The Middle East is drifting toward rival security blocs

The Middle East is increasingly gravitating toward parallel – and potentially rival – security architectures. Rather than pursuing strategic diversification within a shared regional order, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are charting divergent paths amid waning U.S. guarantees. The trajectory points not to cohesion but to structural fragmentation in the regional security landscape.

Abu Dhabi’s signing a letter of intent with New Delhi on a Strategic Defense Partnership[i] highlights this shift, underscoring intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although not a formal defense pact, the arrangement would sharpen regional divisions particularly if Israel is formally embedded in the emerging security network, accelerating the consolidation of the Indo-Abrahamic alliance.

The recalibration unfolded following an October 2023 leaked report that allegedly outlined Abu Dhabi’s plans[ii] to provide support to Israel through a network of military facilities in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, including in Yemen, Eritrea and Somalia, against Hamas. The disclosure reinforced the perception of the UAE[iii] as a permissive conduit for Israeli power projection across the Middle East.

The partnership enables New Delhi to sustain strategic presence and influence in the Middle East without entanglement in regional conflicts[iv] and offers Abu Dhabi a pathway to long-term, technology-driven economic growth, anchored in diversified external partnerships. This flexible hedging model contrasts sharply with Riyadh’s security strategy.

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Pakistan[v] commits the parties to treat aggression against one as aggression against both. While an embryonic framework lacks defined response mechanisms and clear command integration, it signals Riyadh’s preference for formalized deterrence.

Reports of Türkiye’s interest in joining the SMDA[vi] or building a standalone trilateral security alliance[vii] along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan magnifies the Abu Dhabi’s divergence. If realized, Ankara’s accession – as a NATO member with the alliance’s second-largest military[viii], a rapidly advancing defense industry and expanding military footprint[ix] across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus – would add substantial operational and strategic weight to the treaty.

Signed in September 2025[x], the SMDA’s formulation echoes NATO’s Article 5 even as it excludes explicit nuclear undertakings or predefined protocols. Still, observers believe that it could evolve into a more formal collective defense structure over time[xi] with subsequent agreements defining the role of deterrence and the scope of collective response. Turkish participation, especially if it catalyzes interest from additional states, would strengthen this perception.

The SMDA’s origins lie in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy[xii], accelerated by U.S. inaction following the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities. Since then, Riyadh has broadened diplomatic engagement with rivals including Iran and explored parallel security arrangements to reduce dependence on America’s protective umbrella.

Israel’s military operations across multiple theaters, including strikes targeting Hamas leadership in Qatar, crystallized anxieties about the reliability of external deterrence. For Gulf states, the concern was Washington’s apparent inability – or unwillingness – to restrain a close ally from trespassing the sovereignty of another U.S. partner, which could have ignited a wider regional conflict.

As Ellie Geranmayeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations anticipated the looming reckoning, “If you are an Arab country that hosts U.S. bases or a NATO member like Türkiye and then a major U.S. ally attacks Qatar, you are going to deeply question that American security umbrella you’ve paid top dollar for.”[xiii]

Similar doubts have surfaced in Europe. Germany’s exploration[xiv] and France’s conditional consideration of extending nuclear deterrence to other European states[xv] last year emphasized growing unease even among core NATO allies. Türkiye’s interest in the SMDA mirrors comparable skepticism.

For Riyadh, the pact enhances leverage over Washington, bolstering resistance to U.S. pressure to normalize relations with Israel[xvi] without tangible progress[xvii] toward a Palestinian state. For economically strained Pakistan, it offers prospects of translating strategic configuration into material gains[xviii] – arms exports, increased Saudi investment and deeper defense-industrial cooperation. Türkiye’s calculus is strategic, aimed at expanding regional influence and diversifying security options beyond NATO.

These shifts have unsettled peripheral actors. In India, the SMDA has drawn close scrutiny from policymakers[xix] and analysts[xx] about its long-term structural implications. The emerging Saudi–Pakistan–Türkiye triad, Indian critics argue[xxi], could reshape power balances across the Middle East and adjacent regions central to India’s energy security, trade routes and strategic interests.

The implications extend into the South Caucasus, a geostrategic corridor linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. An expanded SMDA would intersect with the existing Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Türkiye political-military axis, complicating India’s efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement.[xxii]

At the same time, Ankara’s strong ties with Baku and its strengthening relations with Tbilisi could provide Riyadh alternative investment and transit pathways into Central Asia via the Middle Corridor[xxiii], reinforcing the bloc’s strategic coherence beyond the Middle East.

Yet, conflating the multilateral defense alliance with ideological cohesion or strategic revisionism[xxiv] misreads the nature of contemporary alignment. From Saudi-UAE rifts over Yemen and divergent positions on Somaliland’s recognition – Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on one side and the UAE and Israel on the other – to their respective outreach to Pakistan and India reveal that regional geopolitics is driven by economic and strategic interests, not ideological affinity.

Whether the SMDA matures into a broader collective framework or remains limited, Türkiye’s interest reflects an adaptive response to eroding security guarantees. By contrast, the UAE–India partnership embodies a different logic, integrating defense cooperation with trade and technology without binding automatic defense commitments.

These contrasting approaches indicate that the Middle East is entering a period of competitive fragmentation. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a more institutionalized model of deterrence while the UAE’s flexible hedging emphasizes optionality over commitment. With little prospect for coordination between these parallel alignments, they risk calcifying into rival blocs – weakening deterrence, raising the stakes for miscalculation and heightening the likelihood of regional escalation.


[i] Embassy of India, Abdu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (2025). “India-UAE Bilateral Defence Cooperation”, retrieved from: https://www.indembassyuae.gov.in/defence-relation.php#:~:text=Bilateral%20defence%20cooperation%20between%20India,Defence%20Cooperation%20in%20June%202003.
[ii] Cafiero, G. (2025). “Israel, the UAE, and Yemen’s South: The Politics of Unlikely Alliances”, Arab Center Washington DC, 14 November 2025, retrieved from: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israel-the-uae-and-yemens-south-the-politics-of-unlikely-alliances/.
[iii] Middle East Eye (2026). “Prominent Saudi academic accuses UAE of being Israel’s ‘trojan horse’”, Middle East Eye, 23 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/prominent-saudi-academic-accuses-uae-being-israels-trojan-horse.
[iv] Patel, S. and Elimam, A. (2026). “India, UAE sign $3 billion LNG deal, agree to boost trade and defence ties at leaders’ meeting”, Reuters, 19 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-uae-agree-boost-trade-defence-ties-finalise-lng-deal-leaders-meeting-2026-01-19/.
[v] Saudi Press Agency (2025). “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister State Visit to Saudi Arabia”, 25 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2399706?
[vi] Hacaoglu, S., Mangi, S. and Kozok, F. (2026). “Turkey Said to Seek Membership of Saudi-Pakistan Defense Pact”, Bloomberg, 9 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-09/turkey-said-to-seek-membership-of-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact.
[vii] TRT World (2026). “Turkiye, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia defence deal ‘in pipeline’”, 16 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.trtworld.com/article/0ddf25688812.
[viii] Al Jazeera (2025). “Turkiye’s booming defence industry – a quick look”, 17 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/17/heres-a-look-at-turkiyes-booming-defence-industry.
[ix] Alhas, A.M. (2025). “Analysis: Turkey pursues deals, bases, training to bolster global military”, BBC Monitoring, 9 May 2025, retrieved from: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003u88.
[x] Saudi Press Agency (2025). “Joint Statement Issued Following Pakistan Prime Minister State Visit to Saudi Arabia”, 17 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/w2399706?
[xi] Ashtakala, D., Horschig, D. and Schiff, B. (2025). “Could the Pakistani-Saudi Defense Pact Be the First Step Toward a NATO-Style Alliance”, 6 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-pakistani-saudi-defense-pact-be-first-step-toward-nato-style-alliance.
[xii] El Yaakoubi, A. (2023). “Saudi crown prince acts to realign Mideast dynamics amid concern over US support”, Reuters, 4 April 2023, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-acts-realign-mideast-dynamics-amid-concern-over-us-support-2023-04-03/.
[xiii] Dagher, S. et al. (2025). “Israel’s Qatar Attack Has Gulf Doubting US security Pledge”, Bloomberg, 10 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-10/israel-s-qatar-attack-has-gulf-questioning-us-security-guarantee.
[xiv] Reuters (2025). “Germany’s Mertz wants European nuclear weapons to boost US shield”, 9 March 2025, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-merz-wants-european-nuclear-weapons-boost-us-shield-2025-03-09/.
[xv] Hairsine, K. (2025). “Macron open to deploying French nuclear weapons in Europe”, DW, 14 May 2025, retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/macron-open-to-deploying-french-nuclear-weapons-in-europe/a-72534138.
[xvi] MEMO (2025). “Report: Tensions soared during Trump-bin Salman meeting over normalization push”, 26 November 2025, retrieved from: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251126-report-tensions-soared-during-trump-bin-salman-meeting-over-normalisation-push/.
[xvii] Roll Call (2025). “Remarks: Donald Trump Holds a Bilat with Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia”, retrieved from: https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-bilat-mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-november-18-2025/.
[xviii] Shahid, A. and Sayeed, S. (2026). “Exclusive: Pakistan, Saudi in talks on JF-17 jets-for-loans deal, sources say”, Reuters, 8 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-saudi-talks-jf-17-jets-for-loans-deal-sources-say-2026-01-07/.
[xix] Vaish, A. (2025). “India Says ‘Will Study Implications’ Of Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Defence Deal”, Outlook, 18 September 2025, retrieved from: https://www.outlookindia.com/national/india-says-will-study-implications-of-pakistan-saudi-arabia-defence-deal.[xx] Pandya, A. (2025). “Could Saudi-Pakistan Defense Cooperation Spark War with India?”, Middle East Forum, 22 October 2025, retrieved from: https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/could-saudi-pakistan-defense-cooperation-spark-war-with-india.
[xxi] India Today (2026). “Turkey in talks to join Pakistan-Saudi Muslim Nato. Should India be concerned?”, 13 January 2026, retrieved from: https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-news-turkey-in-talks-to-join-pak-saudi-nato-like-defence-deal-should-india-be-worried-bloomberg-2851070-2026-01-13.
[xxii] Chalikyan, N. (2025). “India and the South Caucasus: Infrastructure, Arms, and Geopolitical Competition”, ORF America, 16 October 2025, retrieved from: https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/india-and-the-south-caucasus-infrastructure-arms-and-geopolitical-competition.
[xxiii] Amwaj Media (2025). “The burgeoning Gulf Arab footprint in the South Caucasus”, 21 March 2025, retrieved from: https://amwaj.media/en/article/the-burgeoning-gulf-arab-footprint-in-the-south-caucasus.
[xxiv] Restelli, S. (2026). “Two Security Architectures, One Region: Why the India-UAE-Israel Axis Matters”, 20 January 2026, retrieved from: https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/two-security-architectures-one-region-why-the-india-uae-israel-axis-matters/.

*My article first appeared at Manara Magazine/Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum

Merz's visit to set a positive tone for future Sino-German relations

By: Azhar  Azam

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he would seek "strategic partnerships" and pursue future cooperation with Beijing during his China visit, which begins on Wednesday. Against the backdrop of rising protectionism, his comments reflect Berlin's intent to reinforce pragmatic collaboration in trade, investment and manufacturing with Beijing through renewed high-level exchanges and intensified business engagement.

Asked whether concrete outcomes were expected, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul earlier confirmed, "Yes, they can, and in all likelihood they will." He noted that Beijing had approved the export applications for some German companies, reaffirming China as one of Germany's most important trading partner.

Merz is bringing an unusually large business delegation including chief executives from leading firms such as Bayer, Volkswagen and Siemens. With around 30 senior corporate leaders accompanying him and with interest far exceeding available places, the trip has attracted significant attention from not only China and Germany, but also the international community.

Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, Sino-German relations have navigated periods of tensions that have evolved into a robust economic relationship. Despite differences, both countries share interests in boosting trade and investment, supporting the international economy and addressing global challenges such as climate change and public health.

Among Berlin's major demands from Beijing are increased market access for its companies and products. China has already signaled receptiveness to deeper commercial engagement. At a roundtable for German-invested enterprises on February 12, Chinese officials encouraged German firms to invest in innovation, green development and the digital sector, pledging a fair and stable business environment.

For Germany, China remains a vital market and an attractive investment destination. German corporate investment in China reached a four-year high in 2025, and firms themselves credit China-based technologies and products with strengthening their global presence and competitiveness. This demonstrates commitment to elevate business ties and sustain advanced-manufacturing linkages.

Economic fundamentals highlight the depth of the relationship. China was Germany's largest trading partner from 2016 to 2023. After the US briefly overtook it in 2024, Beijing regained the top position in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching 251.8 billion euros (around $296.66 billion), according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis).

Some frame Germany's economic ties with China as a source of dependence; they are reciprocal and historically rooted. Decades of investment, trade and technological cooperation have produced structurally embedded interlinkages that benefit both sides. The priority shouldn't be asymmetric dependence but mutual interdependence.

Merz's outreach to China carries wider geopolitical significance. Amid intensifying global trade frictions and attempts to undermine a coordinated response to climate change, disease surveillance and pandemic preparedness, Berlin's stance on tariffs, support for multilateral institutions and emphasis on free trade align with Beijing's.

At the Munich Security Conference, the German Chancellor himself warned against unilateralism. "We do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade. We stand by climate agreements and the World Health Organization." As protectionist impulses and efforts to weaken institutions threaten global cohesion, closer China-Germany coordination becomes crucial to safeguard multilateralism, open trade and collective action on climate and global health.

As Wadephul, who recently met with his Chinese and French counterparts Wang Yi and Jean-Noel Barrot, stressed: Germany and France should increase communication with China to dispel misunderstandings and consolidate mutual trust. Such engagements could advance strategic dialogue, strengthen the UN-centered international system, improve global governance and support each other's development.

At the European Industry Summit, Merz hailed China's industrial speed and implementation capacity in rolling out large renewable-energy projects as a benchmark for Europe. By partnering with Beijing, Berlin and Brussels can accelerate their green transition, scale innovation and boost competitiveness – three pillars of Europe's industrial renewal amid a protectionist, anti-green administration in Washington.

Building on recent diplomatic exchanges and strong complementarities between Europe's largest industrial economy and the world's leading manufacturing and innovation hub, Merz's China visit is expected to yield concrete results. Possible outcomes include a more predictable market environment, collaboration in innovation, green industries, the digital sector, advanced manufacturing, automotive and chemicals.

Germany's long-standing engagement with China provides a solid foundation. For two decades, German firms have thrived on China's demand – particularly in the automotive, machinery and chemical industries – creating a win-win scenario that allowed them to weather shocks better than their peers.

The momentum hasn't faded. Still, roughly all German companies in China are optimistic about their future outlook, with half intending to increase investment in metal products, automotive, electronic, chemicals and logistics.

As US tariffs weigh on German firms and pivot toward the Chinese market, Beijing is extending robust policy support. During the 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan period, China aims to expand high-quality opening-up and development, generating significant opportunities for German exporters. Germany's parallel efforts to ensure an equitable business environment for Chinese companies would promise a more resilient Beijing-Berlin economic and trade partnership.

Looking ahead, this leadership-level engagement is poised to set a constructive tone for the future of Beijing-Berlin relations. The world's second and third-largest economies share strong economic and political interconnections and a common stake in global stability.

When combined with China's high-quality demand, technological innovation and industrial capacity, Germany's drive for trade expansion, competitiveness and resilient supply chains could help revitalize its economy and sustain a mutually beneficial partnership for decades to come.

*My article first appeared in CGTN

Why Japan is right to restart its nuclear reactors

By: Azhar Azam

Japan’s decision to restart nuclear reactors heralds a major shift in its approach to addressing multifaceted challenges. For an economy that recorded its first real GDP contraction in six quarters, the move could strengthen economic resilience, enhance energy security and advance decarbonization goals.

A key factor, making nuclear power pivotal to energy security, is its capacity to deliver large volumes of continuous, clean and reliable electricity.

In contrast to intermittent, weather-dependent renewable sources such as wind and solar, nuclear plants provide firm baseload power and work 24×7. This reliability is crucial for an advanced economy like Japan, which needs a stable electricity supply to bolster industrial competitiveness.

Nuclear is a zero-emission clean energy source and has successfully been deployed by several leading economies, including America. Nuclear-generated electricity in the US avoids 470 million metric tons of CO2 emissions annually, the equivalent of removing 100 million cars off the roads, in addition to reducing several harmful air pollutants.

Facing geographical constraints for large-scale renewable deployment, nuclear restarts could reduce Japan’s reliance on imported coal and liquefied natural gas, which cost $68 billion last year and accounted for 60-70% electricity generation – helping Tokyo to mitigate geopolitical risks and limit exposure to external shocks and supply chain disruptions.

For power-intensive AI data centers – where electricity demand is expected to increase five-fold by 2035 – Japan’s emphasis on nuclear energy can translate into grid stability and a diversified power supply – thanks to its advantages such as reliability, high energy density, scalable power output, low carbon emissions and enhanced land use efficiency.

But given that nuclear alone cannot meet the looming power surge, Japan must also accelerate investments in renewables to build a robust energy system.

In this context, SEMI’s three priority actions – removing permitting delays, overcoming land-use challenges and reducing market uncertainties – could stimulate local economies, scale up the system’s resilience and cut costs while strengthening Japan’s industrial competitiveness against global peers.

The country’s revised energy strategy maps out an actionable roadmap to achieve long-term goals. By targeting nuclear and renewables to account for 20% and 50% respectively of the energy mix, the plan provides policy stability for businesses – promoting decarbonization, ensuring stable power supply and reinforcing industrial capacity to drive economic growth.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi wants to curb large solar projects, arguing they could damage Japan’s natural environment and increase Tokyo’s reliance on solar panels on foreign countries, particularly China.

Beijing dominates manufacturing and supply chains for solar panels and wind turbines and is rapidly ascending into a powerhouse in nuclear energy with substantial investments in fusion.

Japan’s push to reduce dependence on China-made solar panels has led to Takaichi administration’s action to end financial support and tighten regulations on mega renewable energy projects and promote next-generation technologies like perovskite solar cells and nuclear fusion.

But her ambitions confront several headwinds. These technologies are still in early stages of development, sparking concerns that Takaichi’s bets could sideline Japan’s climate and renewable-energy ambitions.

Studies suggest that perovskites are unlikely to match conventional solar photovoltaics (PV) on cost price and performance by 2040. For perovskites, durability is the key hurdle: they are yet to become stable enough to operate outdoors for decades.

With next-generation reactors carrying a hefty price tag and most experts projecting that fusion needs at least another 20 to 30 years to develop into a commercial reality – an overemphasis on these technologies could divert investments from economically and technologically proven renewables, whose capacity is set to double to 4,600GW by 2030.

Solar PV alone is likely to account for 80% of this growth due to cost efficiency, wider social acceptance and faster permitting.

Nuclear energy can deliver high-capacity, low-carbon baseload power; its financial and construction challenges can’t be ignored. According to the US Energy Information, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for advanced nuclear power stood as high as $110/MWh (megawatt-hour) in 2023 and is predicted to remain unchanged through 2050.

In comparison, the LCOE of solar PVs is likely to drop from $55/MWh to $25/MWh for the same period. Even France, the world’s second-largest producer of nuclear energy that sources about 70% of its electricity from the industry, aims for renewables to account for 33% of its energy mix by 2030.

Japan’s pivot to nuclear and perovskite is a forward-looking response to an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment and domestic topographical barriers to deploy renewables at scale.

This futuristic approach contributes to strengthening economic resilience by lowering electricity cost, cutting dependence on imported fuel and fortifying energy security, self-reliance and climate action.

Yet as these technologies will take decades to fully mature, downplaying established significance of traditional renewables now risks leaving Japan behind in a sector central to economic competitiveness.

This policy imprecision could undermine Tokyo’s ability to navigate immediate challenges, such as economic stagnation and inflation – to which electricity prices are a major contributor.

Tokyo’s goal, therefore, shouldn’t be choosing between nuclear and renewables but to sequence them intelligently: using nuclear restarts and conventional renewables as near-term stabilizers to contain energy costs while next-generation technologies mature and lay the foundation for Japan’s long-term economic and climate resilience.

*My article first appeared in Asia Times

Lee's China visit marks turning point for Beijing-Seoul ties

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: President Lee's Beijing visit marked a "new starting point" for China-South Korea relations, with leaders committing to expanded cooperation in AI, trade and diplomatic engagement.

During South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's maiden visit to Beijing since taking office, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks for the second time in just two months, signaling a strong determination on both sides to boost economic, political and social exchanges and deliver tangible benefits to people in both countries.

One of the key highlights of the meeting was the convergence in the two leaders' approaches toward stabilizing and building the bilateral relationship. Welcoming Lee at the Great Hall of the People, Xi emphasized that as friends and neighbors, China and South Korea should intensify exchanges and conduct closer communication. He pledged to work with Seoul to bolster cooperation, adhere to the principle of mutual benefit and promote a strategic cooperative partnership for people's well-being and regional stability.

Lee was equally optimistic about working with China to improve people's livelihoods and open a "new phase" in the bilateral relationship. Hoping 2026 to be the year for "full restoration" of Beijing-Seoul relations, Lee recalled that the two countries had friendly exchanges for thousands of years. He also noted their shared history of suffering the loss of sovereignty and fighting for independence in reference to Japan's militarist aggression in the early 20th century.

Describing Xi as a "visionary leader" and China as a "truly reliable neighbor," he emphasized more frequent dialogue and deeper collaboration with Beijing in high-tech sectors and artificial intelligence to unlock mutually beneficial opportunities. He reaffirmed Seoul's commitment to the one-China principle and underlined the importance of respecting each other's national interests.

Xi visited South Korea in November for the first time in 11 years, meeting Lee after the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in the South Korean city of Gyeongju. The Chinese president called for respecting each other's social systems and development paths, promoting cultural and people-to-people exchanges and increasing cooperation in emerging areas such as AI, biomedicine, green industries and the silver economy.

Speaking before South Koreans in Beijing on Sunday, Lee said the trip would serve as a "new starting point" to bridge existing gaps in Sino-South Korean relations, restore them to normal and elevate them further. This optimism would translate into a more robust strategic partnership, contributing to bilateral relations and regional prosperity and security.


At the first China-South Korea Business Forum since 2017 on Monday, Lee acknowledged that closely intertwined supply chains had long supported both countries' development. He stressed the need to unveil "new engines of growth" like AI and consumer products to strengthen and expand bilateral trade.

"The Republic of Korea and China are ships that sail on the same sea in the same direction," Lee said, cautioning that "if we rely only on inertia, we could miss important turning points." The position stood as an endorsement of Xi's proposal to view the bilateral partnership from a long-term perspective, pursue common development, properly handle differences and enhance communication to tackle global challenges.

Bilateral trade volume, according to China's General Administration of Customs, reached about $299 billion in the first 11 months of 2025. People-to-people exchanges are gathering pace as China and South Korea become popular destinations for each other's tourists. South Korea's trade ministry announced nine memorandums of understanding between Chinese and Korean companies in such areas as consumer goods, content production and supply chain management. These agreements signal growing resilience and diversification in Beijing-Seoul cooperation.

For instance, South Korea's retail conglomerate Shinsegae signed a deal with China's e-commerce giant Alibaba to support the former's overseas sales. The initiative aims to export high-quality South Korean goods through the latter's platforms to South Asia and southern Europe, including Spain and Portugal, extending afterward to China and eventually to more than 200 countries and regions. The collaboration will further allow South Korean shopping site Gmarket to move beyond its domestic market and compete globally, enabling even small sellers to reach customers abroad by leveraging Alibaba's AI tools.

Three other MOUs were signed between Korean companies — fish cake maker Samjinfood, agriculture technology firm Farmstaff and biotech company PharmaResearch — and their respective Chinese counterparts. The deals aim to boost Beijing's imports from Seoul. They also meet Lee's aspiration to make AI and consumer goods new pillars of the reinvigorated bilateral relationship while revealing Beijing's willingness to open its vast domestic market for South Korean companies.

Following the leaders' summit, Xi and Lee witnessed the signing of 15 cooperation documents covering science and technology, the economy and trade, transportation, and environmental protection. While these MOUs reflect the two leaders' vision to support each other's development, they underscore how sustained top-level political engagement can lead to substantial opportunities for both countries and their peoples.

The global geopolitical environment is becoming increasingly turbulent, driven by rising protectionism and a resurgence of unilateral military actions. This volatility is illustrated by the U.S. global tariff war and recent invasion of Venezuela, including the widely condemned abduction of President Nicolas Maduro.

Such an act of unparalleled aggression — which violates the territorial integrity of an independent nation, the U.N. Charter and established international norms — will deepen the sense of insecurity among states, particularly those wary of U.S. military intervention. It also risks fueling arms races in multiple regions and accelerating the push for nuclear capability rather than denuclearization and nonproliferation.

In the face of intensifying economic and security challenges, China and South Korea need to strengthen their exchanges and cooperation while resolving differences through dialogue and consultation. They must also assume greater responsibilities to safeguard their own economies as well as promote global development and regional peace, including working together for long-term stability in Northeast Asia. Both countries have a shared legacy of resisting Japanese militarism and benefiting from economic globalization. By aligning their development strategies, strengthening strategic coordination and making the right policy decisions, Beijing and Seoul can jointly oppose protectionism, uphold multilateralism and contribute to building a more equitable, accountable and multipolar world.

Lee has expressed confidence that strategic cooperation between Beijing and Seoul will become an "irreversible trend," indicating his determination to build China-South Korea relations on a solid and lasting foundation. This approach is crucial for deepening political trust, improving people's livelihoods, promoting trade and investment, and cementing industrial and supply chain collaboration.

Snapping family selfies with Xi using a Xiaomi smartphone his Chinese counterpart gifted him, Lee demonstrated the personal warmth now characterizing Beijing-Seoul relations. Both leaders' commitment to more frequent communication and deeper cooperation positions the Beijing-Seoul relationship as a stabilizing force for the region amid global uncertainty.

In short, the visit and its outcomes will have positive impact on bilateral ties and regional and global peace and stability if both sides can effectively manage various interferences and distractions, especially pressure from the other side of the Pacific.

*My article first appeared in China Diplomacy in the New Era

Domestic First, Global Last: The Risks of America’s Security Strategy

By: Azhar Azam

Immediately after the unveiling of the Trump administration's National Security Strategy (NSS), the Pentagon has become a center of heated debate over the orientation of American power abroad.

At the heart of this is Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s push to reorganize US combatant command structure to bring it in line with the strategy. These efforts, senior military officials warn, would lack regional expertise and weaken deterrence in Europe and Middle East.

Beneath these controversies, NSS principles are rapidly translating into concrete policy actions. Recently, Trump declared fentanyl a “weapon of mass destruction” and put it at par with chemical warfare, a highly-securitized framing that significantly broadens the document’s conception of national security threats.

Together with Europe’s willingness to lead a “multinational force” in Ukraine as part of the Trump-brokered peace deal between Moscow and Kyiv, these actions underline accelerated operationalization of “America First.”

This shift is already visible in NSS’ elevation of Western Hemisphere as the US' first line of defense, reflected in the administration's decision to order a naval blockade of Venezuelan oil tankers and intensify pressure on the Maduro government. This move signals implementation of Monroe-style doctrine, recast as the “Trump Corollary” in the strategy, to counter narcotics trafficking, illicit migration and China’s growing economic and strategic footprint in Latin America.

But the approach underestimates the challenge: China is the largest trading and strategic partner of several regional countries. Through its extensive investments in energy, infrastructure and technology and sustained cultural and diplomatic engagement, Beijing has embedded itself deeply across the region.

This reality represents a major obstacle to the Monroe-style approach; it remains unclear whether Washington can marshal enough economic, diplomatic and political resources to persuade regional countries into realignment and how many of them will actually be willing to do so on its terms.

Released earlier this month, the strategy articulates a momentous recalibration of American strategic priorities – moving away from decades of alliance-centric global leadership to domestic resilience and internal security, economic competitiveness and interest-based international engagement.

It marks a decisive break with past practices: long-standing security commitments are replaced by transactional arrangements, transnationalism – the idea to tackle global challenges like climate change jointly – gives way to nationalism and interventionist, ideology-driven policies yield to “Flexible Realism,” to cultivate commercial and peaceful relations with all nations.

While NSS emphasis on reindustrialization and production to support supply chains and securing critical minerals addresses genuine economic vulnerabilities – its transactional posture, reduced focus on allied security and dismissive stance towards multilateral institutions could undermine transatlantic unity.

The document’s non-interventionist and “look inward to project power outward approach” could ease military overextension and promote domestic renewal but at the cost of ceding global leadership and disengagement with allies. This risks creating strategic vacuums and encouraging partners to seek greater independence.

Nowhere is the shift more apparent than in Europe. The NSS asks allies to assume primary responsibility for their own and regional defense. With alliances now framed as transactional and the US stepping back from unconditional guarantees to European security, NATO cohesion will be weakened – emboldening Russia to exploit emerging fractures in the Alliance.

The strategy chastises Europe for migration policies, “censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition.” Such a damning assessment could fuel avoidable tensions and complicate efforts to maintain a unified position against shared challenges, accelerating Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy.

In the NSS, climate change and net zero are labeled as “disastrous ideologies” This response to one of humanity's existential challenges offers short-term economic leverage to the US by boosting its fossil fuel exports and blunting China’s competitive edge in renewable energy and clean technology. Yet in the long-run, it could increase partners' reliance on Beijing to advance climate action and fast-track green transition.

In the Middle East and Africa, the strategy emphasizes limited involvement, focusing on preventing adversaries from dominating strategic regions and securing energy routes while avoiding long-term military commitments. This reconfiguration will reduce overseas burdens but may erode Washington's credibility among partners.

The Indo-Pacific is a rare exception where the US will build alliances over its potential to remain a key economic and geopolitical battleground. Even here, engagement is confined to preserving the US “prime position” in the world economy. For peace and stability, India will be encouraged to assume a leading role including through the Quad.

Fundamentally, the NSS represents a deliberate strategic redefinition rather than just a simple retrenchment. Its prioritization of domestic resilience, selective engagement and retreat from global leadership may yield short-term dividends; it risks hollowing out alliance structures that the US spent decades building.

Frictions within the Pentagon are an early indicator of this strategic gamble. The proposed overhaul of combatant commands could raise questions among allies about American reliability as a steadfast security partner, undermining US influence in key regions.

Concurrently, the administration's aggressive posture in Western Hemisphere – as exemplified by the Venezuela case – could drag US in “forever wars,” something NSS promised to evade and this time close to home with potentially some serious implications for American security.

In sum, the NSS codifies a historic geopolitical retreat, epitomizing America’s retrenchment from a global leader and steward of international order to just a regional actor. More strikingly, it constitutes an inadvertent admission that decades of wars have left the US economically strained and strategically exposed to cross-border threats.

By shrinking foreign commitments, this interest-driven approach may reinforce domestic resilience yet could lead to steady diffusion of American global power – paradoxically leaving the US more isolated, less credible and less influential than at any point in the postwar era.

*My article (Unedited) first appeared in Express Tribune

What New Delhi can learn from China’s war on air pollution

By: Azhar Azam

The air quality in New Delhi and its surrounding areas has turned hazardous as a dense layer of smog blanketed the Indian capital. Several parts of Delhi recorded an air quality index (AQI) of 400 and even 450 – a level considered as “severe” under international pollution standards.

Every winter, air pollution in Delhi spikes around this time when cold air traps smoke and fumes from fireworks, stubble burning and heavy traffic. The crisis is aggravated by vehicular and industrial emissions, massive road dust, construction activities and coal and biomass-fired residential heating.

As dozens of Indian cities grapple with “poor” or “very poor” air quality, per India’s pollution watchdog, China serves as a model for its neighbouring nation. Beijing, through stringent measures and effective air pollution control policies, has made a considerable effort to improve its air quality while also achieving impressive economic growth.

Twenty years ago, Beijing was crowned as the world’s smog capital. China’s temporary emission reduction regulations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics set the stage for its war on air pollution. With the launch of a five-year national action plan in 2013, the country introduced a raft of measures, including the closure of coal-fired boilers, promoting public transport and new energy vehicles, accelerating technological reform of enterprises and boosting innovation and green energy.

Special emphasis was given to slashing the “particulate matter (PM2.5)”. These inhalable particles, equal or less than 2.5 microns in diameter, are a major source of air pollution and pose the greatest danger to human health over their ability to penetrate deep into the lungs and enter the bloodstream.

Beijing’s efforts, coupled with the establishment of an early warning and emergency response system, better regulation of pollution activities, relocation of factories from populated areas and incentives for farmers to discourage agricultural burning, made a lasting impact, showing a dramatic 35 percent improvement in highly polluted areas by 2017.

In the following years, Beijing continued its campaign against air pollution. Average PM2.5 concentration dropped by a half, from 72 micrograms per cubic metre (μg/m³) in 2013 to 36μg/m³ in 2019, dropping further to 29.3μg/m³ in 2024. Although substantially higher than the World Health Organization’s guidelines – 5μg/m³ – it still marked a major breakthrough in China’s push against air pollution.

Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, China sustained its battle for blue skies, rolling out targeted air pollution control policies such as limiting construction-related emissions, deploying clean industrial technologies, cutting steel production, retiring old cars and encouraging the adoption of electric energy vehicles. The measures paid dividends as China’s capital transformed from an environmental backwater into an emblematic case of urban air quality governance. Blue skies are indeed back in Beijing, given PM2.5 concentration averaged 24.9μg/m³ in the first three quarters of 2025, per the government.

The recent improvement builds on prior gains. In 2022, average annual PM2.5 concentration across China fell to 29μg/m³, according to Chinese media, and the number of days classified as having good air quality in 339 cities reached 316 – a progress not many regional countries could match. As many parts of the world experienced rising PM2.5 levels, China’s steep reductions were so substantial that they single-handedly drove a decline in global pollution, highlighting the country’s outsized contribution to improving air quality worldwide.

Independent research supports the data. Thanks to timely government intervention, strong coordination between local and central administrations and international financial institutions, the Greater Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region notched a significant achievement. According to the Asian Development Bank, the region has made major gains in air quality: between 2015 and 2023, average annual PM2.5 levels fell by 44.2 percent, sulphur dioxide by 76.3 percent and nitrogen dioxide by 34.8 percent, while the share of days with good air quality rose by 10.3 points to 63.1 percent.

Experts underscore that China’s environmental frameworks have boosted cross-sector cooperation and spurred active participation from industries that were once major polluters. Over the years, Beijing has developed the world’s largest and most comprehensive new energy industrial chain. Its leadership in producing renewable energy and manufacturing electric vehicles positions it at the centre of the global clean energy transition, making it an important actor to combat air pollution at home and abroad.

With Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) growing by more than 73 percent between 2013 and 2024 and PM2.5 concentrations plunging to 26μg/m³ in the January-September period, the country demonstrates how a consistent, policy-driven approach can maintain a high growth rate and still strive to deliver clean air to its people. This experience offers a precedent for India and other nations, pursuing to curb pollution without impeding their development goals.

Air pollution is the greatest environmental health risk. It knows no borders, exacerbates climate change, causes economic losses and reduces agricultural productivity. Even in China, where three-quarters of cities met their annual PM2.5 targets in 2024, the monster is resurging sharply across several regions, urging Beijing to intensify its own measures and ensure enforcement.

The scale of this challenge necessitates strengthening cooperation and sharing best practices, particularly among countries in South, Southeast and East Asia that are worst affected. Being at the forefront of the air pollution crisis – what China faced a decade earlier amid rapid development and urbanisation – India cannot afford to be complacent in drawing valuable lessons both from Chinese past successes and nascent challenges.

By adopting elements of China’s clean-air playbook – from shutting down highly polluting factories and expanding electric bus fleets to establishing real-time dust monitoring at construction sites and reinforcing interprovincial coordination – India could make meaningful progress in securing cleaner air and a sustainable future for its people, while advancing its own development and economic growth.

*My article that first appeared in Al Jazeera

Saudi-Israel normalisation is dead — for now

By: Azhar Azam

Saudi Arabia’s approach to Palestinian issue has long been shaped by King Faisal’s vision. In 1967 – when Israel attacked and defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria, captured Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem and brought one million Palestinians under its control – he made East Jerusalem and Palestine the centerpiece of his diplomacy.

The 1973 Arab-Israel war further underscored his strategic acumen. As a shaking Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir pleaded with Washington for arms, Faisal accurately prophesied that US President Richard Nixon aimed to lift military pressure on Israel from Egypt, allowing it to consolidate its hold on East Jerusalem.

King’s assassination in 1975 marked the loss of a leader who confronted Zionist expansionism; it silenced a powerful voice for the Palestinian cause. By 1977, Sadat – at whose request Faisal imposed the 1973 oil embargo – was addressing the Knesset on peace and soon Cairo would become the first Arab country to normalize ties with Tel Aviv, fracturing regional consensus on Palestine.

Even so, Prince Salman (now King) sustained the mission Faisal entrusted in 1969, mobilizing public support for Palestine. In 2002, he countered Zionist slogan “A dollar you donate kills an Arab” with “A riyal you donate saves an Arab.” As a King, he has rejected any arrangement that excludes East Jerusalem from a future Palestinian state.

This stance is being tested as US President Donald Trump steps up pressure on Riyadh to join the Abraham Accords. Through the treaties – which omitted the Palestinian issue – the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan established formal ties with Israel to secure peace. Yet the so-called blueprint of reconciliation between three Abrahamic religions in practice cemented Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s faith in his military doctrine, encouraging him to pursue normalization without ending occupation.

Before Hamas attacks, even Riyadh was treading on this illusory path, having downgraded Palestine question from core of its foreign policy to merely a “very important” issue. But Israel’s war in Gaza terminated that flirtation. Veteran Saudi statesman Prince Turki al-Faisal’s blistering criticism of both Hamas and Israel for killing civilians and Western hypocrisy in valuing the Palestinian and Israeli lives laid bare the Kingdom's frustration with process derailment.

Israel’s genocidal campaign has since made normalization politically untenable and strategically unwise: driving Riyadh back to its earlier position: no recognition of Israel without establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. Trump’s push to bring Riyadh into the fold faces another obstacle. Saudi conservatives resent the country's liberal direction and with polls showing 81% Saudis oppose the Accords, embracing Tel Aviv Israel now risks igniting public outrage.

Befuddling matters, far-right Israeli ministers – promoting ghastly ideas of expanding territorial expansion, starving Palestinians to death and resuming war – undermine any compromise. Netanyahu’s stubborn denial of a Palestinian state after his coalition partner Bezalel Stomrich’s derisive sneer – Riyadh can “keep riding camels in the Saudi desert” if it wants a two-state deal – reveal a deep schism between Saudi insistence and Israeli defiance to such a solution.

Trump’s vague nod to Palestinian statehood and Israeli threats to annex West Bank and several-hundred ceasefire violations reinforce the perception that while Washington wants to keep the illusion of a Palestinian state alive, Tel Aviv seeks to crush it outright. For Saudi Arabia, this rhetoric demands extreme caution.

Involvement of quasi-colonial figures like former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, condemned for his disastrous role in 2003 Iraq invasion, in postwar Gaza governance is rankling regional states too. His perceived bias toward Israel as Quartet envoy long ago discredited him as a neutral mediator.

For much of the Arab world, his return evokes harrowing reminiscences of British colonialism. The 1917 Balfour Declaration pledged a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine; the 1922 British Mandate, granted by the League of Nations authorized London to establish it. By Mandate’s end, Britain-backed Zionist forces had captured 77% of Palestine, proclaiming independence as Israel in 1948.

While Riyadh held its ground, Egypt’s breakaway from a unified Arab response eased pressure on Israel, opening the floodgates for others. Riding the tide of slow-motion fragmenting regional consensus, Israel has trumpeted the Accords as a symbol of peace even as Gaza is in ruins and Israeli military operations across the Middle East threaten escalation.

Prior to its attack on Iran, Israel had launched 35,000 air raids in 20 months; its invasion of Qatar in September marked the sixth strike on a sovereign nation in just three days. Tel Aviv’s offensives on regional countries and several-hundred truce breaches reflect a grim reality: normalization without Palestinian rights hasn’t moderated Tel Aviv’s policy; it has legitimized Israeli aggression, encouraging it to wield military power as a tool to force other countries into signing treaties or face hostility.

Netanyahu’s continued belligerence even after achieving all of his Gaza war goals, resistance to a Palestinian state and military campaigns across the region have made it increasingly difficult for Saudi Arabia to defend any rapprochement with Israel.

As a result, Riyadh now finds itself embroiled in a strategic quagmire: it wants to straighten out relations with Israel while preserving its historic mantle as guardian of Palestinian cause and steward of Islam’s two most sacred places, Mecca and Medina.

Only a firm Israeli commitment to Palestinian statehood could help Saudi Arabia to navigate this dilemma. In short, Riyadh’s accession and credibility across the Muslim world pivots on Netanyahu – who has stubbornly denied any Palestinian state.

Saudi Arabia may still envisage a future where pragmatism prevails but not at the cost of internal stability and historical identity. Trump’s elusive promises and Netanyahu’s intransigence to Palestinian statehood and Israel’s settlement expansions and ceasefire violations further complicate any Saudi move to formalize ties with Tel Aviv anytime soon.

From the Camp David Accords that established the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty to the 2020 Abraham Accords, normalization that sidestepped Palestinians did nothing to advance regional peace. Instead, they emboldened Israel to entrench its occupation and consolidate regional dominance.

With public anger boiling and support for the Accords collapsing across the Middle East, any Saudi move to forge ties with Israel risks igniting domestic outrage and eroding its standing in the Muslim world. As long as Israel’s war machine grinds on and Palestinian state remains a mirage, the prospect of Riyadh’s accession to the treaties anytime soon is remote.

*My article (unedited) first appeared in Express Tribune

China champions a safer, fairer global internet

By: Azhar Azam

Lead: China is shaping global internet governance to be more inclusive and cooperative, promoting multilateral reforms that prioritize broad participation, digital equity, and cybersecurity as part of a shared future for all nations.

The 2025 World Internet Conference (WIC) Wuzhen Summit concluded successfully this weekend in the historic water town of Wuzhen in the city of Jiaxing, east China's Zhejiang province. This year's event drew more than 1,600 participants from over 130 countries and regions.

Ten years since Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed building a community with a shared future in cyberspace, the summit has evolved into a key forum for promoting international cooperation on shaping an open, stable and secure multilateral system of global internet governance.

Relatedly, behind the rapid growth of China's digital economy is an effective domestic internet governance framework that has made connectivity more inclusive and far-reaching. As of June 2025, China had more than 1.12 billion internet users, according to the China Internet Network Information Center. The number of internet users aged 60 and above reached 161 million and, while those who lived in rural areas totaled 322 million.

Internet penetration in China has risen to about 80%, with rural connectivity exceeding 69% and 5G services covering more than 90% of administrative villages across the country's vast hinterlands. This expansion has helped narrow the rural-urban digital divide, empowering communities in remote areas to harness the benefits of technology.

Thanks to China's widespread 5G rollout in rural areas, farmers now use livestreaming to promote and sell their products directly to online consumers. This digital transformation has not only fueled business growth but also revitalized rural economies, fostering new models of digital cultural tourism and creating digital employment opportunities.

China's concept of jointly building a community with a shared future in cyberspace draws inspiration from its domestic achievements and builds on the four principles and five proposals President Xi introduced at the 2015 WIC. Rather than advancing a Chinese model of internet governance, it envisions a multilateral approach to shaping the global digital order.

Its key priorities include speeding up the development of international internet infrastructure, promoting online cultural exchanges and mutual learning, enhancing cybersecurity, fostering ethical growth in artificial intelligence, and bridging the digital divide. Together, these efforts underscore a commitment to cooperative—rather than unilateral—reform of global internet governance. The core goal is inclusive internet development and broad participation in international digital governance institutions to achieve shared development, common security, joint governance and mutual benefit.

As part of its efforts to build a resilient global internet governance system, China has been actively engaged with U.N.-led platforms such as the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and has deepened cooperation with U.N. specialized agencies on cyber affairs. For several years, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have cohosted the Wuzhen Summit, underscoring Beijing's role in encouraging multilateral participation to shape a robust and equitable framework for universal cyberspace governance.

China's contributions at the IGF focus on establishing a responsible governance framework and exploring common governance practices to achieve co-governance and mutual benefits. Established in 2020, the China IGF — certified by the U.N. IGF — encourages China's domestic internet community to share its governance practices with international counterparts and contribute to the development of global internet governance.

China has attached importance to expansion of internet access across the world. Although global internet use has surged over the years, yet about 2.6 billion people — roughly one-third of the world's population — remain in digital darkness, highlighting a persistent digital divide. To address the challenge, China has urged the international community to work together to expand internet infrastructure in developing countries.

Beijing has, in particular, helped expand universal and affordable internet access in the least developed countries, demonstrating its commitment to reducing the digital divide and showing how technology can help alleviate poverty. China-ITU projects such as Digital Uganda and events like the WIC are accelerating Africa's digital transformation and boosting its ability to fight poverty through the deployment of digital technology.

Since its launch by China in 2017, the Digital Silk Road (DSR) has supported the development of digital infrastructure in several countries, improving telecommunications networks, AI capacity, cloud computing, e-commerce, mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, smart cities and other high-tech fields.

Through the DSR initiative, nations across Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia have acquired affordable, high-quality technology to expand wireless and broadband coverage. The Fiber-to-the-Home project in Indonesia and the first phase of Johor Data Center in Malaysia, both involving Chinese firms, illustrate the DSR's global impact.

China's efforts to jointly develop the DSR and share the benefits of its digital growth, including internet access, have been lauded by leading international organizations such as the WIPO. The capability and price competitiveness of Chinese AI startup DeepSeek further empower partner countries to develop their own reliable AI tools, advancing technological self-reliance and innovation-driven digital growth.

China has also given priority to building a secure and stable cyberspace and jointly enhancing cybersecurity. It has deepened cooperation with other countries and international organizations on data security, information protection and combating cybercrime and cyberterrorism. In addition, China has led or participated in the formulation of more than 50 international standards on cybersecurity, playing a constructive role in multilateral cybersecurity processes.

Beijing's global initiatives on data security and on AI governance, along with cooperation with 100 countries and regional organizations to implement these initiatives, underscore its commitment to promoting multilateralism and safeguarding personal privacy and global data security. As a responsible international stakeholder, China has also supported the formulation of a global convention against cybercrime within the U.N. framework, carrying out joint operations with multilateral mechanisms such as Interpol, BRICS and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

While AI offers substantial benefits, it also presents ethical challenges, including potential abuses that could undermine human dignity, equality, and social stability. To prevent misuse and foster responsible AI development, China has worked at the multilateral level to build consensus on ethical guidelines and norms — focusing on algorithmic bias, data privacy, and security risks. It has also taken a series of measures to help raise global standards for ethical AI development.

All these efforts and initiatives show that China's inclusive approach to digital governance contributes substantially to reforming and fostering multilateral participation in global internet governance frameworks — helping address pressing challenges such as the digital divide, cybersecurity and unregulated AI development.

However, some Westerners, suspicious of whatever China does in the world, are going all out to fan the so-called "China threat", describing China's efforts above as aimed at controlling global internet governance and winning the cyberwar.

Amid a U.S. retreat from key multilateral commitments — including the rejection of major global goals like poverty eradication, climate change mitigation and universal access to clean water and sanitation — framing Beijing's role in international internet affairs as a threat overlooks the core of China's long-term vision, reducing such analysis to a short-sighted narrative of great-power rivalry in the digital realm.

Rather than seeking control over international cyberspace, Beijing has advanced a multilateral strategy aimed at reforming internet governance mechanisms to strengthen cyber development capacity in developing countries, bridge the digital divide, and help implement the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Like in other areas, China's involvement in the global and regional digital initiatives is not about rewriting the rules of the international order. Instead, it reflects Beijing's commitment to multilateral reform and the advancement of universal internet governance — making it more inclusive, secure and equitable as part of its people-oriented push to build a community with a shared future in cyberspace.

*My article that first appeared in China Diplomacy in the New Era

Canton Fair boosts China's opening up with diverse, tailored services

By: Azhar Azam

Currently underway in Guangzhou, south China's Guangdong Province, the 138th China Import and Export Fair (Canton Fair) which has been running for almost 70 years (since 1957) has become a powerful symbol of China's high-quality opening-up and an important window for many foreign companies to better understand economic trends, trade developments and technological advancements in the world's second largest economy.

Born in an era featuring unilateralism, protectionism and geopolitical shocks, it has survived enormous challenges, making important contributions to China's economic growth and opening-up. The history of the Canton Fair, therefore, can be directly linked to the history of China's opening-up and integration into the global economy, which benefited companies and the world alike.

With the Canton Fair's accumulated export volume reaching $1.5 trillion and the number of overseas buyers, onsite and online, exceeding 12 million – the biannual event has emerged as an essential platform for international trade cooperation and economic engagement between China and the rest of the world.

The Canton Fair has been pivotal in advancing China's opening-up policy, exemplified by the establishment of the country's trade relations with 229 countries and regions. This high rate of participation positions the expo as one of the world's most significant international trade shows and endorses its role in accelerating China's economic liberalization and efforts to dismantle trade barriers.

Providing a level-playing field, the Canton Fair facilitates both domestic and international businesses to find suppliers and buyers for their products and gain access to each other's markets, encouraging exhibitors to sell products and investors to invest in China. This highlights Beijing's commitment to promote free trade and its longstanding promise to share development opportunities, unleashed by its opening-up, with the world.

Each new edition beefs up the Canton Fair's appeal. A surge from over 30,000 exhibitors at April's Fair to more than 32,000 this time around and increased attendance from emerging and mature economies, reassert the event's success. It cements global confidence in China's role in stabilizing international trade and supply chains, showcasing Beijing's strengthened economic resilience in defiance of U.S. threats to reignite the trade war.

The Canton Fair has powered high-quality trade growth and undergirded economic momentum. By hosting diverse activities and adding more personalized services, China is further leveraging the platform to deliver an inclusive, unforgettable experience to domestic and international exhibitors and investors – and elevate the level of its high-standard of opening up.

For instance, the Canton Fair in recent years has set up a food street, organized Yingge dance (a vibrant, traditional Chinese folk dance from Guangdong Province that combines martial arts, opera, and dance) and a musical called Bond of Love, established intellectual property complaint stations and rolled out the "Canton Cuisine Carnival." Events like the Canton Music and Cuisine Festival, set to take place in the current expo, are putting China's cultural heritage on display and enabling participants to savor more Chinese delicacies, promoting friendly social exchanges.

Notably, the event has launched a fast and transparent mechanism to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and safeguard innovative development of the companies. At its 137th edition, high-standard IPR protection and trade mediation services were offered. Out of 356 cases of infringement, authorities identified 169 as alleged breaches while the rest were dealt with or mediated.

A strong emphasis is also being placed on providing convenient and quality services to potential buyers. By collaborating with financial institutions and partnering with travel agencies and air carriers – the event offers flight and hotel discounts, delivers whole-journey attendance services and facilitates trade matching for buyers. This collaborative synergy improves the travel experience of exhibitors and investors, reduces costs and makes participation accessible to small and medium-sized enterprises, bringing benefits to all.

Technological innovation is enhancing attendees' convenience and events effectiveness as well. The Canton Fair's upgraded app, offering booth navigation with AI-assisted tools, helps buyers to instantly find exhibitors and products; automated kiosks, tailored for overseas traders, and one-stop service centers expedite the entrance and custom procedures – saving time and creating a smarter, greener environment.

The Canton Fair has also introduced a comprehensive online platform for pre-exhibition credentialing, during-exhibition browsing and post-exhibition outreach. The digital transformation as well as translation services and convenient tax refund points boost procurement efficiency, improve cross-cultural communication and encourage higher inbound spending.

Since its inception in 2021, the "Trade Bridge" – an innovative project, aimed at fostering seamless, round-the-year matchmaking between Chinese suppliers and international buyers – has become the Fair's flagship initiative. In recent months, it has connected buyers, including top retailers like Japan's NITORI and Denmark's F&H Group with Chinese manufacturers – opening growth opportunities and imprinting a positive impact on global trade to the benefit of people around the world.

While the Canton Fair's matchmaking series events provide a personalized trade matchmaking service for professional buyers such as large retailers from the list of the Deloitte Global Retail 250, it offers similar services with enhanced features including exclusive sourcing of booths, leisure catering, business travel and conference facilities to key buyers such as Fortune Global 500 companies, contributing to an efficient and quality sourcing for buyers.

Compared to the last event, this edition has seen 12.5 percent more participation from international business organizations. This increase reflects global trust in China's opening-up and reveals why global companies view the Canton Fair as an indispensable platform to accelerate development, transform business, promote products and expand market access.

Regarded widely as a barometer of China's foreign trade, the Canton Fair has evolved into a testament of the country's high-standard of opening up. Through diverse activities, personalized services and dedicated booths for companies around the world, the platform surely stands as a testament to Beijing's commitment to breaking down cultural and multilingual barriers, pursuing common development and sharing the benefits of its opening-up with all.

*My article first appeared in CGTN

Why Middle East needs a multipolar security order

By: Azhar Azam

US President Donald Trump's Gaza peace plan builds on the New York Declaration, a resolution presented jointly by Saudi Arabia and France last month at the United Nations General Assembly and adopted by 142 votes. Calling for inclusive efforts to end the war in Gaza, it demanded Hamas to release all hostages, surrender its rule in the enclave and “hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority.”

But Washington and Tel Aviv rejected it vehemently because the measure emphasized the implementation of a two-state solution immediately. In contrast, the peace plan unveiled by Trump and Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu centered on disarming Hamas and shelving the likelihood of Palestinian statehood for an indefinite period.

Hamas has given a partial nod to the peace plan, agreeing to release all hostages yet refusing to disarm until Tel Aviv’s full withdrawal from Gaza. However, Netanyahu’s forceful rejection of Palestinian statehood, history of reneging from ceasefires, genocidal ideology and far-right leadership further arouse concern that even if a deal is reached, it will briefly pause Israel's hostilities rather than promoting sustainable peace.

According to Axios, the version of peace plan agreed between Trump and Netanyahu differs significantly with the one presented to the Arab and Muslim leaders and shared with Hamas, enraging Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Türkiye.

The last-minute edits, especially linking Israel's troop withdrawal with Hamas disarmament, and the Times of Israel’s report revealed that some clauses were deliberately left ambiguous to protect Tel Aviv’s interests, denying the formation of a Palestinian state and retaining Israel’s control on occupied territories.

Statements from Qatar and Pakistan – Trump’s plan “requires clarification and negotiation” and the 20 points “made public are not ours” – amplify suspicions the initiative is carefully crafted to skew it overwhelmingly in Tel Aviv’s favor.

The underlying objective behind these revisions was to provoke Hamas' dismissal of Trump’s peace proposal – thereby enabling Netanyahu deflecting political backlash at home. Hamas, by expressing its willingness to resolve the crisis, undercut these attempts. If enacted in its current form, the plan would only halt, not cease, Israeli hostilities. In the long-run, it could expose vulnerable Palestinians to future Israel’s assaults.

Such an outcome would embolden Tel Aviv to entrench its dominance and threaten the sovereignty of other nations as illustrated by its attacks on other countries and unprecedented strikes on Hamas leadership in Qatar.

Netanyahu’s apology to Doha and Trump’s executive order, pledging to consider “any armed attack” against Qatar as a threat to America’s peace and security, is largely symbolic. The presidential directive bypasses the Senate, making it nonbinding for the future US administrations.

At face value, the initiative seems assuaging region-wide skepticism on US security guarantees. It also reflects unease in the White House over the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Although the Riyadh-Islamabad pact was in making for years, Israel’s aggression against Qatar and initial US tepid response accelerated its signing.

Over the last few years, the Gulf has seen the rise of "more pragmatic, less ideological" leadership. These Gen-Z leaders viewed Hamas, over its historical ties with Muslim Brotherhood, as a threat to their dynasty rule. While regional countries didn’t criticize the movement, fearing a public backlash – they drew closer to India and embraced Abraham Accords to secure strategic dividends from normalized ties with Israel.

But Tel Avis’ ceaseless violations of regional sovereignty have shifted the same pragmatism in Islamabad's favor. In response, they have been trying to diversify their security partnerships away from Washington. The SMDA signals this tectonic shift in the Middle East geopolitics.

America’s fragile-now-selective commitment to Gulf security urges regional nations not to solely rely on unilateral initiatives or assurances and pursue alternative, multipolar defense arrangements. Netanyahu’s pursuit of “Greater Israel” – a controversial term used in reference to areas including East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights Israel captured in the 1967 war – gives them a blunt warning: after disarming Hamas, they will be the next.

With its veto powers at the United Nations Security Council and political and military influence in the Middle East, the US has granted Israel an unbounded authority to act with impunity.

And its stated position – to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge and bolster its ability to “counter and defeat” all kinds of military threats from any state or coalition of states as well as ensure unrestrained supply of arms to eliminate Hamas – stipulate it to protect Israel no matter what consequence result from Tel Aviv’s expansionist goals.

The volatile regional security landscape demands the Arab and Islamic world to move beyond rhetorically condemning Israel’s actions and ambitions and begin institutionalizing defense cooperation into a comprehensive multipolar security partnership.

Such an inclusive regional security order, to which the SMDA could serve as an effective platform, won’t abandon security partnerships with America. This mechanism will aim to add an extra layer of defense, contributing to building robust regional security architecture that is capable of maintaining strategic balance and promoting durable peace in the Middle East.

*My article (unedited) appeared in Brussels Morming and Express Tribune

Trump’s Ukraine peace push is a dangerous delusion

By: Azhar Azam

President Donald Trump’s push to broker a peace deal between Kyiv and Moscow reflects less an instinct for mediation than an impulse to appease. He has acted as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s henchman – leaving Russia emboldened, Ukraine isolated, allies abandoned and international security at risk.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy discovered this harsh reality when he, earlier this year, sought Trump's support to deliver a strong response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion. Against all expectations, he received no assurances – just public humiliation.

Trump’s blunt tone and abrasive treatment of a partner under siege revealed that under his presidency, Washington’s foreign policy will be driven by self-interest, not commitment and values.

By making overtures to Moscow, Trump is tearing apart a coalition of 50 nations, his predecessor painstakingly stitched together to shore up Kyiv’s defense. He appears willing to surrender Ukraine’s sovereignty and undermine Europe’s security.

Trump’s placation of a revisionist leader has transcended all limits. He has placed the onus of ending the war on Ukraine, painting Russia as a victim. Not long ago an impassioned defender of democratic freedoms, human rights and transatlantic cohesion – America under new president has defected to an authoritarian adversary – branding Zelenskyy as a “dictator” and dismissing conflict as a European war.

Chasing personal glory and rapid-fire peace deals, he has talked of territorial swaps, nixed Ukraine’s Nato membership, refused security guarantees to Ukraine and pressured Zelenskyy to end the war on Putin’s terms – ceding Crimea to Moscow. Trump’s “deal-making” normalizes aggression and encourages Russia to demand recognition of “new territorial realities.”

This isn't diplomacy – it's capitulation. This doesn’t just reward aggression – it hails tyranny. Worse, this approach shakes the foundation of transatlantic security and casts serious doubts on US commitment to allies.

His action to trade away Ukraine's sovereignty for self-projection has broader implications for global security. It set a dangerous precedent for other powers to resort to use of force – emboldening Israel to flex its muscles beyond Gaza as exemplified by its military campaign in Qatar, a staunch US ally, to target Hamas top leadership.

Trump's abandonment of Ukraine will reinforce the global south's suspicions on US reliability as a security partner and guardian of the rules-based international order, hastening their embrace of a China-led global governance model – not out of ideological convergence but out of disillusionment with America’s negotiable commitments with partners.

To prevent this drift, Washington must reestablish its credibility. Clinging to an arrogant obsession of the world's lone-superpower won’t change the global south’s perception.

For America to change this view, it must treat existing allies as equals, build new partnerships – not alliances – with individual countries and demonstrate that it values its allies regardless of economic and military weight.

Even Europe is growing wary. The bloc’s 2025 Strategic Foresight Report underscores that security has become a “key vector” for all European policies, stressing “We are witnessing the erosion of the rules-based international order and fracturing of the global landscape.” Britain, Belgium, France and Portugal and several US allies have announced to recognize Palestine – apparently in a backlash against Trump’s protectionism and ambivalence toward European security.

Moscow, meanwhile, is exploiting Trump’s whimsical approach. Far from tempering its stance, it has hardened its conditions to end the war, demanding most of the territory it has seized and some of which it's yet to, accepting Zelenskyy only as a “de facto” head of a “regime” rather than as a leader of a sovereign state.

Putin continues to pin the blame of his invasion of Ukraine on the “(2014) coup” and Kyiv’s accession to Nato – a narrative echoed by some Western scholars but belied by Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian land.

More than a decade later, the West’s assessment has prevailed with Russia seizing almost 20% of Ukraine. And despite Trump’s assurance to deny Nato membership to Ukraine, Putin is seeking more – let alone returning the occupied territory. His dizzying pace and bountiful concessions to Moscow have shocked allies and invited escalation.

If this is the peace deal, he boasted on his campaign trail to clinch in 24 hours, Ukraine and Europe are rightly alarmed. Surrender, dressed up as statesmanship, won’t bring peace – it will weaken Ukraine, fracture transatlantic bonds and strengthen authoritarian rivals.

Trump must reverse course. To reestablish US credibility and sustain its global leadership, he must deter aggression, reaffirm Washington’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and allies including those in the global south and strengthen – not undercut – the rules-based international order.

Inaction is not an option. Failure to act risks dragging the world back to the prewar era – only this time, not with bayonets, but with far deadlier weapons and nuclear stockpiles – a catastrophe for both America and the rest.

*My article (unedited) that first appeared in Brussels News and Express Tribune with the title "Need to reverse course reestablish US credibility"