Last week, the defense and foreign ministers of India and the United States signed a new pact – Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) – on the sidelines of the 2+2 dialogue.
Washington describes COMCASA as one of the three routine foundational agreements which it has signed with a number of its allies to facilitate the interoperability between the respective militaries.
Through COMCASA, India will get an access to a more secure communication network system – Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) – which would allow its marine and aerial platforms to get real time location of hostile naval assets deployment in Indo-pacific region.
The bilateral accord has previously been postponed twice after the Trump administration had refused to give India any preferential treatment in its tariff row against various countries. Both the countries also have differences on market access and intellectual property also.
COMCASA is being deliberated as a milestone gait in Indo-US relations but at the same time, it is subject to criticism to many diplomats and experts in India and abroad.
Although it would provide India with the contemporary military information and communication equipment but India remains concerned about revelation of its military assets to Pakistan or other countries, since Washington could monitor Indian communications in operations.
Over the past few years, India has been ambitiously embracing the United States to abate Beijing and Islamabad and to strengthen its ‘unnatural bonds’ with Kabul, without weathering any detriments to its economic, strategic, and trade interests.
The United States apparently has been very supportive in helping India to achieve its strategic goals nevertheless, is seeking some ‘paybacks’ in return while is disinclined to give any waiver to India either on Iran or Russia.
For the past few months, it has been pursuing India to kneel down to its new federal law – Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) – which maps to impose sanctions including two of the Indian closest allies, Iran and Russia.
After Trump pulled out from P5+1 nuclear deal – Joint Comprehensive Plan on Action (JCPoA) – with Iran, the United States has obligated India to reduce oil imports from Iran down to zero by November 4; otherwise it could be exposed to sanctions.
At the conclusion of 2+2 dialogue with India the US foreign secretary Mike Pompeo emphasized that we have told Indians consistently that on November 4, the sanctions on Iranian crude oil will be enforced…or sanctions will be imposed.
Iranian oil is ideally priced for India and it supplements credit provisions too. India is Iran’s second-largest export market however on the back of these US sanctions, Iranian oil import by Indian companies have fallen by about one-third for the last month.
The CAASTA would also impede Indian durable strategic interests in Iran’s Chabahar port since the United States is not willing to give any concession to India on this crucial Indian $500 million strategic investment.
Chabahar has a potential to provide India a new trade link to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan routes but the project has been delayed over negotiations on terms between Iran and India.
India has also committed $1.6 billion for a rail-link from Chabahar to Iranian city, Zahedan.
If India fails to get a US waiver for Chabahar port, it would have to sip a more forceful blow to its Afghanistan-China-Pakistan strategic campaigns. And if it flouts the US federal law, it would risk its emergent relations with the United States.
Under CAATSA, any country that is involved in significant transaction with Russia or its intelligence and defense sectors can be imposed five or more of sanctions, described in section 235 of the Act, by the President of the US.
So, the implementation of CAATSA could also jeopardize India’s purchase of S-400 air missile defense systems from Russia. As more than 60% of Indian military equipment is Russian supplied, any sanctions on Russia could terribly affect Indian national security.
The United States is also recapping India the trade surplus, it has been relishing for years. For the last four years, the United States sustained trade deficit of $23.9 billion, $23.4 billion, $24.4 billion, and $22.9 billion with India.
The Trump administration is compelling India to curtail this trade deficit by supplying its oil, gas, and military equipment.
Trump administration has also accused India’s ‘trade-distorting policy’ of providing massive subsidies to its rice and wheat farmers. ‘Every rice or wheat producing country should be concerned about the trade effects of India’s distorting domestic support’, a USTR official told Congress.
So, the US is using its conventional tool of ‘carrot and stick’ policy for India as well where initially it used more carrots to allure India and now gradually mixing some ‘sticks’ to terrify India.
The United States will carry on this policy to gain from massive Indian market and to reinforce India as its proxy against China and Pakistan’s substitute in Afghanistan, so the volume of ‘carrots’ will invariably be more than ‘sticks’.
On the other hand, India is neatly tugged into a place by the US where neither it can annoy America nor can it backtrack to its old allies.
It can neither completely end its reliance on Iranian oil nor can it surrender its strategic interests at Chabahar port. Similarly neither it can abruptly replace its Russian military stockpile nor can it completely end its long-term defense ties with Russia.
As a result, India is caught up between its new – the United States – and old allies – Iran and Russia.