The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) acts as principal advisor to the President of the United States, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council on intelligence affairs, related to national security.
DNI, with the advice and consent of the Senate, is directly appointed by the President – who works closely with the President and the Senate nominated Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence to protect US national security interests.
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is one of the ODNI’s six centers, which functions as the US intelligence community (IC)’s center for long-term strategic analysis. It draws National Intelligence officers from government, academia, and the private sector.
Every four year since 1997, the National Intelligence Council is publishing an unclassified strategic assessment – Global Trends (GT) – of how key trends and uncertainties might shape the world over the next 15-20 years.
‘GLOBAL TRENDS 2015’ – RELEASED IN DECEMBER 2000
In its December 2000's report ‘Global Trends 2015’, the NIC forecasted that Pakistan will be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on international financial assistance by 2015.
(Regional Trends – South Asia; p. 64)
The connivers of the mission determined that Pakistan will not recover from the decades-stretched political and economic mismanagement, disruptive politics, lawlessness, corruption, and ethnic friction.
Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesive of the military – once Pakistan’s most capable institution.
The connivers of the mission determined that Pakistan will not recover from the decades-stretched political and economic mismanagement, disruptive politics, lawlessness, corruption, and ethnic friction.
Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesive of the military – once Pakistan’s most capable institution.
In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government’s control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.
(Pakistan in 2015; p. 66)
Developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan will threaten regional stability.
(Regional Trends – Central Asia; p. 69)
MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE: 2020 PROJECT – RELEASED IN DECEMBER 2004
The next NIC’s ‘Mapping the Global Future-2020 Project’ anticipated that a Shia-dominated Iraq is likely to encourage activism by Shia minorities in other Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
(Radical Islam; p. 82)
With advances in the design of simplified nuclear weapons, terrorists will continue to seek to acquire fissile material in order to construct a nuclear weapon. Concurrently, they can be expected to continue attempting to purchase or steal a weapon, particularly in Russia or Pakistan.
Given the possibility that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, the use of such weapons by extremists before 2020 cannot be ruled out.
(Weapons, Tactics, and Targets; p.95)
India and Pakistan appear to understand the likely prices to be paid by triggering a conflict. But nationalistic feelings run high and are not likely to abate.
Under plausible scenarios Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to counter success by the larger Indian conventional forces, particularly given Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth.
(Rising Powers: Tinder for Conflict; p. 98)
GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD – RELEASED IN NOVEMBER 2008
The succeeding NIC’s ‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World’ assumed that the developing countries have been hurt; several, such as Pakistan with its large current account deficit, are at considerable risk.
(Globalization at Risk with the 2008 Financial Crisis? p.10)
Pivotal yet problem-beset countries, such as Pakistan, will be at risk of state failure.
(The Geopolitics of Energy; p. 45)
Even as some states may liberalize, others may fail: youth bulges, deeply rooted conflicts, and limited economic prospects are likely to keep Palestine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others in the high-risk category.
(Middle East/North Africa: Economics Drives Change, but Major Risk of Turmoil; p. 64, 65)
Developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan will critically affect regional stability, if not the global order. In 2025, Afghanistan may still evince significant patterns of tribal interaction and conflict.
With the exception of the Taliban interlude, Afghanistan has not experienced strong central authority; centrifugal forces are likely to remain strong even if Kabul increases its sway.
The future of Pakistan is a wildcard in considering the trajectory of the neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and tribal areas probably will continue to be poorly governed and the source or supporter of cross-border instability.
If Pakistan is unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line, maximizing Pashtun space at the expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan.
Alternatively, the Taliban and other Islamist activists might prove able to overawe at least some tribal politics.
Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen due to youth bulges and weak economic underpinnings.
(End of Ideology? p. 73)
Societies most hostile to the United States are found in the Islamic Middle East, as well as Pakistan and North Africa. India is an important exception.
(Near East/South Asia; p. 95)
GLOBAL TREND 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS – RELEASED IN DECEMBER 2012
The report ‘Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds’ said that a number of our interlocutors believe that Iran will stop short of developing a nuclear weapon – but will retain the ability to develop such a weapon.
In this scenario, a breakdown of the nonproliferation system would be inevitable, with Saudi Arabia obtaining nuclear weapons or capabilities from Pakistan.
(Game-Changers; The Middle East: At A Tipping Point; p. 75)
Like the Middle East, South Asia including Pakistan and Afghanistan, faces a series of internal and external shocks during next 15-20 years.
Afghanistan could become the focus of future Indian-Pakistani competition, particularly after the drawdown of US NATO forces post-2014, each country to deny other the strategic advantage in the region.
(Game-Changers; South Asia: Shocks on the Horizon; p. 78)
Over several decades, Pakistan would grow into a relatively stable economy, no longer requiring foreign assistance and IMF tutelage.
In an Islamistan scenario, the influence of radical Islamists in Pakistan and Taliban in Afghanistan would grow. In Pakistan, a weak government would continue to lose ground over the next decade.
A symbiotic relationship would deepen between the military and the Islamists. As Pakistan became Islamicized, the army would become more sympathetic to the Islamic cause.
Consequently, the military would likely cede control of territory to Islamist insurgents and would be more willing to engage in negotiations with these Islamists.
(Game-Changers; South Asia: Shocks on the Horizon; p. 79)
India worries a lot about its influence in Central Asia. A recent Taliban coup occurred in which all the other factions – which had formed the government – were brutally suppressed. India, which blames Pakistan, sought Western help but was largely rebuffed.
(WORLDCORP Strategic Vision Group; p. 115)
GLOBAL TRENDS: PARADOX OF PROGRESS (2035) – RELEASED IN JANUARY 2017
The last of NIC publication ‘Global Trends: Paradox of Progress’ stated that governance shortfalls will drive threat perceptions and insecurity in countries such as Pakistan and North Korea.
(Near Future: Tensions Are Rising; p. 31)
Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region’s fragile communal relations.
The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates—as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the region.
Militant Christianity and Islam in central Africa, militant Buddhism in Burma, and violent Hindutva in India will all continue to fuel terror and conflict.
At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean during the next two decades.
(South Asia; p. 41, 42)
NIC goes on to predict an Indo-Pakistan war in 2028 saying more importantly, however, the Indo-Pakistani war of 2028 reminded all the major powers of the dangerous game we were playing.
(Orbits; p. 56)
South Asia also will face continuing challenges from political turmoil—particularly Pakistan’s struggle to maintain stability—as well as violent extremism, sectarian divisions, governance shortfalls, terrorism, identity politics, mounting environmental concerns, weak health systems, gender inequality, and demographic pressures.
Geopolitically, the region’s greatest hope is India’s ability to use its economic and human potential to drive regional trade and development.
At the same time, Afghanistan’s uncertain prospects, extremism and violence in Pakistan, and the ever-present risk of war between India and Pakistan probably represent the greatest challenge to unlocking the region’s potential.
The threat of terrorism from groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and al-Qa`ida and its affiliates—as well as ISIL expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain key drivers of insecurity in the region.
(South Asia; p. 103)
Moreover, Pakistan, unable to match India’s economic prowess, will seek other methods to maintain even a semblance of balance.
It will seek to maintain a diverse set of foreign partners, from which it can draw economic and security assistance, and to develop a credible nuclear deterrent by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including “battlefield” nuclear weapons and sea-based options.
In its efforts to curtail militancy, Islamabad will also face multiple internal security threats, as well as a gradual degradation of equipment used in these operations, declining financial resources, and a debate over changes needed to reduce the space for extremism.
While violent extremism is unlikely to present an existential threat to Pakistan during this period, it will have negative implications for regional stability.
(South Asia; p. 104)
India is projected to surpass Indonesia as having the world’s largest Muslim population in 2050, raising questions about stability in the face of sectarian mistrust.
India’s largest political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, increasingly is leading the government to incorporate Hindutva into policy, sparking increased tension in the current sizable Muslim minority as well as with Muslim-majority Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Climate change could lead to a faster-than-expected melting of the glaciers in the Pamir Knot, which feed the northern rivers of Pakistan and India.
Tropical storm surges on top of even a modest sea level rise could reduce the already-sparse landmass of Bangladesh, spoiling freshwater resources and pushing people into India and Burma, exacerbating ethnic and regional conflicts.
(South Asia; p. 105)
Pakistan has introduced short-range, “battlefield” nuclear weapons that it has threatened to use against Indian conventional incursions, which lower the threshold for nuclear use.
(How People Fight…; p. 219)
Developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan will threaten regional stability.
(Regional Trends – Central Asia; p. 69)
MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE: 2020 PROJECT – RELEASED IN DECEMBER 2004
The next NIC’s ‘Mapping the Global Future-2020 Project’ anticipated that a Shia-dominated Iraq is likely to encourage activism by Shia minorities in other Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
(Radical Islam; p. 82)
With advances in the design of simplified nuclear weapons, terrorists will continue to seek to acquire fissile material in order to construct a nuclear weapon. Concurrently, they can be expected to continue attempting to purchase or steal a weapon, particularly in Russia or Pakistan.
Given the possibility that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, the use of such weapons by extremists before 2020 cannot be ruled out.
(Weapons, Tactics, and Targets; p.95)
India and Pakistan appear to understand the likely prices to be paid by triggering a conflict. But nationalistic feelings run high and are not likely to abate.
Under plausible scenarios Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to counter success by the larger Indian conventional forces, particularly given Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth.
(Rising Powers: Tinder for Conflict; p. 98)
GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD – RELEASED IN NOVEMBER 2008
The succeeding NIC’s ‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World’ assumed that the developing countries have been hurt; several, such as Pakistan with its large current account deficit, are at considerable risk.
(Globalization at Risk with the 2008 Financial Crisis? p.10)
Pivotal yet problem-beset countries, such as Pakistan, will be at risk of state failure.
(The Geopolitics of Energy; p. 45)
Even as some states may liberalize, others may fail: youth bulges, deeply rooted conflicts, and limited economic prospects are likely to keep Palestine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others in the high-risk category.
(Middle East/North Africa: Economics Drives Change, but Major Risk of Turmoil; p. 64, 65)
Developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan will critically affect regional stability, if not the global order. In 2025, Afghanistan may still evince significant patterns of tribal interaction and conflict.
With the exception of the Taliban interlude, Afghanistan has not experienced strong central authority; centrifugal forces are likely to remain strong even if Kabul increases its sway.
The future of Pakistan is a wildcard in considering the trajectory of the neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and tribal areas probably will continue to be poorly governed and the source or supporter of cross-border instability.
If Pakistan is unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line, maximizing Pashtun space at the expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan.
Alternatively, the Taliban and other Islamist activists might prove able to overawe at least some tribal politics.
Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen due to youth bulges and weak economic underpinnings.
(End of Ideology? p. 73)
Societies most hostile to the United States are found in the Islamic Middle East, as well as Pakistan and North Africa. India is an important exception.
(Near East/South Asia; p. 95)
GLOBAL TREND 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS – RELEASED IN DECEMBER 2012
The report ‘Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds’ said that a number of our interlocutors believe that Iran will stop short of developing a nuclear weapon – but will retain the ability to develop such a weapon.
In this scenario, a breakdown of the nonproliferation system would be inevitable, with Saudi Arabia obtaining nuclear weapons or capabilities from Pakistan.
(Game-Changers; The Middle East: At A Tipping Point; p. 75)
Like the Middle East, South Asia including Pakistan and Afghanistan, faces a series of internal and external shocks during next 15-20 years.
Afghanistan could become the focus of future Indian-Pakistani competition, particularly after the drawdown of US NATO forces post-2014, each country to deny other the strategic advantage in the region.
(Game-Changers; South Asia: Shocks on the Horizon; p. 78)
Over several decades, Pakistan would grow into a relatively stable economy, no longer requiring foreign assistance and IMF tutelage.
In an Islamistan scenario, the influence of radical Islamists in Pakistan and Taliban in Afghanistan would grow. In Pakistan, a weak government would continue to lose ground over the next decade.
A symbiotic relationship would deepen between the military and the Islamists. As Pakistan became Islamicized, the army would become more sympathetic to the Islamic cause.
Consequently, the military would likely cede control of territory to Islamist insurgents and would be more willing to engage in negotiations with these Islamists.
(Game-Changers; South Asia: Shocks on the Horizon; p. 79)
India worries a lot about its influence in Central Asia. A recent Taliban coup occurred in which all the other factions – which had formed the government – were brutally suppressed. India, which blames Pakistan, sought Western help but was largely rebuffed.
(WORLDCORP Strategic Vision Group; p. 115)
GLOBAL TRENDS: PARADOX OF PROGRESS (2035) – RELEASED IN JANUARY 2017
The last of NIC publication ‘Global Trends: Paradox of Progress’ stated that governance shortfalls will drive threat perceptions and insecurity in countries such as Pakistan and North Korea.
(Near Future: Tensions Are Rising; p. 31)
Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region’s fragile communal relations.
The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates—as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the region.
Militant Christianity and Islam in central Africa, militant Buddhism in Burma, and violent Hindutva in India will all continue to fuel terror and conflict.
At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean during the next two decades.
(South Asia; p. 41, 42)
NIC goes on to predict an Indo-Pakistan war in 2028 saying more importantly, however, the Indo-Pakistani war of 2028 reminded all the major powers of the dangerous game we were playing.
(Orbits; p. 56)
South Asia also will face continuing challenges from political turmoil—particularly Pakistan’s struggle to maintain stability—as well as violent extremism, sectarian divisions, governance shortfalls, terrorism, identity politics, mounting environmental concerns, weak health systems, gender inequality, and demographic pressures.
Geopolitically, the region’s greatest hope is India’s ability to use its economic and human potential to drive regional trade and development.
At the same time, Afghanistan’s uncertain prospects, extremism and violence in Pakistan, and the ever-present risk of war between India and Pakistan probably represent the greatest challenge to unlocking the region’s potential.
The threat of terrorism from groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and al-Qa`ida and its affiliates—as well as ISIL expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain key drivers of insecurity in the region.
(South Asia; p. 103)
Moreover, Pakistan, unable to match India’s economic prowess, will seek other methods to maintain even a semblance of balance.
It will seek to maintain a diverse set of foreign partners, from which it can draw economic and security assistance, and to develop a credible nuclear deterrent by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including “battlefield” nuclear weapons and sea-based options.
In its efforts to curtail militancy, Islamabad will also face multiple internal security threats, as well as a gradual degradation of equipment used in these operations, declining financial resources, and a debate over changes needed to reduce the space for extremism.
While violent extremism is unlikely to present an existential threat to Pakistan during this period, it will have negative implications for regional stability.
(South Asia; p. 104)
India is projected to surpass Indonesia as having the world’s largest Muslim population in 2050, raising questions about stability in the face of sectarian mistrust.
India’s largest political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, increasingly is leading the government to incorporate Hindutva into policy, sparking increased tension in the current sizable Muslim minority as well as with Muslim-majority Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Climate change could lead to a faster-than-expected melting of the glaciers in the Pamir Knot, which feed the northern rivers of Pakistan and India.
Tropical storm surges on top of even a modest sea level rise could reduce the already-sparse landmass of Bangladesh, spoiling freshwater resources and pushing people into India and Burma, exacerbating ethnic and regional conflicts.
(South Asia; p. 105)
Pakistan has introduced short-range, “battlefield” nuclear weapons that it has threatened to use against Indian conventional incursions, which lower the threshold for nuclear use.
(How People Fight…; p. 219)