Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) maintained warm economic, cultural and political ties until relations descended into deep animosity in 2010s over Ankara’s support for Arab Spring and Muslim Brotherhood’s government in Cairo. Turkey backed the Islamist organization while Saudi Arabia and UAE opposed its rule.
Broad approval of a Pan-Islamic, religious movement in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria was perceived a threat to the dynastic rule in Saudi Arabia and UAE. Qatar, another hereditary state endorsed Mohamed Morsi before he was overthrown by Egyptian army in 2013 and died during a trial over charges of espionage in 2019.
Notwithstanding differences on Brotherhood – US, through one of the costliest CIA covert programs Timber Sycamore in Syria, managed to align regional rivals in 2013 and started to deliver lethal assistance to 50 vetted opposition factions. The operation – staffed by representatives from America, France, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and UAE – conked out as patrons supported their favored groups. Resultantly, US policy in Syria failed and many CIA-supplied weapons ended up in the hands of al Qaeda.
Qatar diplomatic crisis, Jamal Khashoggi killing, competition for influence in Sudan and exchange of accusations to undermine the Palestinian cause deteriorated Saudi-Turkish relationship further. Each of them wanted to lead the Muslim world; Ankara pursuit of irredentist, Neo-Ottoman ideology across Mideast, Africa, Eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus widened the trust deficit.
Nevertheless, Turkey and Saudi Arabia managed to find consensus on Syria where they backed opposition forces. In March 2015, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan supported the Saudi-led mission in Yemen and slammed Iran for trying to dominate the region by following a sectarian agenda and backing Houthi rebels, demanding Tehran to withdraw forces from Yemen, Syria and Iraq.
There are speculations Ankara still can intervene in Sana’a over requests to jump into the fray from Al-Islah Party, the Yemeni affiliate of Brotherhood that ostensibly played an important role to cool tensions between Saudi Arabia and Turkey and whose cooperation in the conflict Abu Dhabi has long opposed.
In December 2017, Ankara-Abu Dhabi ties plunged to a new low after Erdogan, without naming UAE foreign minister, chided him as an “impudent” nouveau riche after he shared a tweet, denunciating Ottoman leader Fakhreddin Pasha of stealing money and manuscripts from Medina in 1916. In turn, Abu Dhabi stressed the Arab world “will not be led by Tehran or Ankara.”
Egypt, UAE and Turkey have been at odds on multiple fronts in Mideast and Horn of Africa. Last year, bickering turned into fierce diplomatic spat once Abu Dhabi indicted Ankara for interference in Libya and Turkey claimed UAE was assisting al-Shabab militants in Somalia, bringing “chaos” through intervention in Tripoli and Sana’a and alongside Egypt, “trying to destabilize the whole region.”
Erdogan, who threatened to suspend diplomatic relations with the Emirates on normalizing relations with Israel, himself seems to toe the UAE line as he recently agreed to minimize “differences of opinion” with Tel Aviv in a phone talk with his Israeli counterpart Isaac Herzog and emphasized a “mutually beneficial” relationship.
America's consistent deprioritization, reduced engagement and phased pullback from the greater Middle East that started under Obama, adopted by Trump and is being followed by Biden to shift focus on a theater of strategic importance, Asia-Pacific, propelled countries for a wider regional rapprochement.
Qatar blockade by the Arab quartet (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt), demanding Doha downgrade diplomatic ties with Tehran and close a Turkish military base on Qatari soil, was withdrawn and diplomatic relations were restored in January. After lifting the embargo, Abu Dhabi said it didn’t “cherish any feuds” and expressed willingness to bury the hatchet with Ankara.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu gave an affirmative response, adding first contacts between Ankara and Cairo had been restored since two regional powers sparred and broke off in 2013. Tensions eased between Egypt and Turkey once Turkish government forbade three Brotherhood-linked TV channels in the country from airing criticism against Cairo.
In a glaring move, Erdogan bypassed diplomatic protocol and personally received UAE National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayedon August 18. The “historical and positive” meeting, focused on cooperation and economic partnership, was a carpe diem moment for Ankara that helped an increasingly isolated Turkey to recalibrate relations with the Emirates, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and launch a charm offensive to curry favor with Abu Dhabi for “serious” investments.
A rare phone call between Erdogan UAE de facto ruler Mohammed bin Zayed on August 31 further opened up the way for new wider regional reconciliation. Abu Dhabi profited from détente too since it has been seeking to shore up Middle East collaboration under Washington’s steady withdrawal from region.
The cost of bitter Turkey-UAE rivalry – which fueled conflict in Libya, tested their relations on Brotherhood and their allies in Syria and Tunisia and pushed to vie for influence in Somalia – is particularly high for Ankara where stubbornly high inflation has reached 19% and central bank is forced to sell $128 billion forex reserves to support the free-falling lira.
Establishment of a $10 billion fund by UAE in Turkey and cooperation agreements between two countries would shift trend from conflicts to economic issues. The pivot to economy and possible swap deals should support lira, shed 45% this year, and set tone for other countries to follow and contribute to region’s stability and growth.
UAE has been trying to cap rivalries with both Turkey and Iran as the Gulf state hones in on a post-pandemic economy after America's retreat from Afghanistan “definitely” provided a “very worrying test” about the opaque US commitment and described Washington’s snotty attitude to abandon allies and leave a “vacuum” in the region for trouble.
After Abu Dhabi said it would take steps to de-escalate tensions with Tehran, bilateral rifts took a backseat during Iranian officials’ visit to UAE as two sides agreed to work for regional stability and prosperity. In a latest diplomatic overture, UAE top diplomat reached Damascus and threw trust behind Syrian strongman, Bashar al-Assad.
Meanwhile, Erdogan is keen to enhance ties with Saudi Arabia and make use of the “close cooperation” for regional peace, stability and prosperity. Albeit expressing strong reservations about resumption of talks on the Iran nuclear deal, Riyadh intends to continue negotiations with Tehran.
Washington’s allies in Arabian Peninsula have voiced their “angst” to the Biden administration on US declining commitment to the region. US president’s snub to greater Middle East at the “Summit for Democracy” further establishes his lagging interest in the Middle East and would accelerate this novel, localized framework of cooperation and broader regional rapprochement.
*This is one of my opinion pieces (unedited) that first appeared in "The Express Tribune":