June 30, 2022

Alas, the Palestinian cause is taking its dying breath

By: Azhar Azam

After 15 years of Israel’s ruthless land, air and sea blockade of Gaza – which ensued the US failure to anticipate Hamas win in 2006 Palestine legislative election and brought forth America’s covert Middle East mission to buck up “putschist” Mohammed Dahlan destroy Hamas militarily – the Palestinian coastal enclave is still the major casualty of Israeli repression for they voted out Fatah against the will of Israel and the US.

Nearly 80% people of the besieged territory, according to the United Nations, are in dire need of humanitarian assistance as half of the 2 million population lives in poverty with 80% unemployed youth. The Save the Children paints a bleak picture of the children, four out of five of whom are growing up in a climate of “depression, grief and fear.”

Over the last one and a half decade, children in the world’s largest open-air prison have endured five major escalations and the pandemic. While 800,000 children never knew life without blockade, economic deprivation and lack of access to essential services such as healthcare as well as an incessant threat to their lives are adding to the misery of the incarcerated Palestinian children and youngsters.

A symptom of trauma and abuse, temporary reactive mutism, in children is prevalent. Poor hygiene due to inadequate access to clean water and sanitation increases the risk of infection and antibiotic resistance in Gazans. The beleaguered Palestinians are scarily waiting for the apartheid state’s next power display on them to let international community pay another lip service to the Israeli tyranny before redeploying focus on Ukraine.

It was May 2021 when the oppressive Israeli forces launched its last major offensive on Gaza to petrify the orphans of its 51-day bombing campaign in 2014 – which killed more than 2,200 Palestinians including 500 children – and exterminated some 253 Palestinians in addition to completely erasing 1,800 houses. Air raids in the Gaza Strip and the occupied West Bank is a quintessential pastime for the Israeli assailants as they continue hunting down Palestinians to quench their thirst with human blood.

The scale and magnitude of “sorrow and despair” the West feels for Gaza is far lesser than Ukraine because Palestine like Afghanistan and Iraq isn’t “civilized” and a majority of the Palestinians don’t have blonde hair or blue eyes. Unlike the Ukrainians whose video of Molotov cocktails was telecasted on the mainstream media to project their right of self-defense, Israel has the privilege to exercise the punitive expedition against Palestinians without stint.

Israel’s allies delegitimize Palestine’s Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement and bill it as anti-Semitic. They, at the same time, support and bully nations to back the isolation campaign against Russia and exclusion of the Kremlin from international bodies and the world economy. This is a perfect illustration of blatant Western hypocrisy that is smitten with racist profile or white supremacy.

A new wave of normalization in the greater Middle East adds insult to Palestine injuries. Several Arab states have already established diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords with Israel and others are lining up to follow the course. The European Union (EU)’s gas deal with Egypt and Israel during a regional summit in Cairo, aimed at punishing Russia’s economy, tells how the West manipulates between respect of human rights and international law and self-interests.

The EU embargo on Russian oil may cut “a huge source of financing for its war machine”; the tripartite treaty to buy natural gas, to be liquefied in Egyptian plants, from Israel provides transactional immunity to the Israeli jets, tanks and bulldozers to target the confined men, women and children in Gaza with high latitude and then make them starve to death by destroying their farmlands.

Another Palestine’s staunch ally, Turkey, is warming up toward Israel. After 15 years, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu last month arrived in Israel to normalize ties and address disagreements. Earlier in March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog reached Ankara where Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan described his visit as a “turning point” and the country's relationship with Israel “historic.”

Turkey insists its normalization will be antithetical to Gulf rapprochement with Israel, arguing it would augment Ankara’s role in a two-state solution. Yet the Turkish appeasing and submissive posture itself and craving for energy cooperation with Israel is akin to endorse Israeli crimes of apartheid and persecution, putting a big question mark over its commitment to the Palestinian cause.

In the 1990s after signing of the Oslo Accords – through which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) handed over 78% of the Palestinian land to Israel and gave legitimacy to the Jewish state – several Gulf states including Qatar, Bahrain and Oman established diplomatic connections with Israel even as the reconciliation disintegrated in 2000 as tension flared following the second intifada.

The Saudi Arabia’s proposed Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 paired normalization with establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, the plan de facto lent legitimacy to Israeli state. After Egypt and Jordan stepped back from the Khartoum Resolution to recognize Israel – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco have forged diplomatic relations with Israel.

Meanwhile, Iran’s intervention in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen to expand region-wide influence as well as tactic to use Palestine as leverage for negotiations with the US has deepened the prospect of any regional consensus on Palestine. Tehran has been selling its “resistance” narrative via its proxy Hezbollah while avoiding a direct conflict with Israel and playing the Palestine card to “garner popular support” in the wider Gulf.

Given there haven’t been any serious peace talks between Palestine and Israel for more than a decade and all countries compete with one another as to how best exploit the leverage over Palestine to its advantage, the Middle East’s promise to Palestine is almost dead. The PLO retraction from historical position gave a walkover to Israel and the ongoing covert and overt connections between Arab states and Israel, spurred by Iran’s pursuit of the regional dominance, alas, will be the last nail in the coffin of the Palestinian independence.

*This is one of my articles that also appeared in "The Express Tribune""The New Straits Times""Global Village Space."  and "Global Research".

June 29, 2022

US war on Chinese semiconductors is counterproductive


The global semiconductor industry sales booked record revenue of about $556 billion in 2021 with 26% increase in year on year sales, according to the US-based Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). Amid a higher demand and the ongoing global shortage of chips embedded in the essential technologies of now and the future, industry shipped 1.15 million semiconductor units last year.

In 2021, China outpaced any other market in the world and accounted for more than a third of global chip sales including analog, logic and memory products at almost $193 billion. The data manifested the world's largest consumer economy's pivotal role in boosting the global semiconductor market through a whole-of nation effort to advance Beijing's chip sector. Across all segments – fables, IDM, foundry and OSAT – Chinese companies showed strong growth.

The US long-arm jurisdiction to restrict China's access to advanced chips shook the market, hampered chip production and caused a dearth of semiconductors around the world. As chip requirements for 5G devices were expected to surge the demand by 40% to 80%, the US' attempt to out-compete China added pressure on the semiconductor producers.

America's push to make microelectronics a national security and geopolitical issue; their sanctions on China's biggest chipmaker and smartphone manufacturers, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) and Huawei; and their tech war forced customers to shift their orders to other suppliers and created a mess in the market.

Automakers, already facing supply chain hitches because of the pandemic, were hit hard by the chip shortage and the US trade war escalation with China. Many leading international carmakers such as Volkswagen, BMW, Nissan and Ford slashed their production rates. The fall of production severely impacted Toyota sales as the world's best-selling carmaker's profits shrank by 21% in the last quarter of 2021.

Washington's actions on Chinese technology firms recently urged the country's Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to admit "a third of US inflation is new" and it's "all due to a shortage of semiconductors." This is in addition to the warning the lack of availability of chips may take a full percentage point off of the GDP in 2021.

For years, American semiconductor companies have been pulling roughly a quarter of their chip revenue from China. So, the Chinese customers, markets and innovation have contributed to the US economy and employment generation. As neither of the countries have true dependence in the semiconductor value chain, this technological interdependence benefited both the states given the extraordinarily complexity of manufacturing chips involving 300 different inputs.

Beijing is already making efforts to develop its semiconductor industry. In June 2014, the State Council of China released the National Guidelines for Development and Promotion of the Integrated Circuit (IC) Industry. The long-awaited policy to improve the country's semiconductor industry increased government investment, emphasized on creating segment winners and adopted a more market-based approach by giving the responsibility of allocating public funds to local private-equity companies.

The investments paid off as China's semiconductor sector, SEMI which was revealed last year, emerged as one of the world's largest in less than a decade. The industry body estimated Beijing's revenue from the IC industry would double from $128 billion from 2015-2020 to $257 billion by 2025. Noting Chinese wafer fab capacity had soared from 9% in 2010 to 17% in 2020, it forecasted China to sustain its world leadership in new fab projects and capacity growth with $20 billion investments in chip equipment for 2021.

Over the last 30 years, the US share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity has dropped from 37% to 12%. Washington dominates the chip design market. US firms such as Intel, Micron, Broadcom and Qualcomm continue to produce chips overseas or contract out production to foreign firms over lack of domestic manufacturing capability.

The Biden administration seeks to overpower the US inability through $52 billion federal subsidies in a quest to cut dependence on China. While it roughly takes three to four years to establish a fab, the legislative measure puts American companies at disadvantage by making them uncompetitive internationally since the 10-year cost of fabrication plant ownership is as much as 50% higher than in China without any guarantee US automakers and other manufacturers would prefer buying the US-made chips.

Foreign companies are showing deep interest toward investing in China. Last month, Germany's Merck signed an agreement to open a semiconductor base in China. The largest single electronic business investment will be used to build a 69-acre plant in Zhangjiagang to house production plants for thin film materials and electronic specialty gases. It is another sign of trust in "the largest end market for semiconductors" and marks a bright future ahead in the sector.

China is estimated to have 55% and 85% of global rare earths mining and refining capacity respectively. The US is concerned domestic manufacturers do not produce high volume cutting edge ICs, the foundation of "paradigm-shifting" technologies. The US CHIPS Act focuses to fabricate these leading-node logic chips yet needs critical minerals from China, where their supply chain is concentrated and which holds enormous mineral reserves for manufacturing semiconductors.

The semiconductor industry in China, as a result, is unlikely to be barricaded by the US' effort to counter its growth. This was evidenced from the SEMI data in April: China's orders of chip-making equipment to overseas suppliers had increased 58% in 2021. This revenue increase of up to four-fold suggests the foreign firms won't concede the immense Chinese market. Instead, they have indicated to avoid sanctions by building capacity outside of the US.

It is advisable to the Biden administration to stop restricting the China-US technology cooperation, which in turn is blocking the US' own technology edge and driving inflation higher. The US president needs to understand that America's suppression of Chinese companies will not yield any results other than supporting other countries to take advantage of the spat and boost their chip strength. An end to this anti-technology approach could help the US to resume tech collaboration with China and gain mutual benefits.

*This is my opinion piece that originally appeared in "China Daily":

June 22, 2022

Biden's approach urges China and Europe to expand cooperation

By: Azhar Azam

U.S. President Joe Biden's approach towards Beijing, as expected, is modeled on his predecessor's misconceptions of China and delusions of grandeur about American strength.

His administration attempts to make the U.S.-China policy more acceptable to the European Union (EU) by giving occasional touches of cooperation and coexistence to offset bitterness it contains and buy support from Washington's allies, especially in Europe.

Outlining contours of the strategy late last month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged China's transformation was due to the "talent, the ingenuity (and) the hard work" of the Chinese people.

Still, he promised to align efforts with a network of partners to compete with Beijing to sustain and expand U.S. economic and technological influence – or simply America's world hegemony – in a decisive decade.

Europe is the key region where the Biden administration is moving heaven and earth to inveigle leaders that China seeks to secure as part of its sphere of influence.

The U.S. military establishment, too, considers Beijing's growing importance for the continent with "huge concern," comparing Chinese regional engagement with complex issues such as migration, cybersecurity, climate change and even terrorism.

Biden's schizophrenic hallucination is being promoted by other U.S. officials who are demanding Europe help the U.S. counter competition from China, alleging it challenges the European economy, security and values.

The remarks describe Washington's desire to lay landmines beneath the China-Europe relationship to suppress Beijing's growth and hold its European allies by the neck and increase their dependence on America.

Yet the Europeans generally do not view China's rising power status as a threat to the continent. Contrariwise, they are concerned about nascent bipartisan consensus in the U.S. on trade, interventionism and the China challenge, believing Washington's reallocation of resources to deal with Beijing will affect the continent's security and trade agreements and foster America's disengagement from the region.

Since the 1990s, the White House has been enraptured with Wilsonian foreign policy. Advocated by the 28th U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the essence of the so-called missionary diplomacy was to legitimize foreign intervention on humanitarian grounds, prop up democratic regimes in other international states and attack state sovereignty, according to historians. Through this peace doctrine of liberal internationalism, neo-Wilsonianism entered into practice with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

After the botched attempts in Afghanistan and Iraq by neoconservatives, the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly ratified Biden's massive $40 billion economic, military and humanitarian aid package for Ukraine to make it America's client state.

The U.S. president's pursuit of Wilsonian idealism to project power with (or without) international support, along with the U.S. dragging its feet in Asia to contain China, is detrimental to global peace as it shoves the world into bloc confrontation.

The nationalist Make America Great Again (MAGA) narrative pushed by the Republicans slates European allies, arguing they "are free-riders on the U.S. security guarantees" and exploit America through unfair trade agreements.

Since Democrats follow the GOP pathway at least on international trade and foreign intervention, this will unnerve Europe about the U.S. commitment to the region's peace and prosperity.

Under the evolving scenario, European countries are advised to develop an autonomous military capability to reduce overreliance on the U.S. and build intra-EU agreement to withstand the imminent shock.

But Europe needs to do much more. In order to counter U.S. protectionism and the looming threat of expanding anti-European sentiments in America, Brussels should also increase communication with leading inter-EU economies which support the region's strategic independence and are prepared to cooperate on global challenges.

China is one country to whom the EU should look to expand cooperation on economics, trade and investment, technology, the environment, infrastructure development, people-to-people connectivity and pandemic prevention.

Beijing's backing of Brussels' strategic autonomy and eagerness to deepen a mutually-beneficial relationship through multi-tier dialogue at bilateral and multilateral forums makes an ideal European partner.

The Beijing-Brussels economic relationship is a crucial factor for European growth. While China's rapid development has driven up European exports and generated jobs in export sectors, cheap consumer imports from China have benefited the Europeans to weather the profound impact of inflation.

Many regional companies, be it suppliers from outside or as producers within, do not want to abandon such a large market, either.

Europe prefers to intertwine its economy with China to sustain its economic prosperity. It has long seen the U.S. as a security provider. But due to the changing U.S. domestic political realm and deployment of resources to the Indo-Pacific, Brussels chooses to mitigate the risks of growing security dependence on Washington, proactively pursue a resilient strategic sovereignty and resume comprehensive, results-oriented dialogue with Beijing.

China's economic, social and political development came to matter more than ever to the European Union as Chinese rapid growth offered significant opportunities to the bloc.

The alliance's China policy originally sought "constructive management of differences" to achieve mutual growth in diverse areas and promote global public goods, sustainable development and international security through an annual strategic dialogue.

Brussels continues to acknowledge Beijing's critical role in addressing regional and global challenges, and stresses upon cooperation and engagement. The EU current approach is based on the China-EU "Strategic Outlook," which links the two sides in an enduring relationship and has led to the creation of the current "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership."

Both the global economy and world peace are threatened by U.S. protectionism and interventionism in addition to newfound food and energy crises, driven by the ongoing pandemic and the Ukraine war.

At this watershed moment in history, China and the EU should jettison odd disagreements to prevent their longstanding affiliation from disruption, and must adhere to fundamental principles of cooperation already agreed upon to make a joint, invaluable contribution to a stable and prosperous world.

*This is my opinion piece that first appeared at "China Global Television Network (CGTN)":

June 21, 2022

US paradigm shift over China


The basic premise of the US umbrage toward China is the growing intolerant view of the White House that Beijing has evolved into Washington’s rival with openness of its market and support. This conviction leads to thinking: America can obstruct China’s development too and pale the East Asian country’s international approbation by scaling back cooperation, imposing economic and technological sanctions and building alliances.

More recently, the misguided construct – China pursues to reshape the international order and replace America as the world hegemon through economic, diplomatic, military and technology prowess – has intensified within the US. Washington seems to be frustrated by the failure of its “China Fantasy” – draw the Asia giant to the Western liberalization and make it more like the West – and is undertaking an unabashed approach to rein in Beijing.

The US diplomats have openly warned Chinese economic growth and defense and space capabilities can threaten to America’s global economy, hegemony and interests. Yet China doesn’t favor any kind of hegemony: partial, loose or malleable. From 1974 when Deng Xiaoping addressed the United Nations General Assembly to Xi Jinping, every Chinese leader has denied seeking hegemony regardless how powerful Beijing becomes and called for an equitable management of global affairs without enforcing any country’s rules on others.

China’s consistent position, over the years, has successfully prevented the world from accepting America’s paradigm shift on Chinese ambitions to dominate the global economic, technological and strategic ecosystem. Still on assuming office, the US President Joe Biden quickly accused China for practicing economic “abuses and coercion,” walking back from his promise to unite American nation that is now more divided than in the Vietnam War.

Washington piggybacks to supercharge Chinese growth. It’s albeit pre-1978 China, the International Monetary Fund estimated, had seen a growth of 6% as the country patted rural enterprises and private businesses, liberalized foreign trade and investment, relaxed state control and invested in industrial production and education. The efforts to awaken the dormant economic giant paid off and the Chinese economy expanded at an average real growth rate of more than 9% in the coming years. In the 1990s, some analysts even predicted the Chinese economy will be “larger than” that of the US in about 20 years.

A “surprise conclusion” of the Fund in 1997 found China’s increased worker efficiency – as well as expansion of new factories, manufacturing machineries and communication systems – provided an impetus to China’s economy. The “newest” economic wonder in Asia then actualized in “the most impressive miracle of any economy in the history” in recent times.

The current administration too thinks China is “taking advantage of the openness” of the US economy. Biden, at least, should eschew smearing Chinese economic expansion for he, during his first trip to Beijing in 1979, had personally witnessed the changes that were being taken to “spark China’s remarkable, absolutely remarkable transformation.” The young member of a US Foreign Relations Committee had sought America and the West to stop debating whether a “rising China” was in its or the wider world’s interest as such a state “is a positive, positive development” for everyone.

For a world going through unprecedented turbulence and transformation, unrestricted cooperation between China and the US isn’t discretionary; it’s absolute imperative. As the Beijing-Washington relationship runs out of room for further deterioration, extensive efforts are urgently required to get the most critical relations back to normal.

Already, the US intensifying rivalry with China has impeded bilateral cooperation on major global challenges such as vaccine distribution and economic and peace crises management. Tariffs are aggravating uncertainty over international trade and global supply chains. The Asia-Pacific is being forced to yield its deep economic interests with China for the US security guarantee.

In almost two-hour call with Xi this March, Biden reiterated the US doesn’t aim to change China’s system, doesn’t want a cold war with China, doesn’t support “Taiwan’s independence,” and the US-led coalitions aren’t targeted against China. He assured his Chinese counterpart about his eagerness to hold candid dialogue and closer cooperation, vouching to remain committed to one-China principle.

Biden’s assurances to manage competition between the two countries, maintain open lines of communications with China and follow up on the conversations are good; but not good enough to set the course for a better world in the 21st century. Tempus fugit! In the “critical period ahead,” some tangible actions are needed from Washington to demonstrate it really intends to restore trust and seeks cooperation from Beijing.

Unfortunately, the US president avowals to handle differences and strategic risks haven’t been reflected in the China-US talks. From Alaska and Tianjin to Singapore summit, the Biden administration continues to touch upon every single issue that pollutes the climate of cooperation and slurs Beijing’s development and independence on unsubstantiated claims such as alleged human rights violations, cyberspace attacks and “economic coercion” as well as disturbs decades-old policy, guaranteeing peace across the Taiwan Strait.

China is a country with “significant economic and strategic interests” for America and the world. The US needs to wake from its slumber of swallowing up any country that it feels could challenge its global hegemony. Washington should act like a responsible international state, which has the mettle to stomach Chinese evolution and take Beijing along for a stable and thriving world. It’s no more an era that can endure another cold war-defined world order. Coming out from the shock of China’s rise and a change of both perception about Beijing and the adversarial aspect of the US’ China policy will help Biden to engage in a meaningful dialogue with China.

*This is one of my articles (unedited) that also appeared in "The Express Tribune":

June 17, 2022

Foreign capital isn't leaving 'the world factory'

By: Azhar Azam

Recent claims that foreign capital is leaving China or that manufacturing is moving away from the country are just part of crude efforts to erode the Chinese government's war on COVID-19 pandemic to protect people's lives. A couple of years ago, lockdowns in China sparked a conversation about moving supply chains from a land offering optimized shipping lanes, exceptionally cheap labor rates and access to the large young workforce.

Spurred by former U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration, trade bellicosity toward China in the middle of a rampant contagious virus changed the global commercial landscape and disrupted supply chains. Still, companies stayed in China, as higher wages and the lack of a skilled labor force in the U.S. manufacturing sector prevented them from relocating.

An immense talent pool of mature manpower makes China a very attractive destination for total supply chain solutions. China is a prized location for manufacturers since most countries do not have the capacity to produce as much as China does and on such a large scale. Beijing's effective pandemic control measures helped it to contain the virus quickly, which reassured foreign investors and enabled the country to witness record-high foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows hitting 1.149 trillion Chinese yuan ($172.12 billion) in 2021.

The recent COVID-19 restrictions in China have reignited a debate about moving supply chains from or expanding manufacturing away from the world's second largest economy. But experts argue not to pin any hope on the subject. According to Nick Marro, a global trade leader at the Economist Intelligence Unit, supply chain diversification is tricky. It may be a talking point in some boardrooms, but he says it is "difficult to implement."

A pair of surveys found that more than three quarters of factories aren't interested in shifting production or diverting investment from China as a result of the latest COVID-19 controls. They also unveil companies' strong trust in the Chinese market and its ability to bounce back as it did after the pandemic first hit. Beijing holds all the aces for global supply chains. During the first four months of 2022, FDI in China surged 26 percent year-on-year – including 53 percent, 76 percent and 80 percent from the U.S., the Republic of Korea and Germany respectively – to about $74.5 billion.

In 2021, revenue from China operations is expected to have leapt to 58 percent in 2021 from 35 percent a year earlier. Profitability went up too. The two key business metrics describe Beijing's importance for international firms and their plans for near-term investment in the country. Calls of reshoring have met a frosty response with China's inbound investment for the year increasing by a third to reach a new all-time high of $334 billion. The growth reflects that China's domestic market has by no means lost its shine for foreign corporations and their affiliates.

Many manufacturers say there is in no need of quitting China in response to claims that factories are leaving "the world's factory." The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has seen a sharp rise of foreign investment in China over the last two years. More recently, the new relaxed COVID-19 restrictions in the Chinese financial hub of Shanghai will bolster international businesses to strengthen their foothold in the market.

The decline in the number of foreigners living in Shanghai versus a decade ago is often cited to manufacturers as a factor behind what some call a mass exodus of international residents and businesses from China. The half-truth overlooks the fact that the number of foreigners in Chinese provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Yunnan has jumped from 316,138, 62,564 and 47,396 in 2010 to 418,509, 106,248 and 379,281 in 2020 respectively, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics. The country remains a global magnet for many foreigners. Over 10 years, the number of foreigners living in China increased by more than 40 percent to 845,697.

The U.S. administration has been pressuring companies to shift manufacturing away from China. However, it's almost impossible to replace China with another country given its massive manufacturing power, integrated supply chain and large pool of skilled labor. For example, the world's largest iPhone campus in the outskirts of the city of Zhengzhou in central China's Henan Province, known as iPhone City, employs more than 200,000 workers.

Noting China's growth remains in "positive territory," Kristalina Georgieva, managing director at the International Monetary Fund, is very optimistic about Beijing's ability to reboot its economy through "ample" fiscal and monetary policy space. The unique leverage equips the Chinese government with enough room to sustain China's relentless rise as a global economic power at least for another century.

Global investors don't think the lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions will adversely impact China's economy and its profile as a leading international investment destination. A group of top multinational banks, including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Credit Suisse, has even earmarked Shanghai as a major investment target in the coming years with decades-long business plans.

Clearly, the Chinese economy is far from being engulfed by pessimism, and foreign businesses are not falling out of love with China as some claim. China continues to be the most appealing investment market for international firms. Once the pandemic-induced curbs to safeguard human lives are lifted, the economy will gain momentum to further restore investors' confidence and stabilize the global supply chains.

*This is my opinion piece that originally appeared at "China Global Television Network (CGTN)":

June 3, 2022

Biden’s confusion-laden China policy

By: Azhar Azam

China's rise is the foremost concern that has pervaded American policymakers over fear of being overtaken by an Asian country. Washington’s paranoia under the US President Joe Biden clambered up with his Secretary of State Anthony Blinken tagging the world’s second largest economy as “the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century.”

The Biden administration’s China policy is ladened with confusion as it idealistically seeks to cooperate, compete and confront Beijing simultaneously. The dicey modus operandi was put in a nutshell by Blinken last year. “Our relationship with China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be and adversarial when it must be.”

So far, the US president’s strategy toward China has varied little from his predecessor, pushing his aides in an awkward position and making them justify his diplomatic gaffes. In a scathing comment last October, Biden vowed to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict. The White House rushed in to dial back what signaled a shift, from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity,” in the longstanding US one-China policy.

During Trump's presidency, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo unequivocally called for regime change in China by inducing Chinese people against their government. Worries hanging around the possibility of an armed conflict forced then-US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley to phone his Chinese counterpart twice to avert such a tragedy.

Biden's reckless comment, the US would intervene militarily if China were to reunify Taiwan by force, again set off panic in his national security aides over “significant downsides” of the potential shift.” Once again, the White House had to cover things up, stating there’s no change in America’s one-China policy.

After the Ukraine crisis briefly arrested the overriding ambition of a country known by the acronym, US, the Biden administration is refocusing on the Indo-Pacific to infect the region with America's grim syndrome of containing China. The course Washington has picked to reach the goal is even more dangerous because the threat directly collides with the sovereignty of a major world military and economic power as well as undermines the region's security and economic interests.

At his first stop in Seoul, , from where Biden kicked off his maiden trip to Asia as the US president, the Republic of Korea (ROK) President Yoon Suck-yeol agreed to cooperate on his Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) given it is based upon the “principles of openness, transparency and inclusiveness.” Yoon’s advisers looked cautious, indicating that the joint statement and the IPEF didn’t exclude any country.

The new ROK government’s guarded tone vis-à-vis China expresses a desire to pose the country as a “global pivot state” and shield Seoul’s economic relationship with its top trading partner. Yet it remains to be seen how Yoon will thread the needle as he tries to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and develop partnership with China “through qualitative and quantitative economic cooperation” in the face of the US efforts to build an “Asian NATO.”

Japan, meanwhile, is adding some spice to the hawkish US agenda. The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Biden in a joint statement called on China to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine but both leaders shilly shallied to set forth this demand to their Quad ally, India, which is yet to lament Russia. Bizarrely, they "requested" Beijing to help reduce nuclear risks and advance nuclear disarmament while blaming it for “coercion by economic and other means” and undertaking “coercive activities” in the South China Sea.

Kishida welcomed the IPEF and hoped for the return of the US to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a deal Donald Trump withdrew from and eventually became the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. But former Japanese officials are telling Biden “forget about it” for the framework lacked hard commitments and could collapse like the TPP.

Japan and the ROK are two of the US close allies; they are themselves bitter rivals. That’s another daunting challenge for Biden as both seek to draw nearer to Washington. Kishida wants strategic cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul; the nationalism factor in both capitals and compensation claims from the families of the ROK forced labor victims against Japanese companies at any time could overturn the odd rapprochement.

A myriad of challenges make Biden’s effort to hyper focus on China broadly or specifically and step up the contest with Beijing difficult to achieve. Given the disaster-prone strategy will have drastic consequences for regional peace and prosperity and the international economy, some regional states would reconsider a thousand times before placing blind trust behind the US. The Ukraine crisis reminds them how abruptly military alliances such as NATO can upend regional stability and blow up the global economy.

Over growing unease within allies about regional disturbance that will eventually lead to economic turmoil, Biden reassures the US "(one-China) policy hasn't changed at all." But his recurrent statements tell a completely different story: he’s geared up to risk peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific for regional domination. This could be a rude awakening for the US partners, believing it can provide them security guarantee and economic boom.

*This is one of my articles (unedited) that first appeared in "The Express Tribune" and "New Straits Times".

June 2, 2022

Does China view the U.S. as a strategic competitor?

By: Azhar Azam

For some time, U.S. intelligence has been branding China as an "unparalleled priority" and a "formidable challenge." No threat, it believed, loomed larger than the one posed by Beijing. China's economic, diplomatic, military and technological advancement to build a stable and modern world is one core motivation driving the U.S. threat perception that drives its officials to zero in on containing the world's second largest economy.

Another source of the intensified U.S. hostility toward China is that American allies are seeking greater independence from Washington and want to be more open to new bilateral and multilateral partnerships in response to changing U.S. policies. China's development in multiple areas and willingness to share it with the rest of the world has gripped the policymakers in the White House regarding China's growing influence and international admissibility as a more reliable partner.

In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, top U.S. intelligence chiefs uttered similar concerns (unparalleled priority), characterizing China as a "pacing threat and a major security challenge" to Washington and its partners. They accused Beijing of mounting a "sustained challenge to a stable and open international system" and feared the Chinese military was turning into a "credible, peer competitor" in the Indo-Pacific region as well as nearing the status of global competitor to the U.S.

The hearing, as usual, replicated the erstwhile U.S. prevarication about China without any conclusive evidence. But what staggered many was when one of the country's spy heads claimed "Beijing has long viewed the United States as a strategic competitor." The assertion controverted history. Take former U.S. President George W. Bush who by the end of the last millennium had pegged China as a strategic competitor rather than a strategic partner during his election campaign and went as far as to promise to "protect" the Taiwan region.

Within months of Bush taking office, a dreadful altercation involved an American navy spy plane flying into a Chinese aircraft, killing the pilot, and a U.S. arms sale to Taiwan significantly spiked tensions. The 9/11 attacks forced America to veer away from its Cold War approach, summoning up terrorists, not China, as the real enemy. Bush quickly dropped use of the incendiary phrase for China and recognized the importance of a proactive China policy for U.S. foreign policy interests.

After more than 20 years of U.S.-triggered geopolitical suspicion, the Trump administration filtered out terrorism from America's bucket list and instead labeled China as a strategic competitor. In an attempt to support its 180-degree turn, Washington rephrased terrorism as a "persistent condition driven by ideology and unstable political and economic structures." U.S. incredulity toward China grew with the latter's increased wealth, deepened regional economic integration through the Belt and Road Initiative and greater efforts to bolster the role of international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in inter-states affairs.

The notion of strategic competition was pushed by American research institutions which thought America failed to anticipate China's rapid growth upon completion of internal reforms and access to Western markets. America is trying to glide the world into a new cold war era that divides the world into blocs, nurtures terrorism, blunts the global economy and peace and threatens the disappearance of multilateralism.

China has long wished to calibrate its relationship with the U.S. on the basis of cooperation and constructive strategic partnership. Once U.S. President Joe Biden advanced his predecessor's policy under the pretense of "serious competition," Beijing still called for working on broad common interests and taking responsibility to safeguard international peace, stability, development and prosperity.

Unfortunately, Washington continues to see Beijing through the same lens and keeps bullying allies and partners to defend U.S. interests and military advantages via security partnerships. America is also concerned about Chinese support of multilateral international and regional organizations, which may end the U.S. monopoly to dictate its rules and slash America's stranglehold around the world.

The U.S. strategic competition against China veils an offensive mindset and exposes its unabated antagonism toward the world's rising economic and technological power, which is emerging into a leading international stakeholder too. For instance, the U.S. Strategic Competition Act of 2021 aims to assert global dominance, tip the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region in its favor and pressurize regional states to follow rules and standards set by the U.S.

The underlying concept of the bill remains China should be treated as an adversary. This cast doubts on America's commitment to peace and prosperity in the region and to strengthen military-to-military and civilian-military communication between the two sides to "reduce the risk of unwanted conflict."

This is an "ill-conceived laundry list of anti-China provisions" focused more on weakening China than bolstering U.S. competitiveness, according to a report titled "Top Ten Problems with The Strategic Competition Act of 2021" published by the Union of Concerned Scientists. The report points out that it provided a legal cover for the Biden administration to start racial profiling and persecute Chinese Americans, meddle in foreign domestic politics as well as make unsubstantiated claims about China's nuclear capabilities. The legislation further undermined bilateral exchanges and contained an "exaggerated depiction of the threats China poses, says Michael D. Swaine, a scholar of Chinese security studies and director of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft's East Asia program.

Framing competition between "democracy" and "authoritarianism" limits cooperation. Western democracy isn't universally attractive. Many nations wouldn't like American values to supersede their interests. Biden's approach – every nation should strictly adhere to or share the U.S. values – tends to sever the country's international relations with both partners and "rivals" alike.

The strategic competition with China has been a longtime U.S. strategy with much of the acceleration coming in recent times. By picking rivalry over cooperation, America will not win the race against China, nor is it going to clinch any prizes.

During the early years of the 21st century, a strategic partnership established trust and broadened economic ties between the two major economies. There's nothing preventing that era from returning, yet it depends on how quickly the U.S. tosses away its decades-old dichotomy, brings stability to the China-U.S. relations and focuses on much grander global economic, health and security challenges.
*This is my opinion piece that originally appeared at "China Global Television Network (CGTN)":

June 1, 2022

Biden's IPEF and Indo-Pacific strategy heading toward failure

By: Azhar Azam

At the White House, U.S. President Joe Biden hoped to kick-start a "new era of partnership" during a two-day summit with representatives of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In largely a symbolic event, he promised to spend a minuscule $150 million on the region's infrastructure, security, pandemic preparedness and other efforts to demonstrate his commitment to the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific.

Yet all the commitments Biden made pale in comparison to China, which pledged $1.5 billion in November 2021 alone to Southeast Asian states in development assistance over three years to fight the pandemic and revive the economy. Washington craves to up the ante in the region with an eye on Beijing. However, ever-deepening China-ASEAN ties preclude any attempt to sunder the close partners.

Sensing the bloc's ambivalence toward supporting its ulterior motives in the region and its readiness to resolve all disputes peacefully, the U.S. isn't asking the regional states to make a choice between China and the United States. It's rather forced to limit itself, at least diplomatically in a Joint Vision Statement with ASEAN, to the benefits of peace, stability and prosperity in the South China Sea.

The grouping was created in some of the darkest days of the Cold War. ASEAN, of course, won't like to enmesh the region in the "America's great power competition" against China or play a frontline role in a kind of rivalry that led to its formation.

As a result, Washington emphasizes economic engagement with Southeast Asia to seek a greater influence in the Asia Pacific through Build Back Better World and region-specific Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), neither of which has materialized so far.

But there's a problem too. The Southeast Asian leaders were frustrated by Donald Trump's withdrawal from the regional trade pact in 2017, and the Biden administration's continued vacillation on expanding economic cooperation has not helped. For instance, visiting Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakoob voiced ASEAN's dissatisfaction with Washington, demanding that the U.S. "adopt a more active trade and investment agenda." The IPEF could be the one. However, it doesn't offer the increased market access to Southeast Asian countries that they feel is crucial for promoting bilateral economic relations with the United States.

Under Biden, the U.S. has become more assertive in imposing its democratic model on other states, criticizing them for alleged human rights violations. The event is being dulled by voices that question the administration's defiance of "worsening human rights environment and democratic backsliding" and "deterioration of democratic institutions" in almost every ASEAN state in the name of forging alliances against China.


Experts believe Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy is a thinly veiled effort to counter China in the region. They maintain similar views on the four-nation alliance, the Quad, comprising Australia, Japan, India and the United States. The most recent AUKUS pact comprising Australia, the U.S. and the UK is no different and intends to destabilize the regional peace and economy.

For the same reason, ASEAN leaders are apprehensive about endorsing either clique and have expressed strong reservations about the trilateral coalition on the regional security landscape.

As Washington looks to implement its new, turbulent Indo-Pacific strategy, the bloc is urged to sidestep any security partnership with the U.S. and focus on economic cooperation. Such was the case when Biden took the opportunity to align the member states on a China-centric strategy, and he likely faced skepticism.

An ASEAN chair press statement had already reaffirmed that the special summit would reiterate upholding "centrality and unity through the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms" and fostering trust in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

The U.S. has "quite clearly" understood that any initiative directed against China will face "difficulty in gaining altitude" in Asia. It now aims to use the vague IPEF as an economic tool to mount pressure on ASEAN and blunt its enthusiasm for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). During the summit, Biden could have explained his IPEF vision to the Southeast Asian leaders, and they would be very watchful of entrapping themselves in the novel U.S. snare.

With RCEP coming into force on January 1 this year, nervousness and urgency have dramatically crept into the White House. The largest free trade pact, according to the World Bank, it covers about one-third of global GDP and FDI inflows and accounts for over a quarter of the global trade in goods and services.

The manifestation of the region's resolve – to open up markets, brace economic integration and support an open, free, fair, inclusive and rules-based multilateral trading system for quick post-pandemic recovery – makes the treaty invaluable for its 15 member states and almost a third of humanity or 2.3 billion people.

2022 is still in infancy, and RCEP has already made a splash in China-ASEAN trade. In the first four months, the grouping continues to be Beijing's largest trading partner, with a total of $274.5 billion at an increase of 7.2 percent year-over-year. The data signals the injection of more vitality and the release of more dividends to the bilateral trade in the future. It also positions the Asia-Pacific region as a new hub for global commerce, as total trade is expected to surge by $42 billion.

Initiatives such as the RCEP and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are not antithetical to the internationalization of trade and development. They are expected to accelerate intra-Asian integration. Studies show that RCEP, through trade liberalization, regional investment and the digital economy, could be instrumental in aiding the region's post-pandemic economic bounceback. Meanwhile, the BRI "significantly increases bilateral trade flows between the BRI countries.”

The U.S. sees ASEAN and Southeast Asia as central to the regional architecture, but it also wants to explore opportunities for the Quad to work with them. That will be another point of divergence between the two and would upset the regional countries because it opens the way for economic degeneration, confrontation and instability across the Asia-Pacific.

Biden might announce the launch of the IPEF during his trip to Japan and South Korea. Tokyo perceives that the framework will undermine the Japan-led Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

As the potential failure of the initiative risks the success of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and warns about America's return to "military and security heft" to shore up regional influence, countries across the expanse should ramp up engagement and coordination to thwart the looming threats to the economy, peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific emanating from the U.S.
*This is my opinion piece that originally appeared at "China Global Television Network (CGTN)":