By: Azhar Azam
*The edited version of this article first appeared in "Daily Times":
https://dailytimes.com.pk/430110/the-us-turkish-row-isnt-all-about-s-400/
Turkey and the United States are still in discussions for setting up a free zone along the Turkish-Syrian border, the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL James Jeffery reiterated his erstwhile statement in Cairo and in an interview to a Turkish daily Hürriyet last month.
Ambassador Jeffery has been talking with Turkey about establishing a “free of YPG (People’s Protection Units)” buffer zone in northeastern Syria. The Kurdish-led YPG is the major military faction of SDF that Ankara considers an offshoot of the outlawed and terrorist-declared Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. SDF now controls larger area of northern Syria – known as Rojawa – which Turkey fears of becoming a “terrorist corridor” for Kurds to destabilize Turkey.
The United States believes that Turkish security concerns are legitimate, given the SDF’s “traditional and political ties” with PKK but asserts that it would stand by the SDF and would not want anyone to mishandle its coalition partners against ISIS. In addition, Washington does not support Kurdish independence from Syria either and envisions their future as part of “a democratic, peaceful government” in Damascus.
Clearly, Washington is trying to align both SDF and Turkey simultaneously in order to counter ISIS and it is also exploiting the Kurd-Turkish conflict to achieve its wider strategic objectives in the region. Another key US national goal is to prevent Ankara from buying S-400 missile defense system from Moscow.
In its broader regional strategy, the United States is making sure that the Kurdish militant forces continue to remain deterrent to alleged Turkish ambitions to expand its regional influence at the same time; the US is exerting all efforts that Ankara does not unequivocally go into the clique of American adversaries.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is twigging the American secretive script ingeniously and dubs the plan as US effort to overthrow his regime by arming the Kurdish militias in Syria. “Do you know what the only target of these in Turkey? Their only concern is ‘How we can topple the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) from power?’, but they won’t be able to”, Erdoğan said in his speech on June 12.
A Turkish security official, who chose to remain anonymous, told Bloomberg that Ankara wants the United States to push the YPG fighters 30-40 kilometers away from its southern border, take back heavy weapons from Syrian Kurds, and place the safe zone under Turkish control.
While speaking at the Middle East Institute last week, the former ambassador to Turkey James Jeffery said that the United States, Turkey, and the SDF had “a general agreement in principle on the pullback (of the Kurdish forces) and on the safe zone” but termed return of US-provide weapons from SDF a sticking point to clinch the deal.
In December too, following a marathon telephonic conversation between President Tayyip Erdoğan and the US President Donald Trump, the Syrian Kurds were traumatized by the Trump’s surprise announcement of complete US troop withdrawal from Syria and handing over their future to Ankara.
But propitiously for Syrian Kurds, Turkish consistent denials to desert the S-400 missile defense systems purchase from Russia strained the Turkish-US bilateral relations and forced Trump to backtrack from his prior decision of entire US troop retraction.
Latter in January, livid Trump had warned to devastate Turkey economically if they hit Kurd. Washington has also been flapping to impose sanctions on Ankara through Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and blocking the delivery of F-35 aircraft to pile up pressure in Ankara over withdrawal of S-400 indenture.
However the concurrent Turkish ministerial visits had somewhat defrosted the escalating diplomatic spat between the two NTO allies as DOD spokesperson Charles Summers dubbed Turkey a “valuable NATO ally” and “a longtime ally”. But the most critical note of his off-camera briefing was that the United States is “in active discussions with them (Turkish officials) to get beyond the issue of the S-400”.
Summers comments were distinctly an indication of that the diplomatic row between Turkey and the United States isn’t all about S-400. Including Kurdish issue on Turkish border, there are several other clashes that impede the bilateral relations between the two to burgeon.
Although Turkey stopped buying Iranian oil after US sanctions waiver ended on May 1 but the countries sustain close bilateral relations. So, Ankara surely would not welcome any US military aggression on Tehran and would respond strongly, at least diplomatically.
Both Tehran and Ankara has deep ties with Moscow too whereas European Union isn’t jovial either about Trump’s trade war and the US unilateral retraction from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran nuclear deal. Therefore, Turkey and European Union might re-converge, functioning as a diplomatic wall in a potential US-Iran standoff.
Palpably, the United States would never Turkey a free hand exterminate the Kurdish forces, which it has invested upon both economically and militarily for such a long period but it cannot afford to lose its NATO ally too. Hence, it would chart a twofold strategy to supporting Syrian Kurds and press-ganging Ankara to acquiesce to Washington.
*The edited version of this article first appeared in "Daily Times":
https://dailytimes.com.pk/430110/the-us-turkish-row-isnt-all-about-s-400/
Turkey and the United States are still in discussions for setting up a free zone along the Turkish-Syrian border, the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL James Jeffery reiterated his erstwhile statement in Cairo and in an interview to a Turkish daily Hürriyet last month.
Ambassador Jeffery has been talking with Turkey about establishing a “free of YPG (People’s Protection Units)” buffer zone in northeastern Syria. The Kurdish-led YPG is the major military faction of SDF that Ankara considers an offshoot of the outlawed and terrorist-declared Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. SDF now controls larger area of northern Syria – known as Rojawa – which Turkey fears of becoming a “terrorist corridor” for Kurds to destabilize Turkey.
The United States believes that Turkish security concerns are legitimate, given the SDF’s “traditional and political ties” with PKK but asserts that it would stand by the SDF and would not want anyone to mishandle its coalition partners against ISIS. In addition, Washington does not support Kurdish independence from Syria either and envisions their future as part of “a democratic, peaceful government” in Damascus.
Clearly, Washington is trying to align both SDF and Turkey simultaneously in order to counter ISIS and it is also exploiting the Kurd-Turkish conflict to achieve its wider strategic objectives in the region. Another key US national goal is to prevent Ankara from buying S-400 missile defense system from Moscow.
In its broader regional strategy, the United States is making sure that the Kurdish militant forces continue to remain deterrent to alleged Turkish ambitions to expand its regional influence at the same time; the US is exerting all efforts that Ankara does not unequivocally go into the clique of American adversaries.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is twigging the American secretive script ingeniously and dubs the plan as US effort to overthrow his regime by arming the Kurdish militias in Syria. “Do you know what the only target of these in Turkey? Their only concern is ‘How we can topple the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) from power?’, but they won’t be able to”, Erdoğan said in his speech on June 12.
A Turkish security official, who chose to remain anonymous, told Bloomberg that Ankara wants the United States to push the YPG fighters 30-40 kilometers away from its southern border, take back heavy weapons from Syrian Kurds, and place the safe zone under Turkish control.
While speaking at the Middle East Institute last week, the former ambassador to Turkey James Jeffery said that the United States, Turkey, and the SDF had “a general agreement in principle on the pullback (of the Kurdish forces) and on the safe zone” but termed return of US-provide weapons from SDF a sticking point to clinch the deal.
In December too, following a marathon telephonic conversation between President Tayyip Erdoğan and the US President Donald Trump, the Syrian Kurds were traumatized by the Trump’s surprise announcement of complete US troop withdrawal from Syria and handing over their future to Ankara.
But propitiously for Syrian Kurds, Turkish consistent denials to desert the S-400 missile defense systems purchase from Russia strained the Turkish-US bilateral relations and forced Trump to backtrack from his prior decision of entire US troop retraction.
Latter in January, livid Trump had warned to devastate Turkey economically if they hit Kurd. Washington has also been flapping to impose sanctions on Ankara through Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and blocking the delivery of F-35 aircraft to pile up pressure in Ankara over withdrawal of S-400 indenture.
However the concurrent Turkish ministerial visits had somewhat defrosted the escalating diplomatic spat between the two NTO allies as DOD spokesperson Charles Summers dubbed Turkey a “valuable NATO ally” and “a longtime ally”. But the most critical note of his off-camera briefing was that the United States is “in active discussions with them (Turkish officials) to get beyond the issue of the S-400”.
Summers comments were distinctly an indication of that the diplomatic row between Turkey and the United States isn’t all about S-400. Including Kurdish issue on Turkish border, there are several other clashes that impede the bilateral relations between the two to burgeon.
Although Turkey stopped buying Iranian oil after US sanctions waiver ended on May 1 but the countries sustain close bilateral relations. So, Ankara surely would not welcome any US military aggression on Tehran and would respond strongly, at least diplomatically.
Both Tehran and Ankara has deep ties with Moscow too whereas European Union isn’t jovial either about Trump’s trade war and the US unilateral retraction from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran nuclear deal. Therefore, Turkey and European Union might re-converge, functioning as a diplomatic wall in a potential US-Iran standoff.
Palpably, the United States would never Turkey a free hand exterminate the Kurdish forces, which it has invested upon both economically and militarily for such a long period but it cannot afford to lose its NATO ally too. Hence, it would chart a twofold strategy to supporting Syrian Kurds and press-ganging Ankara to acquiesce to Washington.