrella – Washington's pledge to employ its nuclear arsenal to defend allies like NATO members and Japan against nuclear or major conventional attacks – reflect a dramatic expansion of its security ambitions.

These measures further mark a clear departure from Japan's longstanding commitment to its three non-nuclear principles: not possessing, not producing and not allowing nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory or its territorial waters.

Last week, Japan's Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed that Tokyo had begun receiving US-made Tomahawk and Norwegian Joint Strike Missiles. The acquisition of these offensive weapons is a significant escalation in Japan's military approach. While successive governments have interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to allow self-defense, acquiring long-range strike capabilities is a clear shift toward a more assertive military role, stretching the limits of Japan's pacifist framework.

These actions have sparked an outrage in Japan's civil society and among opposition political leaders, many of whom view the missile acquisitions as a violation of Article 9. The controversy illustrates how far Japan has moved from its peaceful doctrine.

Tokyo frames this hardline stance as a response to growing regional threats. In practice, the narrative has become a familiar tool for pushing through military expansion and gradually dismantling the restraints of its post-war security guideline.

Since becoming prime minister, Takaichi has been emphasizing the centrality of the US-Japan alliance to secure US President Donald Trump's support for her contentious security agenda. She has repeatedly signaled goodwill toward him, highly accommodating his terms, highlighting cooperation on trade, defense spending and strategic alignment with Washington.

Yet this overture ignores the underlying feature of American foreign policy. For Washington, alliances are rarely altruistic. The Trump administration – and Washington more broadly – tend to treat partners through the lens of national interest and transactional pragmatism. The "America First" logic is explicit: Alliances are valued only if they advance US objectives.

From the US perspective, the Tokyo-Washington alliance is not an unconditional security guarantee but an instrument of geopolitical convenience. Within the US Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan functions as a strategic piece on the regional chessboard rather than an equal partner or staunch ally – valuable to contain China, yet expendable when American interests demand flexibility.

Senior American officials have already clarified that Washington's policy toward China and Japan will not be driven by an either-or choice. Recently, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that the US intends to maintain both close ties with Tokyo and constructive engagement with Beijing, calling tensions between the two countries "preexisting."

For Japanese policymakers, this statement should dispel any illusion that the US could be leveraged to pressure China. Japan's role in US strategy has inherently been and will remain contingent, dictated by American interests rather than Tokyo's security ambitions. Washington may at times seek to counterbalance Beijing's influence but it wants to maintain an extensive diplomatic and economic relationship with China.

Public opinion in the country backs this approach with many Americans supporting friendly cooperation and engagement between the world's two largest economies.

Relying on the US alliance to underwrite Japan's growing military assertiveness therefore is a risky strategy. Historically, Washington-Tokyo relations have proven transactional. Washington has demonstrated that it prioritizes its own economic and strategic interests. Trade negotiations, for example, have seen Japan accept tariffs and commit to large investment packages in the US.

Even US intelligence has flagged Takaichi's controversial remarks on Taiwan – that a Taiwan contingency would constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan – as a "significant shift" from a sitting Japanese leader.

By leaning on US support to justify its military expansion, Japan risks trading decades of restraint for a security promise that may never hold. Caught between Trump's demand to provide escort ships in the Strait of Hormuz and widespread domestic opposition to US-Israel actions in Iran, Tokyo's strategy will threaten its own pacifist principles, fracture public consensus and inflame regional tensions.

And whenever American priorities shift, it will leave the nation exposed, delivering neither security nor stability.

*My article first appeared at CGTN

April 14, 2026

Boao Forum puts cooperation at the heart of Asia's future

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: Leaders and policymakers at the Boao Forum for Asia's 25th annual conference delivered a clear message: Asia's path to stability and growth depends on partnership, shared innovation and inclusive development.

Over the years, the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) has transformed into a high-level dialogue platform for governments, businesses, experts and scholars to jointly discuss the most pressing issues in Asia and the world.

Held annually in Boao, south China's Hainan province, this year's forum brought together participants to address shared challenges and promote economic growth across Asia.

Marking its 25th anniversary this year, the BFA reaffirmed its commitment to deepening regional economic integration and promoting common development among Asian countries. The Asian Economic Outlook and Integration Progress Annual Report 2026, released during the forum, highlighted the resilience and vast economic potential of the continent. Asia's economy is forecast to expand by 4.5%, with its share of global GDP approaching half on a purchasing power parity basis, the report said, pointing to the continent's growing influence worldwide.

Equally significant is the strengthening of intra-regional trade dependence, which edged up from 56.3% in 2023 to 57.2% in 2024. This increase reflects a gradual shift toward deeper regional integration as major economies orient their partnerships within Asia itself. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been identified as "twin anchors of stability," helping sustain economic momentum and reinforce confidence across the region.

The region, particularly China and ASEAN, continues to be the world's premier destination for foreign direct investment, underpinned by economic resilience, an expanding consumer market and growing appeal for global investors. The region is also emerging as a global hub for artificial intelligence. Through advances in AI research, large-scale deployment and industrial application, China — through cooperative mechanisms like the BFA — is playing a central role in Asia's economic and technological transformation.

Despite headwinds such as unilateralism, protectionism and "de-risking," China has drawn global attention for its high-quality development. Amid efforts to downplay the event's significance, participants at the annual conference said Beijing had injected invaluable stability into global supply chains and that the country's edge in technology would drive exports of advanced machinery.

China's openness has fostered a strong and dynamic innovation ecosystem. Over the years, the East Asian nation has evolved from the "world's factory" into a global hub for research, development and technological advancement where multinational companies see value in locating their innovation centers. Beyond gaining access to China's vast consumer market, global enterprises recognize China’s pivotal driving role in global industrial and innovation development. They actively leverage the country's unparalleled talent pool, mature integrated supply chains and policy support that encourages technological collaboration and synchronized innovation strategies.

This openness has also created new corridors of cooperation, particularly with countries of the Global South. For multinationals, China not only offers opportunities to broaden their business footprint but also to grow alongside the country. Beyond collaboration with pharmaceutical firms, Beijing has extensively engaged global enterprises from diverse industries and strengthened comprehensive science and technology cooperation with developing nations.

By leveraging China's robust research infrastructure, advanced technology base and regulatory support, global companies can innovate, grow and contribute to shared development across the region.

International leaders are increasingly highlighting China's critical role in building an open, rules-based multilateral trading system and promoting innovation-led, sustainable development amid widening global fragmentation. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, speaking at the forum, said Beijing has a key role to play in supporting Asia's prosperity and stability. He cited the Hainan Free Trade Port as a "concrete example" of China's commitment to openness and its role in shaping the region's economic architecture.

Praising China's contribution to global development — including through the Belt and Road Initiative — and placing the country at the forefront of emerging areas such as digital and green technologies, Wong called on Beijing to lead the next wave of technological change. As the world explores new areas of cooperation, the BFA has stood out as a leading platform to help maintain the region's competitiveness, advance green growth and create opportunities for mutual development.

This year's forum took on added significance following China's adoption of the Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), which prioritizes high-quality development, AI, scientific and technological innovation and domestic consumption. As Beijing advances its long-term strategy and pushes into emerging technologies, the BFA served as a key venue for leaders, investors and policymakers to understand China's development priorities. Many see opportunities to leverage its strengths in renewable energy and green technologies to accelerate their own transitions.

Against a backdrop of intensifying tariff disputes and a deepening security crisis in the Middle East, this year's BFA emerged as a platform to advocate for peace, stability and development. Speaking at the forum, China's top legislator Zhao Leji emphasized that President Xi Jinping’s vision and initiatives—including building a community with a shared future for humanity and the four global initiatives—have provided a clear direction for the world amid profound global changes. He reaffirmed Beijing's commitment to openness, improving the business environment and promoting common development. He also urged regional nations to jointly work toward an "Asian security model" that emphasizes dialogue and consultation to resolve conflicts. In doing so, the forum reinforced its role as a venue for Asian leaders and global stakeholders to discuss pathways to maintaining stability and sustaining economic growth.

Asia is navigating an unprecedented phase marked by intense economic and security challenges. At such a critical juncture, the BFA proved more important than ever. By bringing together policymakers, industry leaders and scholars, the forum facilitated meaningful exchanges and helped steer the region's collective response to emerging risks and opportunities. China's sustained commitment to openness, innovation and regional cooperation — and its promotion of peace and stability — provides a solid foundation for deeper collaboration to safeguard regional economies and security.

Ultimately, the BFA delivered a compelling reminder: sustainable growth and stability in the region depend not on competition, rivalry or fragmentation but on strengthened partnerships, shared innovation, and a renewed commitment to inclusive development and lasting peace.

*My article first appeared at "China Diplomacy in the New Era"

March 31, 2026

China's 'two sessions' chart course for high-quality growth

By: Azhar Azam

China's annual "two sessions" — the concurrent meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) — opened in Beijing last week, setting the stage for the next chapter of the country's development strategy. Having invested heavily in innovation, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing, Beijing is now focused on leveraging these technological gains over the coming five years.

This year's gathering carries particular significance. As geopolitical tensions and conflicts weigh on global economic prospects, the policy direction emerging from Beijing underscores China's determination to sustain stable development and reinforce its role as a stabilizing force in the world economy, while accelerating its transition toward innovation-driven, green growth.

At the opening meeting of the NPC, Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the government work report, outlining an ambitious yet pragmatic roadmap for China's development in 2026. The report sets a GDP growth target of 4.5-5%, emphasizing a shift toward stable, high-quality development, building on the resilience shown in recent years.

It identifies clear development targets, including a surveyed unemployment rate of around 5.5%, over 12 million new urban jobs and a consumer price index increase of around 2%. Emphasis will be placed on innovative industries such as AI, cutting-edge sectors like quantum technology and next-generation communications, as well as green development, to achieve technological self-reliance and further the low-carbon transition.

The report also commits to proactive fiscal and monetary policies, which are crucial in boosting domestic consumption, strengthening social welfare and fostering inclusive growth. Taken together, these measures signal China’s commitment to quality growth and people-centered progress and cement its role as a responsible and major contributor to global economic growth.

Despite global uncertainty and challenges, China's economy continues to scale new heights. In 2025, the country's economic output topped 140 trillion yuan ($20 trillion), registering 5% growth from the previous year. This expansion translated into tangible social gains, including the creation of roughly 12.7 million urban jobs and the rollout of public well-being initiatives. Efforts to strengthen the social safety net and expand access to health care, education and other essential services promise a development model increasingly focused on improving the quality of people's lives.

At the same time, China's push toward innovation-driven, green development is yielding visible progress across key industrial sectors. In 2025, the output of industrial robots rose 28% and production of new energy vehicles exceeded 16 million units. These advances reflect the rapid modernization of China's manufacturing base, maximizing productivity and further consolidating its role in the global transition toward cleaner, more sustainable mobility.

China's broader energy landscape is changing too. The share of non-fossil energy in total consumption has reached 21.7%, with clean energy accounting for 30.4% of overall energy use. This is definitive evidence of Beijing's steady progress in building a more sustainable and diversified energy system.

Alongside these structural shifts, the production of green technologies continues to expand rapidly. Output of products such as charging piles and solar cells has surged, demonstrating how Beijing's green and low-carbon transformation is simultaneously advancing environmental goals, technological innovation and industrial growth.

Recent assessments support the view that China's current economic strategy places a growing emphasis on strengthening domestic demand through targeted social policy reforms. Elitza Mileva, the World Bank's lead economist for China, recently noted that measures such as higher pension benefits and childcare subsidies would expand social protection and reduce precautionary household savings, exerting a positive impact on household consumption.

Analysts view this approach as signaling "strong continuity" in China's economic management. As China's consumer market expands and upgrades, its scale and purchasing power are expected to drive global demand and generate spillover benefits across the Asia-Pacific. The momentum will be reinforced by expanded digital and green trade, AI and green technology exports and broader free trade partnerships.

At a time when the international economy is navigating a decisive period of geopolitical and technological transformation, a stronger Chinese consumer market can turbocharge the domestic economy and act as a catalyst for deeper regional economic integration, strengthening trade, investment and supply-chain connections with neighboring economies, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Beyond the near-term policy measures, the "two sessions" reaffirm China's strategic vision for development. The draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) highlights Beijing's resolve to anchor future growth in technological innovation, industrial upgrading and greater self-reliance. By pairing a more dynamic consumer market with advances in frontier technologies, China would be better positioned to achieve long-term growth, bolster economic resilience and secure a leading role in emerging industries.

The blueprint marks an evolution in the country's development model. Rather than prioritizing growth speed alone, the new draft plan emphasizes stability, technological sophistication, innovation and consumption. By embedding these priorities across sectors, Chinese policymakers aim to modernize the economy and reduce dependence on traditional growth drivers such as export-led expansion. This strategy — combining a vibrant domestic market with technological leadership — lays the groundwork for a flexible, future-ready economy capable of sustaining high-quality prosperity.

*My article first appeared at China Diplomacy in the New Era